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In this thesis I explore if and how digital technologies capture human potential in terms of 
economic value, and how this shapes imaginaries, subjectivities, and forms of relationality. I 
investigate ‘digital ubiquity’ as both an epistemological and material condition, and how this is manifest 
in the discourses that theorise, narrativise, advocate and oppose digital technologies in their many 
facets. I relay these considerations to Mark Fisher’s notion of capitalist realism, and address how 
and where digital technologies - as extensions of capital - materialise capitalist realism as a 
ubiquitous force in everyday life (2009, p. 2). I consider how these dynamics influence imaginaries 
for the future, and whose politics and futures are privileged via the epistemic and material 
conditions of contemporary digital environments.  
 
The thesis is comprised, chiefly, of three critical case studies, each offering a response to various 
dynamics associated with ‘digitally ubiquity’. The first case study explores an ethnography I 
undertook at a ‘digital detox’ camp, which was a space that invited its participants to relinquish use 
of their digital devices and discussion of their professions for a four-day period. Here, I examine 
the pertinence of why a ‘detox’ from digital technology and work were encompassed with one 
another, and how the participants of the ‘digital detox’ understood digital technologies - or the 
lack thereof - to influence their behaviours, interpersonal relationships, and senses of self. The 
second case study explores prospective ‘blockchain for good’ initiatives, which are often offered 
as forms of techno-solutionism to issues surrounding financial inclusion and digital identity. I 
focus primarily upon how relationships between bodies and digitality are articulated within 
‘blockchain for good’ discourses, and how these relationships speak to specific structures of 
power: not simply in terms of an intensification of big data by Western apparatuses, but also in 
terms of the epistemological and ideological ‘erasures’ that emerge when populations are rendered 
digitally legible in this way (Vazquez, 2011). The final case study explores the discourses employed 
by a left-wing think-tank entitled Autonomy, who critique the role of work within the UK and 
pose suggestions for prospective ‘post-work’ futures. Here, I continue my considerations around 
interrelationships between work and identity formation. I further explore if and where neoliberal 
discourse is invoked within Autonomy’s work, reflecting upon how this relates to articulations of 
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The contemporary dictionary definition of the term ‘ubiquity’ is ‘the state or capacity of being 
everywhere, especially at the same time’ (Dictionary, 2020). A look at its etymology will reveal that 
- perhaps unsurprisingly - the term has theological routes. According to the bible, ‘ubiquity’ was 
first used by Martin Luther to describe the ‘omnipresence of God or Christ’ within the story of 
the Last Supper, where Jesus picked up a piece of bread and remarked ‘this is my body’ (Schaff, 
2003; Harper, 2018). There have been many interpretations of the meaning of this statement, but 
the position of Martin Luther maintained that it referred to the ‘omnipresence’ of the body of 
Christ. All things, Luther deduced, are permeable to the body of Christ, rendering his presence 
capable of passing through even the smallest of atoms. This process, however, was believed to be 
non-reciprocal. While the body of Christ was considered to be present in all things, all things were 
not present in the body of Christ; Christ was both immanent and transcendental. The relationship 
between the ‘ubiquity’ of Christ and humanity articulated here was thus hierarchical, and suggested 
that any human understanding of Christ could only ever be partial and incomplete. ‘Ubiquity’ 
understood in this way, then, was present in everything that could be encompassed in the human 
imaginary; it was material and immaterial; and it was totalising.  
 
When conjoined with the terms ‘digital’ or ‘computing’, ‘ubiquity’ usually refers to environments 
that are saturated by a prevalence of networked information technologies (Greenfield, 2006; Iansiti 
& Lakhani, 2014). Just over a decade ago, Greenfield used the term ‘everyware’ in reference to the 
‘ubiquitous information technology’ that he anticipated would appear in ‘many different contexts 
and take a wide variety of forms’, and would ‘affect almost every one of us, whether we’re aware of it 
or not’ (2006, p. 9, emphasis added). Internet-of-Things devices, cloud computing, sensor 
technologies, blockchains and biometrics are now just a few spheres that help compose these 
environments, and contribute toward the translation of space, time and bodies into machine 
readable information. It is useful to the ideas presented in this thesis, I believe, to consider what 
might become of some of ubiquity’s earlier theological connotations when transposed into 
contemporary computational contexts. Although meaning of course shifts over time, there are 
resonances between its earlier theological meanings and some of the connotations of ‘digital 
ubiquity’. The theological framing of ‘ubiquity’ suggests that: its relationship to humans is 
hierarchical; it knows humans in a way that humans cannot know it; it is both material and 
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immaterial; and it is totalising. While these connotations surrounding ‘digital ubiquity’ are not ones 
that I personally concur with, I would suggest that they indicate something pertinent about the 
contemporary moment, and how life and matter are often understood within it.  
 
When I undertake a Google search containing the words ‘digital ubiquity’ at this moment of 
writing, the most relevant results go by titles such as ‘Digital Ubiquity: how Connections, Sensors 
and Data are Revolutionising Business’, or ‘Why Companies Need to Understand Digital Ubiquity’ 
(appendix 1.1). Although - due to reasons that are likely to become clear throughout the course 
of this thesis - I rarely use Google nowadays, I had anticipated that these search results would 
either echo my own user data to some degree, would provide information that was more closely 
aligned with my personal politics, or, at least, would derive from scholarly literature of some kind. 
Whether it was because I had taken adequate care with regards to shielding my own user data from 
large corporations (unlikely); that Google’s own politics favour these search suggestions; that the 
term belongs predominantly to the tech industry; or, simply, that the search algorithm did not 
deem results outside of these vantage points to be relevant - the results mostly stem from corporate 
perspectives, and refer to relationships between digital ubiquity and economisation. The writers of 
the most frequently returned article inform their readers about how Google, Amazon Web 
Services, Salesforce and Workday are all intimately involved with the development of ‘cloud-native’ 
software that is serving to significantly improve ‘efficiencies’ within enterprise (Iansiti & Lakhani, 
2014). ‘Even Domino’s, the pizza company’, they write, ‘is building digital capabilities, mobile 
technologies, and analytics to enhance innovation and meet consumer expectations’ (ibid).  
 
While it would be entirely premature to state anything conclusive from the above discourse, it does 
offer a gateway into some of the core subject matter of this thesis. Terms such as ‘efficiency’, 
‘innovate’ and ‘consumer’ have become some of the buzzwords of neoliberal capitalism, and it is 
precisely where these politics intertwine with the material conditions of ‘digital ubiquity’ that I 
situate my focus. To state however that digital technologies are intimately entwined with, or pivotal 
to, the functioning of neoliberalism is nothing new. Mbembe, for one, directly attributes 
neoliberalism to this moment in history in which humanity falls under the domination of Silicon 
Valley and digital technologies (2017, p. 3). Digital technologies are essential to the operations of 
globalisation and finance, and help facilitate many of neoliberalism’s governmental practices 
(Foucault, 2007): namely, those pertaining to population, police, security, circulation, and political 
economy (Venn, 2009). It is these structures that have come to shape who is seen and who is not 
seen; what is legitimate and what is illegitimate; what is named and unnamed. 
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Where my interest lies, more specifically, is around neoliberal governmentality, and how it is 
established with and via digital technologies. I explore whether digital technologies capture human 
potential in terms of economic value, and how this influences forms of cognition, relationality, 
imaginaries and subjectivities. I investigate ‘digital ubiquity’ as both an epistemological and material 
condition, and how this is manifest in the discourses that theorise, narrativise, advocate and oppose 
digital technologies in their many facets. I consider how economic activity is sustained, then, not 
just through the corporate and state apparatuses that influence and govern incarnation within 
everyday life, but rather how these forms of power become outsourced, established, re-established 
and embodied via the material and epistemic structures of contemporary digital environments.   
 
There have been a whole host of terms coined to describe the ideologies that sustain economic 
activity. Two that I believe to be particularly pertinent to the ideas presented in this thesis are 
Fisher’s ‘capitalist realism’ (2009) and Boltanski and Chiapello’s ‘new spirit of capitalism’ (2005). 
For Fisher, the term ‘capitalist realism’ pertains to the imaginative constraints that he understood 
to be imposed by capital; to the overarching sense that ‘not only is capitalism the only viable 
political and economic system’, but also that alternatives to capitalism lie outside of contemporary 
imaginaries altogether (2009, p. 2). Capitalist realism thus refers to the narrowing space to even 
think outside of capital, and points toward the (almost) absolute reification of capitalistic 
understandings of the world, and ways of operating within it. Boltanski and Chiapello’s ‘new spirit 
of capitalism’ likewise pertains to the ideologies that encourage an engagement with capitalism, 
referring to the ways in which people find justifications for their actions, and the meanings that 
they ascribe to such actions, under a capitalist order (2005, p. 3). They note 
 
If, contrary to prognoses regularly heralding its collapse, capitalism has not only 
survived, but ceaselessly extended its empire, it is because it could rely on a number 
of shared representations – capable of guiding action – and justifications, which 
present it as an acceptable and even desirable order of things: the only possible 
order, or the best of all possible orders. These justifications must be based on 
arguments that are sufficiently strong to be accepted as self-evident by enough 
people to check, or overcome, the despair or nihilism which the capitalist order 
likewise constantly induces (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, p. 10) 
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While ‘neoliberalism’ is a broad term that has shifted across the course of its history1, I will loosely 
typify the contemporary neoliberal worldview here as one that distinguishes all aspects of life and 
matter in terms of market value (Hamann, 2009; Mbembe, 2017). This neoliberal order is first and 
foremost an economic order, which has evolved from a set of Eurocentric legal and political 
structures that privilege forms of dominance based on quantification and categorisation (de Santos, 
Nunes and Meneses, 2007; Mbembe, 2017). Glendinning outlines  
 
I define neoliberalism in general, then, as the outlook of a community of ideas that 
seeks the limitless extension of the norms of conduct of one domain of life to the whole of life. Its 
emancipatory claim is that it will achieve the optimal flourishing of the whole of life 
by co-ordinating and controlling it in terms dictated by the norms of that one 
domain (2015, p. 9, original emphasis) 
 
Echoing some of the thoughts already outlined by Fisher (2009) and Boltanski and Chiapello 
(2005), Read further usefully defines neoliberalism as a ‘restoration … not only of class power, of 
capitalism as the only possible economic system, [but] a restoration of capitalism as synonymous 
with rationality’ (2009, p. 32). Neoliberalism refers both then to an economic framework, geared 
toward deregulation, privatisation, and the enhanced power of the market; but also to the 
establishing of a set of social conditions that stimulate the construction of neoliberal subjects; of 
a neoliberal governmentality (Foucault, 2007; Hamann, 2009). Governmentality, as I use it in this 
thesis, refers to the ‘attempt to shape human conduct by calculated means’; to the ‘intervening in the 
delicate balance of social and economic processes no more, and no less, than is required to adjust, 
optimise, and sustain them’ (Murray Li, 2007, p. 275; Foucault, 1991; p. 93). This is distinguished 
in terms of individualism, self-interest, and a subject’s capacity for rational choice; citizens are 
established as ‘free’ and autonomous, and are encouraged to understand themselves as ‘morally 
responsible for navigating the social realm using rational choice and cost-benefit calculations 
grounded on market-based principles, to the exclusion of all other ethical values and social 
interests’ (Hamann, 2009, p. 37).  
 
‘Digital ubiquity’, meanwhile, has drastically expanded what can be encompassed within the sphere 
of economisation. Research across a series of areas has drawn attention to the operationalisation 
of hierarchy and bias via corporate and state use of big data, highlighting how such apparatuses 
are inseparably entangled with, and supported by, specific cultural knowledges and assumptions 
(Hall, 1996; Mignolo, 2000; Vazquez, 2011; Browne, 2015; Mbembe, 2017). The growth of 
                                                 
1 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to give a detailed overview of neoliberalism’s history. For more 
detailed accounts, see Foucault, 2007; Hamann, 2009; Mirowski, 2013.  
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biometrics, data wearables, and the vast architectures of surveillance that perpetuate streets, wrists 
and pockets have continued to miniaturise the means through which thought and bodily 
movement become quantified. Self-tracking movements have actively pursued ideals of self-
improvement ‘through numbers’ (spearheaded, uncoincidentally, by Wired magazine big-names 
Kevin Kelly and Gary Wolf) under the rationale that ‘real change will happen in individuals as they 
work through self-knowledge... of one’s body, mind and spirit... a rational [path]: unless something 
can be measured, it cannot be improved’ (Kelly, 2009, cited in Moore, 2018, p. 6, my emphasis). 
Such logics have expanded far beyond the spheres of self-tracking communities: ‘self-knowledge 
through numbers’ is the ideology that perpetuates the abundance of fitness and wellness apps that 
are orchestrated to ‘improve’ how we eat, drink, sleep, work, exercise, communicate, and think 
(Cederström and Spicer, 2015). These digital devices not only bind neoliberal ideology increasingly 
intimately to vast spheres of existence, but also tie individuals and populations - to growing degrees 
of precision – to unprecedented forms of corporate and state control. 
 
‘Digital ubiquity’ thus upholds multiform modes of power: it sets the terms for the movement of 
bodies in space, and provokes certain forms of thought and behaviour within such spaces. 
Securitisation, border controls, militarisation and policing set categorical limits upon the 
movement of bodies that have been immensely intensified through big data (Aradau & Blanke, 
2016). Relatedly, the accumulation of big data, made possible by digital technologies, has helped 
further the knitting together of psychology and economics, provoking new forms of behaviourism 
and governance (Jones, 2017; Bassett, 2018). Spheres such as neuroeconomics and behavioural 
economics have gained a great deal of momentum over recent years, which both claim to make 
use of ‘empirical evidence relating to brain activity’ to help explain and entice specific forms of 
economic behaviour (Wilkinson, 2008, p. 17). The human brain, within these spheres, is depicted 
and interpreted in economic and computational terms, and is measured and assessed according to 
a subject’s capacity for making ‘self-interested’ and ‘rational’ choices (Wilkinson, 2008, p. 5; Jones, 
2017). These behavioural economics models challenge ‘traditional’ economic models that 
understood the human mind purely in rational terms, and posit that subjects can be ‘nudged’ into 
making ‘optimal decisions’, should they be inclined to act ‘irrationally’ (Jones, 2017; Fireman, 
2016). 
In this regard, writers such as Thaler and Sunstein are key. They have helped bring libertarian 
paternalist notions of ‘nudge’ into public discourse, which is underscored by the notion that 
corporations and governments can encourage users to behave in certain ways, without violating 
maxims pertaining to ‘freedom of choice’ (2008). Libertarian paternalism rests on the premise that 
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‘an agent is unable to make a wholly rational decision and that she is impaired in her cognitive and 
affective capacities, and therefore must be intervened upon or administered’ (Archer, 
forthcoming). Such rhetoric asserts that ‘nudge’ does not coerce, but rather encourages users to 
make ‘better’ or more ‘rational’ choices that are more closely aligned with economic interests 
(Jones, 2017). As the writers of an article in one business-oriented computing journal contends, 
‘people have cognitive limitations, so their rationality is bounded, and heuristics and biases drive 
their decision making’ (Schneider, Weinmann, & Brocke, 2018, emphasis added). In these terms, 
those with lesser ‘cognitive limitations’ are those who are more likely to make choices that 
maximise personal benefit and minimise potential costs (Salecl, 2011). This, of course, is deeply 
embedded in the neoliberal worldview, which stresses that ‘the poor have only themselves to 
blame, because of their backwardness, underdevelopment or their inadequacies as economic 
subjects’ (Venn, 2009, p. 207).  
This ‘knitting together’ of ‘living-being and formations of capital’ (Murphy, 2017, p. 13) is not, 
however, an untrodden path. Postcolonial and de-colonial thought remind us of the long-
entrenched history of human objectification and commodification; of the translation of life into 
systems of meaning that are readable and controllable for those in power (Mignolo, 2005; Vazquez, 
2011). Mbembe notes, 
 
Historically, race has always been a more or less coded way of dividing and 
organising a multiplicity, of fixing and distributing it according to a hierarchy, of 
allocating it to more or less impermeable spaces according to a logic of enclosure. […] 
Race is what makes it possible to identify and define population groups in a way 
that makes each of them carriers of differentiated and more or less shifting risk 
(2017, p. 35) 
 
 
Here, it must be stressed that I am not equating the forms of control that are manifest in 
contemporary digital environments to those made manifest in histories of colonial violence: to do 
so would be insulting and reductive; it would overlook many of the nuances that have contributed 
toward each sphere of experience; and it would expunge earlier technologies from histories of 
colonial violence, and racist violence from technologies. Rather, what I mean here is that today’s 
digital architectures are bred out of a Eurocentric worldview that measures, categorises and divides, 
out of a set of epistemological and material structures that have privileged, and continue to 
privilege, the maintenance of social inequality and capitalist power. Contrary to long-iterated 
discourses of science and technology’s objectivity and neutrality, it must be foregrounded that, 
regardless of how seemingly seamlessly the ‘digital’ is bound to the fabric of existence, ideology 
always permeates the means and terms of what is recorded, and what is subsequently produced. 
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Having now introduced in the form of an overview some of the overarching themes that will 
feature in this body of work, I will now turn to the following section, which will detail some of the 
inspirations and thoughts that led to my writing of the thesis.  
 
How I Came to Write this Thesis 
 
1.11 Neoliberalism and ‘Epidemics’ of Anxiety 
 
During my Master’s degree, I instigated a mental health campaign, which is where I first started 
formally grappling with how surveillance architectures and commercialism interact with forms of 
political participation. The campaign was part of an attempt to generate visibility and awareness 
around the mental illness sufferers who had been, or were, struggling to attain support from the 
NHS due to funding cuts. It was during a political moment in the UK in which the Conservative 
Party had recently won the majority vote, and it seemed as though austerity politics had succeeded 
in cementing its position within the UK for the foreseeable future. I had certainly initiated the 
campaign from a very idealistic frame of mind, and as a self-orchestrated project with no financial 
backing, it largely fell flat2. What had begun to form as a result, however, was a desire to understand 
the role of digital technology within forms of social change; relationships between digital 
technology, cognition and political participation; and how these dynamics were, and are, 
intertwined with sets of broader social, cultural and political frameworks.  
 
At a similar moment in time, there was growing media rhetoric around what was - and still is - 
being described as cultural ‘epidemics’ of anxiety, depression and poor mental health (Bedell, 2016; 
Atkinson, 2018; Donnelly, 2018). I have, for a long time, felt sceptical of the ways in which mental 
health is framed and broadly understood within the West, both in terms of the 
compartmentalisation of various mental ‘disorders’, and how non-Western approaches to mental 
health treatments are discursively framed as ‘alternatives’ (see Davar, 2016, p. 14-19). With regards 
to these issues, Mark Fisher’s accounts have felt very poignant. In these he left us with the vital 
lesson that mental health is in vast need of politicisations (2009; 2014). Before taking his own life 
in 2017, he had woven his personal experiences of depression into his works Capitalist Realism: Is 
                                                 
2 The campaign invited users to submit a ‘cut out’ selfie, as part of a collaborative artwork that would 
draw attention to those affected by cuts to mental health services on the NHS. The campaign featured on 
a range of social media platforms, as well as a main website domain, and campaign posters were 
distributed around the city of Brighton in the UK.  
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There No Alternative? (2009) and Ghosts of my Life: Writings on Depression, Hauntology and Lost Futures 
(2015), where he argued that the ‘epidemics’ of mental struggle that permeate the contemporary 
moment cannot be adequately addressed or alleviated if understood as a private problem that is 
experienced by individuals. For Fisher - a perspective with which I wholeheartedly concur - the 
medicalised framework that shapes how mental health is broadly understood within the West 
abstracts causality from the experience of mental illness, and again divides vast networks of 
experience into reductive categories, paving the way for experiences of mental anguish to be seated 
within pre-existing systems of bureaucracy (Bennet, 2005). What Fisher described as the 
‘privatisation of stress’ (2009, p. 19) has felt very apt, and neatly summarises neoliberalism’s 
relationship to mental health, in terms of each: its rationalisation; its medicalisation; its 
pharmaceuticalisation; and now even its commercialisation. In Fisher’s accounts, the relatedness 
of the so-called mental health ‘epidemic’ to neoliberalism’s maxims of individualism and personal 
responsibilisation is made clear (ibid).  
 
It did not - and does not - feel coincidental then, that over the last few years we have witnessed an 
abundance of ‘wellness’ products emerge within the commercial sphere. Amidst the 
aforementioned plethora of self-tracking apps aimed at ‘self-optimisation through numbers’, the 
commercial West is now littered with colouring books, yoga classes, meditation workshops, early 
morning ‘health raves’, and a whole abundance of other wellness schemes and products, which 
each revolve, to some degree, around the self-management of one’s health. Writers such as Pearl, 
for example, offer analyses of the emergence of early morning ‘sober raves’ that have become 
increasingly commonplace within economically affluent cities (2014). While rave culture, he argues, 
can be understood as the ultimate rejection of work, breaking down the body in pursuit of 
hedonistic pleasure, the early morning health rave ‘confines transgression to a padded room’, in 
pursuit of the ‘regime of productivity’ (ibid). Cederström and Spicer’s cultural diagnosis of the 
‘wellness syndrome’ draws upon similar themes, arguing that such ‘optimisations’ of one’s health 
are intertwined with a moral imperative that is closely bound with ideologies of economic growth 
(2015).  
 
Many have also offered critiques of the wellbeing schemes that have become increasingly 
commonplace both in and outside of workplace environments. Flemming and Sturdy’s 
ethnography of a call-centre outlines some of the management techniques that were utilised within 
this environment; they note that ‘wellness’ practices were often utilised as a way of ‘distracting 
employees’ attention away from the stultifying effects of […] otherwise low discretion 
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environment[s]’ (2010, p. 178). They highlight how discourses of ‘play’, ‘authenticity’ and ‘being 
oneself’ were utilised as a way of ‘capturing the emotional and social skills of workers’ and 
enhancing the quality of their emotional labour (ibid, p. 178). These management techniques are 
underscored by a recognition that aspects of the labour process have a detrimental impact on the 
mental health of workers, which could then impact the amount of loyalty that workers feel toward 
the workplace and curtail productivity. Flemming and Sturdy conclude that the opportunities for 
self-expression offered by the call-centre were ‘inextricably linked to enhancement of control and 
domination’, and, when compared to more Taylorised manufacturing settings, further aspects of 
the self were considered to be ‘an open economic concern’ (ibid, p. 192, 196).  
 
Such notions have long been part of the ethos of tech-giants such as Google, who have famously 
tailored their office spaces to establish the ‘happiest, most productive workplace in the world’ 
(Stewart, 2013). Treadmills at desks, ‘scribble walls’, the imitation of a ‘college campus’ aesthetic, 
the prospect of a four-day working week, and free food available at all times are just a few of the 
techniques employed by Google to enhance the productivity of its workers (ibid). In accordance 
with the politics of ‘nudge’, employees are encouraged to make healthy eating choices, with healthy 
snacks presented in transparent jars, and sugary snacks in translucent jars with prominent 
nutritional labels (ibid). Such strategies are again tightly bound with ideologies of ‘wellness’, and 
the maxim that ‘healthy bodies are productive bodies’ (Cederström and Spicer, 2015, p. 4).  The 
co-aligning of wellbeing and capital in this way is part of a wider cultural framework in which 
illness represents an inability to work; citizens are framed as either ‘economically productive or 
economically needy’ (Davies, 2011). Mental health has become a central concern of economic-
policy, whereby depression represents a ‘distinctly neo-liberal form of psychological deficiency, 
representing the flipside of an ethos that implores individuals to act, enjoy, perform, create, achieve 
and maximize’ (ibid). ‘Wellness’ initiatives allow employers to adapt to declines in productivity 
stemming from poor mental health, intended at reducing dissatisfaction, revolt or abstinence. In 
this respect, I would like to take forward a question that is posed by William Davies in his account 
of The Happiness Industry, who asks: ‘what if the greatest threat to capitalism, at least in the liberal 
West, is simply a lack of enthusiasm and activity?’ (2015, p. 105). 
 
1.12 Digital Technology and (a Lack of) Human Agency   
 
With regards to the underpinnings of the thesis, another key point of interest was around public 
debate that drew links between digital engagement and cognition. Recurring themes within these 
public debates often revolved around relationships between digitality and social fragmentation, the 
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growth of individualism, ‘epidemics’ of poor mental health, the growth of modes of ‘hyper 
attention’, and a dwindling in human agency (Carr, 2011; 2014; Hayles, 2007; Sullivan, 2016; Bedell, 
2016; Lewis, 2017). Pieces of writing that were particularly provoking for me in this regard were 
written by Nicholas Carr, who posited that digital technologies were having a significant impact 
upon his sense of self, as well as his understanding of what it meant to be human (Carr, 2011; 
2014). In an article entitled ‘Is Google making us stupid?’, Carr argued that the Google search 
algorithm was ‘tinkering’ with his capacity to retain mental information and concentrate on literary 
texts for sustained periods of time (2007). His own cognition, that he understood to be shaped by 
his engagement with literary texts, had become fundamentally ‘altered’ by the reading strategies 
that were being encouraged by the Web. I would posit that Carr’s position is very much one sided, 
and privileges the forms of reading that came to afford him his own cultural capital: 
 
Thanks to the ubiquity of text on the Internet, not to mention the popularity of text-
messaging on cell phones, we may well be reading more today than we did in the 1970s 
or 1980s, when television was our medium of choice. But it’s a different kind of 
reading, and behind it lies a different kind of thinking – perhaps even a new sense of self 
(ibid) 
 
Similar themes emerge in his work The Glass Cage: Automation and Us, in which he warns readers of 
‘automation’s human consequences’, and considers technological developments such as Google’s 
self-driving car to be ‘reset[ting] the boundary between human and computer’ (2015). This, he 
notes, is due to the capacities for judgement that were being exemplified by the Google car; it was 
exhibiting characteristics that psychologists, economists and himself had previously considered to 
be exclusively ‘human’. While, once upon a time, ‘we used to do things for ourselves’, Carr’s work 
presents a dystopic forecast of what happens when ‘we defer to the wisdom of algorithms’ (2015). 
He draws upon two types of knowledge that have ‘long’ been distinguished by economists and 
psychologists to elucidate his argument: tacit and explicit (ibid). Carr associates tacit knowledge 
with the forms of learning that emerge from doing, providing examples such as riding a bike or 
reading a book; forms of knowledge that he claims cannot ‘be expressed as a simple recipe’ (ibid). 
Explicit knowledge, meanwhile, he defines as ‘processes that can be broken down into well-defined 
steps’, and, accordingly, are capable of being translated into code (ibid). This is the distinction that 
he believes has, until recently, defined the difference between humans and machines. ‘How’, he 
asks, ‘do you translate the ineffable into lines of code, into the rigid, step-by-step instructions of 
an algorithm?’ (ibid). This question is underscored by a belief, or a hope, that the ‘ineffable’ does 
indeed exist; that the mysteries that perpetuate our inhabitance in the world are not reducible to 
the logics of computational capital.   
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He argues that the Google car, however, has come to exemplify some of the characteristics that 
had previously belonged to the realm of tacit knowledge. While, he notes, this does not mean that 
machines possess tacit knowledge (‘people are mindful; computers are mindless’), the Google car’s 
capacities of gaging whether to turn left or right, turn on the breaks, or to stop at sets of traffic 
lights challenges this model of understanding forms of learning. He writes,  
 
But when it comes to performing demanding tasks, whether with the brain or the 
body, computers are able to replicate our ends without replicating our means. When 
a driverless car makes a left turn in traffic, it’s not tapping into a well of intuition and 
skill; it’s following a program. But while the strategies are different, the outcomes, 
for practical purposes, are the same (Carr, 2014) 
 
Carr recurrently speaks of fears of AI exhibiting characteristics that he had once been considered 
to be ‘uniquely human’, and of ‘dependencies’ upon this or that technology to undergo day-to-day 
tasks (ibid). The presence of AI, Carr argues, has led to a milieu in which ‘humans’ have been 
rendered less intelligent, and less capable of undertaking tasks that did not previously require digital 
assistance. Narratives such as these also occur in Andrew Sullivan’s piece ‘I Used to Be a Human 
Being’ (2016), in which he makes frequent references to the more ‘human’ moments in his life 
which preceded his habitual engagement with the Web. His self-diagnosed technology addiction 
led him to attending a silent meditation retreat, where, after fifteen years, he would finally ‘live in 
reality’ (ibid). This, he notes, was part of a choice he had to make, between living ‘as a voice online’ 
or as a ‘human being in the world that humans had lived in since the beginning of time’ (ibid). In 
a vein that echoes some of the narratives offered by Carr, Sullivan nostalgically privileges pre-
digital moments, which he repeatedly constitutes as more ‘human’, or more ‘natural’ (ibid). 
Frequently, within pop-technology accounts such as these, ‘humans’ and the ‘digital’ are situated 
as two distinct ontological spheres, where the ‘digital’ is understood as something that hinders or 
challenges a purported uniqueness of the experience of being human, articulated in terms of its 
capacities to understand, remember, learn, and concentrate.  
 
While I do not, to any degree, dispute that there are complex relationships between digital devices 
and user cognition, what is problematic about these debates is that they depend upon binaristic 
understandings of human and technology, and divorce the impact of the so-called ‘digital’ from its 
surrounding multiplicity of cultural, political and social factors. It is also worth noting how the 
notions of ‘addiction’ and ‘dependencies’, highlighted above, are again tied with broader discourses 
of wellness, health, and productivity. On this tack, writers such as Paul Lewis for The Guardian 
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have made claims that our ‘minds can be hijacked’ by digital technologies themselves, and similarly 
substantiates such claims through invoking medicalised discourse (2017). ‘As well as addicting 
users’, Lewis writes, ‘technology is contributing toward so-called “continuous partial attention”, severely 
limiting people’s ability to focus, and possibly lowering IQ’ (2017). He continues, ‘one recent study 
showed that the mere presence of smartphones damages cognitive capacity – even when the device 
is turned off’ (ibid, emphasis added). Further to medicalised discourse of addiction then, these 
claims are further justified through using the language of scientific method; ‘one recent study’ is 
used as the qualifier for ambiguous claims around smartphones ‘damag[ing] cognitive capacity’. 
Such forms of ‘scientific’ legitimation pose questions surrounding representation, narrative and 
discourse, and how they are intertwined with technocratic understandings of life and matter within 
the contemporary moment. These are again bound with a moralising narratives; to be ‘addicted’ is 
to be distracted, unhealthy, and ergo, unproductive. Such discourses - discourses of technoscientific 
expertise - will be a core focus point of this thesis. I examine how they shape what is construed as 
real; how what is real is bound with certain sets of perceived effects; and how this dynamic shapes 
imaginaries and initiatives pertaining to what comes next. 
 
 
1.13 Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics 
 
My readings into Nobert Wiener’s cybernetics were also fundamental in forming some of the 
foundational thoughts of this thesis, and provide some historical context to the technoscientific 
understandings of the mind iterated in behavioural economics models, highlighted previously. 
Described by some as a theory of everything (Pickering, 2010), cybernetics played a significant role in 
shaping cultural understandings of the mind in terms of binary logic and rationalisation. It was a 
universalistic conception of the world in which ‘the gathering and interpretation of information’ 
was used as a way to understand the commonalities between technical and biological systems 
(Turner, 2006). Cybernetics understood both humans and machines to be ‘goal-seeking mechanisms 
that learn, through corrective feedback, to reach a stable state’, and lay some of the groundwork for 
understanding human behaviour in terms of information (Hayles, 1999, p. 65, emphasis added; 
Dubberly and Pangaro, 2014, p. 4). It was, as Wiener described, a behaviouristic theory that 
concerned the ‘extent to which answers that we may give to questions about one set of worlds are 
probable among a larger set of worlds’ (1950, p. 12, emphasis added). 
 
Cybernetics became fully established within the context of post-war America, and was a key focus 
of the interdisciplinary Macy conferences held between 1946 and 1953 (Bassett & Roberts, 2019; 
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Archer, forthcoming). These conferences hosted scholars from a range of disciplines, including 
psychiatry, sociology, anthropology, mathematics, statistics, neurophysiology, physics, 
psychopharmacology and statistics, and were held, as Peter Csermely describes, with the purpose 
of ‘understanding [the] control of human behaviour’ (2012, emphasis added). Hayles describes the 
conferences as ‘claim[ing] to be a universal solvent that would dissolve traditional disciplinary 
boundaries’, where these disciplines joined together to ‘remap’ understandings of the body 
according to a ‘science’ of information (1999, p. 85). Particularly influential participants in these 
conferences included: Claude Shannon, whose paper, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, was 
pivotal in the development of Norbert Wiener’s cybernetics (1948); Warren McCulloch, 
neurophysiologist and cybernetician whose work explored ‘how neurons worked as information-
processing systems’ (Hayles, 1999, p. 7); and John von Neumann, mathematician and physicist, 
who, as Adesalu writes, held the belief that ‘new technology is always basically beneficial, even if 
sometimes hazardous; people simply have to adapt to the inevitable march of progress’ (1981, p. 172; 
Hayles, 1999, emphasis added).  
 
Norbert Wiener was a mathematician at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). His 
work built upon Shannon’s A Mathematical Theory of Communication, which was one of the first 
papers to view communication in terms of statistics, and, pivotally, introduced the concept of the 
binary digit. It also promoted the idea that ‘information and entropy were related in physical terms’, 
which paved the way for Wiener’s work on cybernetics (Conway and Siegelman, 2005; Turner, 
2006). Their understandings of the relationships between information and entropy, however, 
differed: while Shannon’s model framed entropy and information as co-constitutive - where the 
‘more unexpected (or random) a message is, the more information it conveys’ - Wiener understood 
entropy and information to be opposites (Hayles, 1999, p. 102). In the Human Use of Human Beings, 
Wiener wrote, 
 
As entropy increases, the universe, and all closed systems in the universe, tend 
naturally to deteriorate and lose their distinctiveness, to move from the least to the 
most probable state, from a state of organisation and differentiation in which 
distinctions and forms exist, to a state of chaos and sameness (Wiener, 1950, p. 12) 
 
For Wiener, then, entropy could be managed via the communication of information; the greater the 
amount of information, the less amount of disorder. Hayles presses that this was felt so strongly by 
Wiener that he came close on ‘several occasions to saying that entropic decay is evil’ (1999, p. 103). 
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Information thus became a way of measuring ‘negative enthropy, or negentropy’; that is, a way of 
determining order in a system that tends toward chaos (Johnston, 2010, p. 202). 
 
It is also pivotal to note that Wiener’s work on cybernetics was fundamentally shaped by his liberal 
humanist politics (ibid, p. 85). These politics - privileging ‘a coherent, rational self, the right of that 
self to autonomy and freedom, and a sense of agency linked with a belief in enlightened self-
interest’ - were central to Wiener’s worldview. ‘He was less interested in seeing humans as 
machines,’ Hayles writes, ‘than he was in fashioning human and machine alike in the image of an 
autonomous, self-directed individual’ (ibid, p. 7). Communication for Wiener could be understood 
as a ‘game that two humans (or machines) play against noise’ (ibid). Hayles continues,  
 
To be rigid is inevitably to lose the game, for rigidity consigns the players to the 
mechanical repetition of messages that can only erode over time as noise intervenes. 
Only if creative play is allowed, if the mechanism can adapt freely to changing messages, can 
homeostasis be maintained, even temporarily, in the face of constant entropic pressure 
toward degradation (ibid, own emphasis) 
 
‘Creative play’, as it is articulated here, shares pressing similarities with the notions of ‘play’ 
articulated within neoliberal discourses, already referenced above: as a way of maintaining equilibrium 
- or ‘stability’ - within a broader context of uncertainty. Just as ‘play’ allows a mechanism to ‘adapt freely 
to changing messages’ within the cybernetic imaginary, ‘play’ within the context of neoliberalism 
encourages subjects to be always sustaining mental flexibility and productivity within broader 
frameworks of economic precarity.  
 
The co-aligning of human and machine in the cybernetic imaginary strengthened the idea that 
aspects of the human were automatable. Wiener argued that in the same way computation can be 
understood as sets of feedback loops, governments, corporations and universities should also 
participate in this ‘two-way stream of communication, and not merely in one descending from the 
top’ (1950, p. 49). While, as Bassett and Roberts highlight, automation wasn’t a term that occurred 
in Wiener’s work, it did inspire notions of a ‘second industrial revolution’, where, they write, the 
first industrial revolution ‘devalued the human arm, the second would do the same for the brain’ 
(2019, p. 12). Tomas further writes, 
 
Wiener’s cybernetic automaton was conceived as an active, hierarchically governed, 
self-regulated and goal-oriented machine, which was bound through a particular 
time/space logic - the adjustment of future conduct through a comparative 
assessment of past actions - to its environment (Tomas, 1995, p. 25) 
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This thus produces ‘an orientation towards the future’ that is rooted in what is deemed to be 
certain about the past and present (Bassett, 2019). While, it is important to note, cybernetics can 
be understood as one starting point among many that adhered to such forms of rationality, cybernetics 
was unique in that it situated such logics, as manifest through information, to be ubiquitous amongst all 
systems. This thus had pivotal implications for subsequent political imaginaries that pre-figure 
humanity as legible, controllable and predictable via the transmission of digital information. On 
this tack, I will conclude this section by bringing forward a question that was posed to Wiener at 
the Macy conferences, which will provide a further guiding question for this thesis: ‘where should 
the cybernetic dissolution of boundaries stop? At what point does the anxiety provoked by dissolution 
overcome the ecstasy?’ (Hayles, 1999, p. 85, my emphasis).  
 
1.14 The History of Technolibertarianism 
 
The final sphere I will turn to, in terms of the political ideas, imaginaries and discourses that led 
me to the writing of this thesis, pertains to the politics of technolibertarianism. 
Technolibertarianism emerged as a conglomerate of some of the principles of cybernetics, the 
nineteen-sixties counter culture movement, and economic liberalism. It refers to the belief that 
technological development will bring about human ‘freedom’, in a way that government, in any 
form or capacity, is understood to be detrimental to such ‘freedom’ (Golumbia, 2016). 
Technolibertarianism posits that digital technology will pave the way for a globalised virtual class 
of empowered users, able to choose if and how they are to participate in the regulatory structures 
imposed by states. It is oriented toward disintegrating the ‘top-down’ structures of states and 
governments, and to form instead a ‘global’ network of autonomous users who will henceforth be 
enabled and empowered by digital technologies (ibid). This also relies on the presumption that 
government will always stand to curtail ‘freedom’ in a way that corporations never could (ibid).  
 
The nineteen-sixties counter culture movement - on a very broad scale - was driven by an anti-
establishment politic, and opposed many of the state doctrines of the time, including America’s 
drive for imperial expansion, and its policies and cultures of sexual discrimination, homophobia, 
racism and consumerism (Barbrook & Cameron, 1995). Economic liberalism pertains to the view 
that economic ‘freedom’ should rest with individuals rather than with institutions (Adams, 2001). 
The conception of ‘freedom’ endorsed by the counter culture movement embraced notions of 
collectivity, unity, and self-expression, while economic liberalism heralds individual freedoms 
within the marketplace, freedom from state control, and the freedom to choose (Barbrook and 
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Cameron, 1995). Both ideologies found a meeting point in new developments in digital 
technologies during the nineteen-sixties and seventies, and the belief that new digital systems 
would help bring about their own visions of utopia. While some within the nineteen-sixties 
counter-culture movement rejected the military origins of cybernetics, others believed that 
understanding humans, machines and other biological systems to be governed by the same set of 
regulatory laws could inspire ideas about a more democratic and ‘collective’ future (Barbrook and 
Cameron, 1995, p. 2).  
 
Within this cultural landscape, in 1968, Stewart Brand founded the Whole Earth Catalogue, which 
fused the social values of the some elements of the counter-culture movement with the ‘whole-
systems thinking’ drawn from cybernetics, appreciating it as an ‘intellectual framework and as a 
social practice’ (Brand, cited in MNM, 2009; Turner, 2006, p. 43). The Whole Earth Catalogue 
embraced a ‘tool-centric’ worldview that rejected institutions and celebrated individualism, where 
‘agricultural equipment, weaving kits, mechanical devices’, alongside recent developments in digital 
technologies and readings of cybernetics, were celebrated as pivotal to these politics. Turner 
describes the technical progress of the time as carrying a ‘mystical charge’ for many and a faith in 
a sense of ‘togetherness’ (Turner, 2006). Such mysticism was emblematic of Whole Earth Catalogue, 
which regularly invoked dogmatic discourses. Indeed, the title of the publication itself came from 
a campaign that Stewart Brand instigated in 1966, which aimed to provoke NASA into releasing 
its rumoured photographic imagery of the ‘whole earth’. Seeing the earth from above, Brand 
believed, would serve as powerful and evocative imagery, and fulfil the Catalogues purpose of 
helping the readers see themselves ‘as gods’ (Brand, 1968; Cadwalladr, 2013). Up until the moment 
of the Catalogue’s release, Brand posited that power had existed only in the hands of states, big 
businesses, formal education institutions, and the church (ibid). The forming of the Whole Earth 
Catalogue, for Brand, celebrated the coming of a milieu in which ‘intimate, personal power [was] 
developing - power of the individual to conduct his own education, find his own inspiration, shape 
his own environment and share his adventure with whoever is interested’ (ibid). The Whole Earth 
Catalogue went on to have a considerable impact upon the cyber-culture of the 1990s. In his 
Stanford Commencement Address in 2005, Steve Jobs recounts the inspiration he personally took 
from the Catalogue, as one of the ‘bibles of [his generation]:  
 
When I was young, there was an amazing publication called The Whole Earth 
Catalogue, which was one of the bibles of my generation. It was created by a fellow named 
Stewart Brand, not far from here, in Menlo Park, and he bought it to life with his 
poetic touch. This was in the late sixties, before personal computers and desktop 
publishing; it was all made with typewriters, scissors, and polaroid cameras. It was 
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sort of like Google in paperback form, thirty-five years before Google came along. 
(Jobs, 2005, emphasis added) 
 
 
John Perry Barlow is also often foregrounded as one of technolibertarianism’s ‘core’ proponents 
(Winner, 1997; Borsook, 2000; Turner, 2006; Morrison, 2009). John Perry Barlow became a 
prominent public figure writing lyrics for the Grateful Dead, and later became a digital rights 
activist and ‘champion of free speech on the internet’, forming the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
alongside Mitch Kapor (Schofield, 2018). Barlow’s world-view was very much in keeping with that 
of the Whole Earth Catalogue, in that he believed the technical developments of the time could offer 
‘what LSD, Christian mysticism, cybernetics and countercultural ‘energy’ theory had all promised: 
transpersonal communion’ (Turner, 2006). The advent of the Web in 1989, from Barlow’s 
perspective, bought about a new space in which it seemed these ideas could flourish. In 1996, his 
notorious Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace was distributed on the Web, advocating the 
technolibertarian stance that governmental regulation had no rightful position within ‘cyberspace’ 
(Barlow, 1996). The Declaration exhibited an explicitly technolibertarian politic, outlining a ‘new’ 
world without ‘elected government’, a ‘global social space [that] we are building to be naturally 
independent’ (1996). Barlow continues, 
 
We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or prejudice accorded by 
race, economic power, military force, or station of birth. 
 
We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no 
matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity. 
 
Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not 
apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter here. (ibid) 
 
This text has been widely referenced and is largely a rhetorical document (Morrison, 2009, p. 54). 
It exhibits a politic where ‘cyberspace’ is framed as free from political bias, which Barlow locates 
as belonging to the realm of ‘matter’. The ‘we’ in this document are those in high-tech, where 
dogmatic notions of ‘creating a world’ echoes Brand’s earlier rhetoric of the Catalogues readers 
seeing themselves as ‘gods’. Barlow establishes himself as coming from ‘Cyberspace, the new home 
of Mind’, which ‘consists of transactions, relationships, and thought itself’, and construes a 
seemingly radical world, where state-governance - that which imposes ‘increasingly hostile and 
colonial measures’ - places ‘us in the same position as those previous lovers of freedom and self-
determination who had to reject the authorities of distant, uninformed powers’ (ibid). Such 
‘crypto-religious’ ideology, in relation to new developments in digital technology, was prominent 
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within high-tech spheres in the 1990s, and is a thread that I will continue to pull upon throughout 
the course of this thesis (Winner, 1997; Borsook, 2000; 20001).   
 
Each of the factors discussed in this thesis introduction have led me towards my areas of key field 
research. Each responds to a particular issue but also explores the connections between apparently 
discrete formations. Firstly, I turn to a case study of ‘digital detoxing’, which speaks to the 
discussed ideologies of ‘wellness’ and how they intertwine with discourse around digital 
engagement, work and ‘play’. Secondly, to prospective ‘blockchain for good’ initiatives, which are 
offered as forms of techno-solutionism to issues surrounding financial inclusion and digital 
identity. Thirdly, I investigate an anti-work think-tank, which critiques the role of work within the 
UK, and poses suggestions for prospective ‘post-work’ futures. Explorations into Fisher’s notion 
of ‘capitalist realism’ underscore each of these empirical studies, and how it is entwined with the 




I will now turn to a brief summary of the structure of this thesis. In chapter two, I critically frame 
the methodologies that were used for the empirical work of the thesis, for which I combined 
ethnography, autoethnography, and digital humanities methods, broadly speaking. I also outline 
the analytical tools that were used for study of my research materials, which included Critical 
Discourse Analysis, close reading techniques and use of qualitative data analysis software NVivo. 
I draw upon a series of feminist-materialist and de/post-colonial accounts to help outline the 
rationale for the adoption of these methodologies, and reflect upon how some of the politics 
embroiled with these methodologies are tied with broader concerns of the thesis. I then proceed 
to outline how each of these methodologies were specifically enacted for each of the thesis’s case 
studies, and reflect upon some of the ethical considerations that were encompassed with each.  
 
Chapter three then explores and critiques a series of theoretical accounts that engage with forms 
of sociomateriality. Sociomateriality, as I use it in this thesis, refers to the social norms and 
processes that are entangled with matter, and how these entanglements recursively shape and 
influence the conditions and practices of everyday life (Orlikowski, 2007; Shotter, 2013). I situate 
my own work as aligned with a series of feminist-materialist and de/post-colonial approaches, 
which will provide some of the conceptual framework for the empirical case studies undertaken 
later in the thesis. I provide a route through the arguments offered by these writers, and draw upon 
 26 
a series of central threads within these: firstly, some of the ways that technological determinism 
has been conceptualised, and within this, how technologically deterministic ideology can be 
understood to be constitutive of an epistemic framework that helps propagate corporate and state 
power (Wyatt, 2008); secondly, how this epistemic framework is intertwined with histories of 
colonialism, and concomitant systems of heteronormative patriarchy; and thirdly, how these logics 
are manifest in the material conditions of digital environments, and are embroiled with forms of 
cognition, relationality, imaginaries and subjectivities. 
 
The chapters up to this point provide the necessary groundwork for the thesis’s empirical case 
studies. My case studies each, in some way, respond to the public and academic debates around 
digital technology already outlined. They provide a space for exploring the forms of individuation 
that digital environments might propagate, and some of the responses this has opened up, 
particularly through the issue of discontent; not, however, in terms of global revolt, but in terms 
of a relation to a relation to the digital. I explore the futures that are imagined, or absent, within 
the discourses offered in each of these case studies, and how these futures speak to forms of 
discontent within the contemporary moment. In each case, I focus on how digital technologies - 
as extensions of capital - materialise ‘capitalist realism’ as a ubiquitous force in everyday life. 
 
For chapter four, then, I attended a four-day ‘digital detox’ retreat as a participant observer, and 
carried out fourteen research interviews with fellow attendees following my visit to the retreat. I 
explore the pertinence of why, within this sphere, the ‘digital detox’ meant we would not only 
relinquish use of our mobile devices and laptops, but also, we would not engage in ‘work talk’, we 
would not go by our given names, and we would engage in activities that were discursively framed 
by the retreat as ‘play’. My motivation was to understand how the ‘digital’ was understood by the 
participants of the digital detox, and how they saw it to impact their behaviours and social 
interactions within the space. I consider the pertinence of why a detox from the ‘digital’ and from 
‘work’ were enveloped with one another, and how the centrality that was accorded to ‘work’ was 
interlinked with a cultural framework that prioritises ‘digital ubiquity’. To develop my arguments 
in this chapter I draw upon themes of neoliberal ‘wellness’ already briefly mentioned, and consider 
why themes of mental wellbeing were central to the camp’s ethos of digital rejectionism. 
 
In chapter five, I explore discourse that is encompassed in notions of ‘blockchain for good’. This 
is a term that has appeared in both academic and polemic discourse, and pertains largely to 
prospective blockchains for use within ‘social impact’ settings (Adams, Kewell and Parry, 2017; 
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Casey and Vigna, 2018b). In the first section of this chapter, I undertake a critical discourse analysis 
of grey-literature and pop-literature accounts surrounding ‘blockchain for good’, in which issues 
surrounding financial inclusion and digital identity emerged as prominent themes. Here, I focus 
primarily upon how relationships between bodies and digitality are articulated, and how these 
relationships speak to specific structures of power: not simply in terms of an intensification of the 
accumulation of big data by Western apparatuses, but also in terms of the epistemological and 
ideological ‘erasures’ that emerge when populations are rendered digitality legible in this way 
(Vazquez, 2011). I also explore how economic reason is recurrently employed as the justifying 
narrative for claims to ‘social good’, and where and how such claims are made both explicit and 
implicit. This draws on earlier arguments pertaining to interrelationships between digital 
solutionism and capitalist and colonialist expansion, already lightly introduced.  
 
In the final section of this chapter, I provide an account of a data-scrape process, which crawled 
Twitter for all Tweets containing the term ‘blockchain’ across a six-week period during July and 
August 2018. My intentions here were to explore how I might go about abstracting Tweets 
pertaining to ‘blockchain for good’ from other Tweets about blockchain, how this might be 
undertaken using digital methods, and how the systems of visibility and intelligibility offered by 
the software influenced how I conduced myself in relation to the data. I reflect upon how my own 
personal politics and processes of decision-making became embedded in the algorithm, how my 
working process became influenced by the forms of rationality that computation embodies, and 
how the combination of these factors influenced what was ultimately analysed and explored.  
 
Chapter six is the thesis’s final empirical case study, and explores the ‘anti-work’ and ‘post-work’ 
politics of a UK based left-wing think-tank group entitled Autonomy. Autonomy examine the role 
of work within the UK, and aim to de-stabilise some widely held perceptions around work, and 
propose ‘solutions’ to some of the issues that they understand to be associated with waged labour. 
These ‘solutions’ pertain both to positing suggestions for contemporary issues surrounding waged 
work, as well as prospective ideas around harnessing automation for a ‘post-work’ society, based 
on principles of ‘freedom, equality, and democracy’ (Autonomy, 2018). This research data is 
composed from a series of semi-structured interviews, as well as a discourse analysis of website 
material and reports by Autonomy’s affiliates. Following the thoughts developed in the case study 
of the ‘digital detox’, I continue my considerations around interrelationships between work and 
identity formation, and how this was understood by a group who directly advocate anti-work 
politics. I further explore if and where neoliberal discourse is employed within Autonomy’s work, 
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and reflect upon how this relates to articulations of ‘radical’ politics within a cultural context of 



















































In this chapter I will critically frame the methodologies that were used for the field research of the 
thesis. I explore the rationale for the adoption of each of my research methodologies, and how 
these methodologies were specifically enacted for each of these case studies. I detail some of the 
ethical considerations that were encompassed with the data gathering process for each case study, 
and the ethical review procedures that I underwent via the University of Sussex. I detail how 
research participants were informed about my research, how consent was attained, and how I 
enacted what I considered to be ethical practice. What I constitute here as ‘ethical practice’ was 
informed principally by the frameworks provided by the University of Sussex, and further by my 
own readings of critical writing on ethical ethnographic research as outlined in a series of feminist-
materialist and de-colonial approaches (Haraway, 1988; Rosaldo, 1993; Toyosaki, 2018).  
 
For the empirical components of this thesis, then, I used a combination of ethnography and digital 
humanities methods. These came to include participant observation, semi-structured interviews, 
autoethnography, and a data-scrape of Twitter using some proprietary Natural Language 
Processing (NLP) software. I used qualitative text analysis software NVivo for coding and 
analysing the data gathered from my semi-structured interviews, and a Critical Discourse Analytic 
(CDA) approach for the analysis of all of the research data. Ethnographic and autoethnographic 
methods were used for the case-study of the ‘digital detoxers’. This involved embodying the role 
of participant-observer whilst at the ‘digital detox’ site and conducting semi-structured research 
interviews via Skype following my visit. Data-scraping and autoethnography were used for the 
‘blockchain for good’ case study, which was combined with analyses of literature that explicitly 
covered the topic of ‘blockchain for good’. This broader ‘blockchain for good’ literature was found 
via search engine queries and ‘snowballing’ through internet links (LibGuides, 2019). I used semi-
structured interviews for the final case study of think-tank Autonomy, which I juxtaposed with 
analyses of literature provided on the Autonomy website. This literature came to include website 
information and research undertaken by affiliates of the think-tank that featured on the website at 
the time of writing3. 
 
                                                 
3 February 2019. 
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The structure of this chapter will proceed as follows. In the first section I outline what I mean in 
this thesis by ethnography. I explore some of the ways it has evolved, and highlight how some of 
these moments in ethnography’s history have encompassed different ways of narrativising the lives 
of those it studies. Here, I chiefly focus upon how ethnographic practice has shifted from accounts 
that make claims to objective truths, to more contemporary practices that emphasise the embodied 
role of the ethnographer. This then leads into a brief exploration of what constitutes 
autoethnography for this project, and how its explicit foregrounding of the subjectivity of the 
ethnographer counters notions of an ‘objective’ ethnographic gaze, and provides scope for 
exploring the self as a site for cultural and political insights. In the following section, I then outline 
some of the ways the ‘digital humanities’ has been conceptualised, and highlight some key 
arguments that bare relevance to my use of digital methods within the thesis. I then detail the 
methodologies that I used for the analysis of my data, which comprised predominantly of close 
reading techniques and use of qualitative data analysis software NVivo. The following sections 
then outline how these methodologies were employed in each of my case studies specifically, and 
some of the main ethical considerations that were encompassed with the gathering of my research 
data.  
 
2.1 Ethnography: Participant Observation and Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Ethnography, in various different forms, was the methodology that I used most extensively for 
my field work. Put simply, ethnography is the study of ‘social interactions and behaviours’ amongst 
social groups and communities (Reeves and Hodges, 2008). The term ethnography is, however, 
vastly polysemic, and encompasses a series of approaches and theoretical assumptions that have 
shifted across the course of its history (Jones and Rodgers, 2019). On this tack, James Clifford 
usefully describes ethnography to be located amidst an array of ‘processes’; as an ‘interdisciplinary 
phenomenon’ situated ‘between powerful systems of meaning ... [it] decodes and recodes, telling the 
grounds of collective order and diversity, inclusion and exclusion’ (Clifford, 1986, pp. 2-3). He 
goes on to outline six spheres that can be used to distinguish ethnographic practice, and how these 
intersect with the insights that ethnographies can provide: 
 
(1) contextually (it draws from and creates meaningful social milieux); (2) 
rhetorically (it uses and is used by expressive conventions); (3) institutionally (one 
writes within, and against, specific traditions, disciplines, audiences); (4) generically 
(an ethnography is usually distinguishable from a novel or a travel account); (5) 
politically (the authority to represent cultural realities is unequally shared and at 
times contested); (6) historically (all the above conventions and constraints are 
 31 
changing) (ibid, p. 6) 
 
Norman Denzin identifies five historical moments that have marked changes in what is 
understood by ‘ethnography’, which include the following: ‘the traditional (1900 to World War II), 
modernist (World War II to the mid-1970s), blurred genres (1970-1986), crisis of representation 
(1986 to present), and the fifth moment (now4)’ (1997, p. xi). These different ethnographic 
moments lead Denzin to conclude that what is meant by ethnography can ‘no longer be taken for 
granted’, with each moment encompassing different theoretical assumptions about how an 
encounter should be approached (ibid, p. xiii). ‘Traditional’ and ‘modernist’ forms of ethnography 
are based upon a splitting between subject and object, where the ethnographer’s role entails an 
articulation of so-called ‘objective’ or ‘scientific’ accounts of the world. Such accounts are 
predicated upon the ‘conflicting parameters’ of the ‘we’ and the ‘they’, where the researcher is 
‘typically considered an ‘outsider’ belonging to ‘we’ and the people are ‘insiders’ belonging to ‘they’’ 
(Uddin, 2011, p. 459). These forms of ethnographic relationality are closely tied with histories of 
coloniality, where the broader anthropological umbrella has been described as ‘the child of western 
imperialism’ (Gough, 1968) or the ‘handmaiden of colonialism’ (Moore, 1999, p. 2). This, Uddin 
notes, is due to Victorian anthropologies and ethnographies constructing ‘the people it studied as 
primitive, ancient, illiterate and nude exotic others’, and the equating of the white-male gaze with 
notions of objectivity and truth (2011, p. 459).  
 
Renato Rosaldo cites Levi Strauss’s Tristes Tropiques as an example of such forms of ethnography; 
of the ‘Lone Ethnographer’s […] ideological role in perpetuating the colonial control of “distant” 
peoples and places’ (1993, p. 31; Levis Strauss, 1975). The subjectivity and political positionality 
of the ethnographer is abstracted from any claims to truth made in such accounts, where the 
ethnographer is instead positioned as an omniscient observer who documents unbiased accounts 
of the real. Such ethnographic forms have been heavily problematised for their colonialist 
underpinnings, where the world is framed as a directly representable ‘external social reality’ (ibid, 
p. 31). This form of encounter presumes that the ‘real’ can be grasped through meticulous 
recordings and transcriptions of ethnographic data (research interviews, field notes, and etcetera) 
and the interpretation of these materials via the ‘objective’ body of the ethnographer. The language 
or discourse provided by ‘subjects’ (participants) in such ethnographic accounts is assumed to be 
verbatim; as an unmediated representation of the subject’s experience of the world. On this tack, 
                                                 
4 This text was written in 1997.  
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Denzin emphasises how language never acts as a direct mirror of one’s experience, and always 
interacts with the participant’s relationship and understanding of themselves, the ethnographer, 
and other surrounding contextual factors (1997, p. 5). Further to this, language is also always 
encompassed with specific epistemic orders, which thus entails absences, gaps and specific 
linguistic associations that the ethnographer must reflexively interpret.   
 
Following such ‘traditional’ and ‘modernistic’ ethnographic forms, poststructuralist and 
postmodern accounts have foregrounded how language and discourse can only ever offer partial 
perspectives, and can never provide ‘direct’ representations of the world (Denzin, 1997). This does 
not mean that valuable insights and ‘truths’ cannot be derived from language, but rather that 
careful consideration must be paid to how accounts provided by both research participants and 
ethnographers are influenced by broader cultural frameworks and structures of power. They 
further foreground how ethnographic work must reflexively engage with how language functions 
as a construction and performance of self (ibid, p. 5). This is constitutive of what Schatz labels as 
ethnography as ‘sensibility’, which, he notes, goes ‘beyond face-to-face contact’, to the gleaning of 
‘the meanings that the people under study attribute to their social and political reality’ (2009, p. 5). 
This is formed through a close interrogation of research data or broader artefactual material, and 
requires the ethnographer to have a close familiarity with broad social narratives. This then 
facilitates recognition of what constitutes individual experience or more extensive hegemonic 
discourse (Allina-Pisano, 2009, p. 66). This can bring to light what participants see to be the ‘banal’ 
and ‘unassuming’ aspects of social reality, and illuminate how the normalisation of these ideas 
becomes intertwined with relationships between power and meaning (Boellstorff, 2008, p. 83). 
Hegemony within this context can be distinguished through repetition across isolated individual 
accounts (Allina-Pisano, 2009, p. 70), helping to bring to light forms of reification and socialisation. 
 
While Donna Haraway is not an ethnographer per se, her widely-cited Situated Knowledges 
problematizes notions of ‘objectivity’ and how they sometimes figure within claims to truth within 
discourse (1988). She emphasises how all claims to truth are situated within specific times and 
spaces, where an acknowledgement of the researcher’s positionality can help provide more 
‘responsible’ accounts of the world. ‘Feminists don’t need a doctrine of objectivity that promises 
transcendence’, she writes, ‘a story that loses track of its mediations just where someone might be 
held responsible for something, and unlimited instrumental power’ (1988, p. 579). Haraway’s 
position resists accounts that assume a universalistic ‘objective’ voice, and emphasises the 
importance of ‘feminist objectivity’ (ibid, p. 583). This is a position, she writes, about ‘limited 
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location and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and the splitting of subject and object’ 
(Haraway, 1988, p. 583). For Haraway, this is the only way truly ‘scientific’ accounts can be 
achieved, where an acknowledgement of the subjective cultural lens shaping claims to truth helps 
the researcher becomes ‘accountable’ and hereby responsible for what and how they see 
(Boellstorff, 2008; Haraway, 1988). This more ‘responsible’ approach acknowledges the privilege 
(or un-privilege) shaping truth claims; the cultural factors that may be causing the researcher to be 
more acutely aware of certain social dynamics than others.  
 
Following the post-structural turn, ‘digital ethnographies’ explore how ‘we live and research in a 
digital, material and sensory environment’ (Pink et al, 2016). Since the term ‘digital ethnography’ 
is also vastly polysemic, I will use it in this thesis to refer to the many ways in which digital 
technologies influence the process of ethnographic research. As Pink et al. similarly highlight, 
digital ethnography entails not just the explicit study of how digital technologies are entwined with 
elements of social life, and rather extends to considerations of how the ethnographic encounter is 
influenced by the presence of digital technologies, and how digital technologies might be more 
indirectly involved with the research process. This might include, for example, what technologies 
are required to conduct research interviews via the internet, what role the mediation of the screen 
plays in the research interview, or who has access to specific digital mediums. It further 
encompasses the politics that are entwined with the digital technologies required for conducting 
and analysing the research, which in the case of this thesis, primarily included Nvivo and 
Method525. Both pieces of software are proprietary, meaning that my capacity to explore 
underlying mechanisms within the software was limited. Further, access to the software is only 
available to those who belong to a specific institutional setting, or have sufficient financial means. 
As I discuss throughout the thesis, these pieces of software encompass specific epistemic 
tendencies, and thus had pivotal implications for the research.  
 
In these ways, each of my case studies comprised elements of digital ethnography. While my 
research interviews with members of Autonomy and attendees of the ‘digital detox’ were not, for 
instance, specifically examining how the process of interviewing via Skype influenced what 
research data was gathered, this was nonetheless an intrinsic part of my research process that 
rendered my ethnographic research in some sense ‘digital’. In a similar vein, my participant 
observation at the ‘digital detox’ can also be constituted as a form of digital ethnography. Although 
the title ‘digital detox’ infers an absence of digital technologies, this absence was part of the appeal 
                                                 
5 Specific discussions of these politics are discussed in sections 2.8 and 2.9 
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for the community that gathered at the retreat, which thus gestured towards potential sets of 
mutually held meanings that pivoted around a nexus of the ‘digital’. Using NVivo for the analysis 
of my ethnographic research data also had a significant influence upon the write-up of my research 
materials: it allowed me to identify key themes and patterns in discourse via tools that indicated 
how many times a word or phrase occurred within the text; and it allowed me to compile sections 
of the text that belonged to similar themes, which was then useful for viewing thematically similar 
sections of text in conjunction with one another. 
 
Power relations between the researcher and researched will always exist within the ethnographic 
encounter. Ways of critically and reflexively working with, and resisting, such power relations have 
been variously conceived. Some have argued that participant observation can work to counter 
some of these problematic dynamics (Boellstroff, 2008; Schatz, 2009). ‘There is no illusion of 
detached objectivity to shatter in participant observation’, Boellstroff writes, ‘because it is not a 
methodology that views the researcher as contaminant’ (2008, p. 71). Schatz defines participant 
observation as ‘immersion in a community, a cohort, a locale, or a cluster of related subject 
positions’, where participation within a given social setting can offer insights that may not be 
available within other forms of ethnography (2009). In what might be described as a hybrid space, 
the ethnographer operates neither wholly from-above nor wholly from-within a given social 
setting: the researcher does not act wholly as ‘participant’, since the motivations for their 
participation will be partially bound with the aims of the research, and their presence may influence 
the behaviours of others within the space; nor wholly as ‘observer’, since they partake in the 
activities of the research setting, and may also self-reflexively consider how the dynamics of the 
space influenced their own behaviours and attitudes. These were factors that I deeply considered 
during my participant observation at the ‘digital detox’, where my role as researcher provoked 
particularly interesting dynamics whilst at the retreat. As I will explore in more detail in section 
2.3, a key element of the ‘digital detox’ was that participants were instructed not to speak of their 
‘work’ whilst at the retreat. My positionality as researcher - what might be constituted as my ‘work’ 
- meant I did not experience this element of the ‘detox’ in the same way as other participants, and 
also may have shifted the experience of others in attendance through my embodying of this role. 
 
Immersion within specific social settings can offer insights into relationships among participants, 
cultural norms, as well as information about cultural ideas and behaviours. Unassuming or 
‘common sense’ elements of social life might be uncovered during participant observation, 
revealing ties between shared cultural assumptions of the participants (Boellstorff, 2008, p. 75). 
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Mack et al. (2005) posit that notable qualities that should be observed during participant 
observation research should be: appearance, including age, gender, and physical appearance of the 
participants, that may or may not give indications about membership in a group or community; 
specificities around verbal behaviour and interactions, including information about who speaks to 
whom, who initiates interaction, and vocal tone; details of physical behaviour and gestures, 
pertaining to who and who is not interacting, and what emotion is communicated through body 
language; and details around personal space, in terms of how the spatial relations between 
participants communicate information about relationships and hierarchy (p. 15). These are all 
elements that I documented during my case study of the ‘digital detox’, which I will explore in 




Autoethnography can be broadly defined as a self-reflexive research methodology, where the 
‘multiple nature of selfhood’ is foregrounded to offer narratives on particular social and cultural 
formations (Read-Danahay, 1997, p. 3). Strathern characterises autoethnography as ‘anthropology 
carried out in the social context which produced it’, while Pratt defines autoethnography as a form 
of writing that offers a personal and political account of one’s own culture (Strathern, 1987, p. 17; 
Pratt, 1994; Read-Danahay, 1997). It often stresses ‘multiple, shifting identities’, where the 
researcher examines the cultural conditions and forms of relationality that have come to influence 
their embodied engagement with the world (Toyosaki, 2018). Many accounts also highlight how 
autoethnography can be conceived of as processual, where, as Trinh notes, ‘a certain identity is never 
possible: the ethnographer must always ask, ‘Not Who am I? but ‘When, where, how am I (so and 
so)?’ (1992, p. 157). It emphasizes a move away from the gaze of the ‘objective’ observer to 
foreground the importance of the meanings of the ‘personal’, where – moreover – the meanings 
embroiled with the ‘personal’ are understood not as stasis, but as constantly changing ‘through 
experience, and with knowledge […] as something that is deeply historical and collective’ 
(Mohanty, 2003, p. 191).  
 
It is for these reasons that Toyosaki considers autoethnography to hold significant de-colonial and 
postcolonial potentialities (2018). Autoethnography, he notes, purposefully makes no claims to 
objectivity or ‘political neutrality’, and represents a ‘commitment for our continuous self-reflexive 
labour to interrogate, become more aware of, and possibly challenge the relationality through 
which we became and continue to become autoethnographers in our academic culture and 
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everyday living’ (2018, p. 33). This was significant to all elements of my research project, as I 
deliberately sought to challenge claims to knowledge that abstract the subjectivity of the researcher 
from the research materials. The role of academia is also a core focus within this piece of 
Toyosaki’s work in particular. Here, he explores how colonial histories are manifest within 
educational institutions, and what autoethnography might offer by means of countering these 
colonial legacies. Here, he argues that it presents the opportunity for researchers to challenge the 
cultural politics that shape how claims to truth are formulated and treated as legitimate, and question 
how ‘academia’s cultural and institutional past of colonisation (i.e. racism, heteronormativity, 
patriarchy, xenophobia, cultural Othering, sexism, classism, Standard English, etc.)’ can be 
dialectically challenged through the foregrounding of personal experience (ibid, p. 34). 
Interrogating the aspects of these cultural legacies that are constitutive of our own ways-of-seeing 
are thus central to decolonial and postcolonial ethnographies, where the researcher self-reflexively 
considers their own role in reproducing these structures.  
 
Toyosaki foregrounds the significance of the imagined ‘YOU’ within academic writing, and how 
this interacts with constructions of the self. This, for him, is a central concern of autoethnography, 
where the ‘relational nature of our self construction’ is fundamentally a political and economic 
concern (2018, p. 35). The ‘YOU’ marks a mode of governmentality; an ‘imagined hand’ that ‘write[s] 
with and/or over me’, in order for academic work to adhere to sets of institutional conventions 
that remain shaped by colonial histories (ibid, p. 35; Conle, 2004, p. 141). He argues that while 
autoethnography - in its countering of notions of the ‘objective’ observer and the framing of the 
research as ‘process’ not ‘product’ - offers a form of resistance to some of these conventions, this 
does not negate that ‘we have been always already colonised by the normalising, neoliberal and 
capitalistic academic discourse to be “successful” or to be able to “survive” U.S-American higher 
educational culture where autoethnography ties to flourish’ (ibid, p. 36). He continues,  
 
I still consider how the assigned blind reviewers would respond to my autoethnographic essays 
while imagining who they may be; I still imagine them to be White, Standard-English-
speaking, and middle/upper-class scholars and others who became trained to value such 
standardised educational culture. Since the early stages of my academic career, I have learned 
to be scared of blind reviewers whom I can only imagine as powerful academic ghosts who 
are real but not really. They render real materialistic and psychological effects on me (ibid, p. 
36) 
 
These are considerations that I engage with most extensively in chapter six, where I utilise an 
autoethnographic approach to narrate and reflect upon a data scrape process. I explore the forms 
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of intelligibility that my engagement with this digital method encouraged, and how these are tied 
to broader colonial legacies and rationalities. I have, however, tried to maintain this self-reflexive 
perspective in response to all of my research materials, and to foreground my own political 
positionality throughout the thesis.  
 
2.3 Digital Humanities and Digital Methods 
 
 
This section of the chapter will explore some of the debates and critiques surrounding ‘digital 
humanities’ methods, which will chiefly provide some theoretical background to the 
methodological frameworks that I utilise in chapter six. It will also highlight how the vast majority 
of the content in this thesis can also be understood as in some sense ‘digital humanities’, due to 
the array of digital tools that were utilised to compile the research. In a similar vein to notions of 
‘digital ethnography’ highlighted in the previous section, the vast majority of research conducted 
within the ‘arts and humanities’ will in some respect be ‘digital humanities’, whether this be due to 
accessing online journal data bases, conducting internet searches, using emails or social media to 
correspond with interview participants, or simply using word processing software to present 
research findings. In this way it is arguably not possible to disentwine the influence of the ‘digital’ 
from contemporary ‘arts and humanities’ research. For these reasons alone, this thesis can be 
loosely defined as belonging to the ‘digital humanities’. There are however, other specificities that 
render this thesis a ‘digital humanities’ project, which I will now outline in this section. 
 
The scope of the ‘digital humanities’ is far reaching, and has evolved from a series of fields and 
theoretical practices. Some of these include, but are not exclusive to, new media studies, science 
and technology studies, humanities computing, communications, and cultural studies, amongst 
others (Lopez, Rowland and Fitzpatrick, 2015; Risam, 2018). One way of describing the ‘digital 
humanities’ which bares relevance to this thesis is as ‘self-conscious’ humanistic enquiries into 
digital worlds and cultures (Berry & Fagerjord, 2017, p. 13). There has, however, been a great deal 
of debate around what precisely constitutes the ‘digital humanities’, and whether this should be 
constituted as a clearly defined field at all (Allington, Brouillette & Golumbia, 2016; Kim & 
Stommel, 2018). Franco Moretti has gone as far to state that the term ‘digital humanities’ means 
‘nothing’, while others have ‘decidedly’ not defined the ‘digital humanities’, arguing that it is not 
for ‘any single voice or collection or discipline to define’ (2016; Kim & Stommel, 2018, p. 32). For 
Davidson, the reasons for eschewing clear-cut definitions of the ‘digital humanities’ lie in resisting 
further dividing lines between disciplines, noting that the ‘binaries that have shaped academe […] 
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need to be blurred, if not entirely erased, across all disciplines, departments and fields […] if we 
are to arrive at a DH defined by difference, not simply by automation and replication of the past’ (ibid, 
emphasis added).  
 
A common thread among critiques of the ‘digital humanities’ is that the term has close ties with 
the neoliberalisation of humanities education (Allington, Golumbia, Brouillette, 2016; Moretti, 
2016). On this tack, critiques of the ‘digital humanities’ have often revolved around its role in 
heightening the commercial and economic applications of humanities subjects, and it’s possible 
role in preventing humanities departments from too much damage from the barrage of budget 
cuts that have been increasingly impacting universities over recent years (Allington, Brouillette and 
Golumbia, 2016; Risam, 2018). These arguments emphasise the restructuring of the humanities in 
accordance with the epistemological tendencies of STEM subjects, viewing the digital humanities 
as steering it towards being more ‘instrumental, employable, and fundable’ (Risam, 2018). As 
Allington, Brouillette and Golumbia point out, neoliberal policies favour academic work that 
‘produces findings immediately usable by industry and that produces graduates trained for the 
current requirements in the commercial workplace’, which might be more easily or efficiently 
generated via methodologies that are explicitly ‘digital’ (2016). They continue, 
 
Advocates position Digital Humanities as a corrective to the “traditional” and 
outmoded approaches to literary study that supposedly plague English departments. 
Like much of the rhetoric surrounding Silicon Valley today, this discourse sees 
technological innovation as an end in itself and equates the development of 
disruptive business models with political progress (ibid) 
 
While I empathise with aspects of these critiques, it is equally important to scrutinize what forms 
of knowledge can and are produced via explicit and self-reflexive engagements with digital 
technologies, and what epistemological and methodological inequalities and biases these might 
encompass. I thus believe it is important not to dismiss the ‘digital humanities’ as merely a product 
of neoliberalisation, and rather consider how critical engagements with digital tools can be used to 
expose workings of power, in terms of the voices they are more likely to bolster, or the epistemic 
biases that might be bolstered via digital tools. As Kim notes in Disrupting the Digital Humanities,  
  
We must discuss how to deliberately create structures and frames for an antifascist 
DH - to deliberately dismantle the methodologies, epistemologies, structures, data, 
databases, tools, archives, code that have created a world in which technology is now 
used to consistently bludgeon its most vulnerable denizens (2018, p. 482) 
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These are concerns I engage most extensively with in chapter six, where I self-reflexively engage 
with data-scraping software Method52. This software, as I highlight in section 2.8 of this chapter, 
is most extensively mobilised within commercial spheres for analysing consumer behaviour, and 
for policing. The fact that such data-scraping tools are utilised within these spheres indicates that 
the epistemological formulations that are specific to this software are likely advantageous to these 
politics and forms of power. This is not to state that such epistemological formulations are 
exclusively bound to these applications, but rather that there is a relationship between these data-
scraping mechanisms and neoliberal power that requires closer inspection.  
 
My own personal interests then, when it comes to ‘digital humanities’ methods, pertain to how the 
generalised ‘computational turn’ within approaches to learning, knowing and educating 
encompasses forms of epistemic violence, and how these epistemic violences can be explored, 
exposed and subverted via a closer and more nuanced engagement with the digital itself (Boyd and 
Crawford, 2011). Computation necessitates the translation of everything it processes into binary 
code, which in turn shapes and reshapes the worlds it comes to touch. This thus always entails a 
level of reductivism, which, as Berry writes, produces ‘new knowledges and methods for the 
control of reality’ (2012, p. 2). Within my own case studies - which explore conceptions of digitality 
within predominantly Western contexts, and not, for instance, the role of digital technologies in 
areas such as China6 - some of these knowledges and cultural biases might include: contributing 
to the rising hegemony of the English language, and the suppression and underrepresentation 
therefore of other languages; the resultant privileging of the epistemological tendencies that are 
embroiled with the English language; the privileging of histories from certain sectors of the world 
and the suppression of others, namely the historical narratives as told by, and pertaining to, 
Western-Europe and the United States; and the ways in which these histories are remembered or 
forgotten, thus retaining (often Eurocentric) cultural forms and silencing (often indigenous) 
cultural forms.  
 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that - while critical - in studying Western contexts I am also in some senses 
reproducing such forms of Western-centrism. This is due partially to spatial limitations within the thesis, 
and partially to my own linguistic limitations that make studies into non-English applications of digital 
technologies inaccessible. My hopes, within this thesis, are to use my own forms of cultural understanding 
to uncover and expose how specific digital technologies developed within Western contexts are oriented 
towards establishing new forms of neo-coloniality and governmentality, and thus the forms of power that 
underlie these digital applications. 
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Relatedly to these considerations, Risam foregrounds the importance of applying postcolonial and 
decolonial approaches to the study of computing and technoculture, which would thus encourage 
the ‘creation of new tools and methods with epistemological and ontological roots beyond the 
Global north; [attend] to the role of labour in digital humanities projects; and [address] the 
hegemonic role of the English language in digital humanities scholarship and practice’ (2018). 
Decolonial and postcolonial approaches foreground the ways in which modernity and scientific 
rationality have been shaped by colonialism, imperialism and capital, and how these are inseparably 
intertwined with the development of digital computing. These cultural legacies have shaped and 
continue to shape the functionality of digital tools, their surrounding discourses, the institutions 
and corporations that produce them, and who has ownership or access to the data they produce. 
These are all pivotal considerations when engaging with digital tools for research, and are 
considerations that I will return to throughout the thesis.  
 
2.4 Data Analysis Techniques: NVivo and Close Reading  
 
My data analysis for all of the case studies involved close reading techniques, where I made notes 
about any overarching themes that I noticed, and my preliminary observations. I tried to 
distinguish key tensions that occurred within each of the texts, and how these tied into broader 
social, political and economic narratives (Nicholson, 2017, p. 184). I usually did these on print-
outs of the manuscripts as I found I was more able to immerse myself within the texts this way 
(without, for instance, distractions such as emails, or the inclination to conduct internet searches 
around aspects of the interviews). This allowed me to get a sense of overarching themes for coding 
within NVivo.  
 
For the case studies of the ‘digital detox’ campers and Autonomy, I made extensive use of 
qualitative data analysis software NVivo. This software helped me corroborate, or shed new light 
upon, any preliminary hypothesises that had been drawn from my close readings. NVivo served 
as a useful tool for illuminating any significant biases in the analyses drawn from my close readings 
(for instance, I noticed that I was more inclined to draw upon themes that had already been 
explored within the thesis than I was with new patterns in discourse). This was due to NVivo’s 
function of quantitatively highlighting how many times a word or phrase occurred in a text. It also 
allowed me to visualise which words occurred in conjunction with other words, which was also 
helpful for identifying linguistic patterns and associations within the discourses of my interviewees. 
It is also important to note here that NVivo did not, by any means, completely eliminate my own 
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personal biases that influenced my interpretation of the data, but rather provided tools to bring 
my awareness to patterns that I may have been less inclined to notice without qualitative data 
analysis software.  
 
2.5 Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is the data analysis approach I used for the analysis of the 
majority of my research materials. CDA chiefly explores the ways in which power and inequality 
are produced and reproduced through language and discourse (Van Dijk, 2015, p. 466; Lupton, 
1992). Within the context of CDA, Deborah Lupton defines discourse as ‘a group of ideas or 
thinking which can both be identified in textual and verbal communications and located in wider 
social structures’ (1992, p. 145). A ‘critical’ approach to textual analyses avoids dichotomous or 
reductive explanations, and rather explores the nuances and contradictions that might underlie 
discursive formations (Wodak & Ludwig, 1999, p. 12). Wodak and Ludwig also foreground how 
a ‘critical’ approach should encompass some level of self-reflexivity on part of the researcher, 
where they might consider how their own cultural conditioning or political environment might 
shape their personal approaches to the discourse in question, and make this stance explicit. Social 
and political context are thus fundamental components in CDA, where the researcher looks 
‘behind language use’ to uncover and expose underlying or unassuming elements of the text which 
might propagate specific workings of power (Hart, 2010).  
 
Many accounts of CDA highlight that it is not a homogenous approach with a precise 
methodological framework (Wodak & Lidwig, 1999, p. 11; Van Dijk, 2001, p. 353). Rather, it is a 
conglomerate of approaches that might be better understood as a ‘perspective’, which, as Teun 
van Dijk notes 
 
may be found in all areas of discourse studies, such as discourse grammar, 
Conversation Analysis, discourse pragmatics, rhetoric, stylistics, narrative analysis, 
argumentation analysis, multimodal discourse analysis and social semiotics, 
sociolinguistics, and ethnography of communication or the psychology of 
discourse-processing, among others (van Dijk, 2015, p. 466) 
 
The way that this intersected with my use of qualitative language analysis software NVivo was 
therefore pertinent. For instance, the ways that NVivo draws connections between frequently 
occurring terms is chiefly quantitative, which potentially lends itself towards reductive 
interpretations of research materials: it does not allow, for instance, for words with multiple 
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meanings to be identified within their broader discursive contexts. Using NVivo for my research 
analyses thus necessitated self-reflexivity and an understanding of how the analytic mechanisms 
within the software functioned, as well as an awareness of the broader discursive structures within 
which specific terms existed. 
 
Weiss and Wodak also describe CDA in terms of a synthesis of approaches, some of the most 
prominent being Foucauldian approaches to discourse and the utilization of Bourdieu’s habitus 
(2003, p. 6). Habitus refers to patterns in behaviour that might be associated with an actor’s cultural 
and social background, including race, gender, class, ethnicity and sexuality, where these cultural 
and personal elements are not understood as determined (Power, 1999, p. 48). It is, as Elaine 
Power writes, ‘a way of describing the embodiment of social structures and history in individuals 
[…] a set of dispositions, internal and external, that both reflects external social structures and 
shapes how the individual perceives the world and acts in it’ (ibid). Foucauldian discourse analysis 
similarly aims to make explicit the ways power performs within social relations, where discourse is 
understood to play a pivotal role in the maintenance of structures of power, and how these impact 
social groups (Powers, 2015, p. 18).  
 
CDA might also foreground why the researcher selects the area of study, how it will be studied, 
and the approach taken to the materials. Each of these elements of the research process are 
inseparably entangled with the researchers own beliefs, cultural background, language, personal 
histories, and interests, which will always steer the research in a direction that is specific to the 
researcher. CDA foregrounds these subjective particularities, and aims to situate them within wider 
structures of power. ‘The right interpretation does not exist; a hermeneutic approach is necessary. 
Interpretations can be more or less plausible or adequate, but they cannot be ‘true’’ (Wodak & 
Ludwig, 1999, p. 13). As an approach that encourages self-reflexivity and focuses largely on 
analyses of the materials captured or given (in this thesis’s case interviews, Tweets, and web 
content from specific sources), CDA complimented the scales of my other research methods, 
which were chiefly ethnographic and autoethnographic. These methodologies, as I use them in 
this thesis, each foreground how the subjectivity of the researcher is intimately tied with any claims 
to truth made, and how examinations into microcosmic formulations can reveal patterns which 
bare relevance to broader political and cultural frameworks.  
 
Having now critically framed each of the methodological frameworks that I used to compile the 
research data of this thesis, I will now outline how these were applied for each critical case study. 
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This will detail how the research was gathered and subsequently analysed, and the ethical 
considerations that were specific to each case study. 
 
2.6 Participant Observation at Camp Wild* 
 
In this section I provide details around the ethical and methodological practices that I enacted at 
the Camp Wild as a participant observer. I will highlight what terms were agreed with the 
organisers of the retreat prior to my attendance, and how my data were subsequently recorded in 
accordance with these terms. I will also focus on how causing harm was avoided, how privacy was 
preserved, how informed consent was attained, and how the process was deemed to be ethical by 
the University of Sussex (appendix 2.5).  
 
I attended the retreat as a ‘camper’, meaning that I was not involved in the set-up, planning or 
running of the retreat, and experienced the four-day event as a participant observer, in a way that 
was broadly similar to the other paying guests (non-paying attendees were those who were 
conducting workshops or helping organise the camp). I lived alongside the other participants for 
the entire duration of the retreat, and slept in the children’s summer-camp-style cabins that were 
located on the site. I attended workshops and events alongside other campers, as well as taking 
coffee and lunch breaks together. Spending this time fully-immersed in the camp’s activities 
allowed me to develop trust between myself and the other campers, and – with the caveats set out 
above with regards to ‘work’ – to share their experience. It also facilitated informal discussion 
about my research during the semi-structured interviews that I followed up with. Participants, 
including myself, were not permitted to have cameras (digital or otherwise) for the duration of the 
retreat, nor were we allowed mobile devices, laptops, or any other items that could be labelled as 
‘digital’ (there were however discontinuities in what was considered to be ‘digital’, which I will 
discuss in detail in chapter five). Prior to the retreat, I was asked by the organisers not to utilise 
any digital devices for the recording of my research data whilst on site, as this may have altered the 
experiences of other campers. This meant that all of my field notes were made using pen and 
paper, and consisted of my own observations about the camp, and brief notes about conversations 
that I’d had with other campers (appendix 4.4). 
 
Besides the prohibition of our digital devices and other photographic apparatuses, there were 
several other prominent rules that we, as paying attendees, were to abide by during our stay: we 
were asked not to engage in ‘work talk’ (discussion of our professions), and we were to use 
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nicknames of our own choosing for the duration of the retreat. All campers were informed about 
these rules via email prior to attending. The ‘no work talk’ rule also prompted ethical questions 
about how I would present myself as researcher. Participants were informed that a UK-based 
researcher would be present at the camp prior to arrival in a group email that was sent to all 
attendees (appendix 4.3). This email stated that I would only be taking hand-written notes, and 
that no recording devices would be used. It also noted that my research adhered to a policy of 
‘complete anonymity’, meaning that any details of location and identity would be abstracted from 
my research. Participants of the ‘digital detox’ were reminded of my presence again during an 
opening presentation given by one of the camp’s organisers. If there was any discomfort or 
opposition to my presence at the camp, participants were told that they should report this to one 
of the camp’s ‘counsellors’ (these were appointed helpers who had often been involved in the 
retreat in previous years, and were now involved in the organisation of the retreat). If there were 
any concerns expressed, I was not informed of these.  
 
As noted earlier in this chapter, my role as researcher meant my experience was different to the 
other campers in that they were at the retreat specifically to remove themselves from discussions 
of their ‘work’. Although we were asked not to speak of our professions whilst at the camp, I 
decided that it was unethical to anonymise myself, and thus informed those around me that I was 
the person conducting the research. Responses to this were mixed, but I was never policed or 
instructed not to speak of my role. There were sometimes instances in which the topic of my 
research prompted discussion around my subject area, and others where attendees commented 
that they were ‘being watched’. I was never asked not to make notes when comments such as 
‘we’re being watched’ were made, and if I sensed that participants felt uncomfortable about my 
presence during discussions, I asked for additional consent about whether I could make notes 
about what had been said. Participants always consented on the condition that conversations were 
anonymised. This combination of factors meant my role as researcher did alter the experiences of 
the participants to some degree. It is also relevant to note here that repeated narratives put forward 
by the camp of it being a ‘safe space’ where people were ‘free to be whoever they wanted to be’, 
alongside factors such as the prohibition of cameras and discussion of professions, were done to 
help participants of the ‘digital detox’ feel less self-conscious (more details of this will be explored 
in chapter five). I thus felt that overt note taking would have significantly altered the experiences 
of those at camp. In order to mitigate this dynamic slightly, I recorded notes a few minutes after 
conversations had taken place, and made these whilst sitting alone. This was not however 
 45 
completely private as all of the spaces for paying attendees were shared, which meant that others 
were able to see me working.  
 
There was also a culture amongst some of the campers - certainly not all - of sharing alcohol and 
hallucinogenic substances. This was a very minor element of the camp, however it did provoke 
important ethical considerations. I was not aware of this prior to attending, although 
retrospectively it had been vaguely alluded to in the ‘BYOF’ section of the email (an acronym for 
‘bring your own fun’, which included ‘alcohol, herbs or elsewise’, see appendix 4.1). Although 
campers had been made aware that I would be making notes throughout the duration of the camp, 
and were thus aware that research would be ongoing, I never made notes on conversations held 
with campers if I was aware that they were under the influence of any illicit substance, or if I felt 
their judgement had been impaired by the consumption of alcohol. If participants were not sober 
then their memory or judgement may have been potentially impaired, which I felt provoked 
problematic issues with regards to participants being able to grant fully informed consent. 
Therefore, all notes I made pertaining to the use of substances were highly generalised. By this, I 
mean I did not make notes on specific individuals, and referred to the use of alcohol and 
substances in the broad sense of these being part of the culture at the camp. This was to protect 
participants from any potential legal consequences that could result from the publication of my 
study, and to minimise any risk of psychological harm that could have been caused from overt 
note taking while attendees were under the influence. Details of the name of the camp, the names 
of the participants, and any other identifying information have been abstracted from my study. It 
is also pertinent to note that I never felt threatened, or in danger, as a consequence of the presence 
of alcohol and hallucinogenic substances being used at the camp.  
 
This case study was retrospectively assessed by the ethical review board at the University of Sussex. 
Prior to my attendance at the camp, I completed the ethical assessment required by the University 
of Sussex, which was subsequently approved by my supervisors. However, due to some 
misunderstandings in how this procedure was to be fully completed, it was not formally cleared 
by the CREC review board prior to my attendance at the retreat. Following my visit however, I 
provided full details of how the details of my participation were agreed with the camps organisers, 
how the organisers of the camp informed attendees of the camp about my presence and the 
research I would be conducting, how I informed my interviewees about what would be required 
of them within research interviews, how I informed my interviews about how the information they 
provided in research interviews would be used, and how I attained consent from my interviewees. 
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After providing these details, the chair of SS-ARTS CREC wrote a full letter noting that the 
research I conducted was ethical, despite the fact that institutional ethical approval was not gained 
before-hand. This letter is attached in full in the appendices of the thesis (appendix 2.5). 
 
2.7 Semi-Structured Interviews: Digital Detoxers and Autonomy 
 
I will now detail how the data for my research interviews was gathered. The interviews for both 
the case study of Camp Wild and Autonomy were conducted via Skype, or other video-calling 
software such as Facetime. These different video-calling applications were used in accordance with 
the preferences of my participants, rather than due to my own choices around the politics or the 
various affordances of these pieces of software. The only functions we used within the software 
were audio and video for video-calling, which meant the different applications made little 
difference to the data produced. All data was transcribed in the same way, and the audio was of a 
similar quality.  
 
That the interviews were conducted via video-calling software was due to distance, since all of my 
interviewees lived in far-away locations that were too costly for me to travel to. All of my 
interviewees did however have means to conduct video calls via the internet. This was not 
necessarily my preferred method since this was prone to disruptions. The most prominent issue 
that I experienced conducting interviews in this way was fluctuating internet connection. This 
meant that aspects of some conversations were inaudible, or discussions were interrupted as we 
attempted to regain sufficient connection, which lead to some interviews feeling stunted. It was 
also more difficult to observe the non-verbal cues of participants using video-calling software, 
which was particularly prevalent during the Camp Wild interviews as participants sometimes used 
bodily gestures to help describe the sensations that they experienced during the ‘digital detox’. As 
Mary Bayles notes in relation to Skype, ‘we lose the full range of postural, gestural, and expressive 
movement that the body conveys, as well as the intentionality that is carried and expressed in that 
movement’ (2012, p. 578). Interviewing via Skype did however have some advantages, in that my 
participants could undertake the interview in a space which felt comfortable to them, and they 
didn’t have to spend extra time or money travelling to a given location. It is also relevant to note 
that none of my interviewees expressed concerns around the video-calling software and end-to-
end encryption. Since my interview questions did not directly enquire into what might be deemed 
as sensitive personal information (for instance, experiences of trauma, engagement in illegal 
activity, and so on), I did not find it necessary to conduct the interviews with software that had 
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stronger end-to-end encryption than Skype or Facetime. In order to reduce any extra unpaid labour 
from my participants, I usually asked which video-call software would be most accessible to them 
and used their chosen software for the interview. 
 
My research interviews for Camp Wild were carried out with fourteen of the camp’s attendees 
across a two-month period following our time at the camp. Those who I interviewed responded 
to a request I’d posted on a ‘closed-group’ for the camp’s attendees on Facebook. This request 
invited the group to get in touch if they were willing to participate in a research interview with me 
about their experiences of the camp, and noted that the interviews would likely take around twenty 
to thirty minutes. As the relationships I had established with my participants whilst at the camp 
were generally cordial and friendly, the interview format was fairly conversational, and other 
questions formulated on the spot were often asked in response to the answers that participants 
had given (sample interview provided in appendix 4.5). I asked each of the volunteers the same 
set of pre-established interview questions, regarding: what their motivations were in attending a 
‘digital detox’; how they found the experience; how they thought other people’s experiences were 
similar or different to their own; how they interacted with others whilst at the camp; and if they 
considered these interactions to be different to those that they usually have outside of the camp. 
The interviews generally took between fifteen and thirty minutes, and several neared an hour in 
length. Of the fifteen volunteers, eight were female, and seven were male. Thirteen of these 
volunteers were Canadian, were nearly all between the ages of twenty-eight and thirty-five, and 
were vast-majority white. Consent was initially attained verbally for these interviews during the 
video-calls themselves, and then subsequently my interviewees each signed a consent form using 
e-sign software (appendix 5.5). Verbal consent and signatures were attained from all of my 
interview participants. 
 
The research interviews with Autonomy were undertaken in a broadly similar fashion, in that they 
were semi-structured and conducted via video-calling software. I became aware of Autonomy 
through an acquaintance who is involved in running the think-tank, who assisted me in providing 
contact information for the others involved. I contacted every person who featured on the 
Autonomy website during my research interview period7, and interviewed all who responded and 
consented to giving an interview. I sent all prospective participants the same initial email regarding 
the basic purpose of the interview (appendix 2.1), which entailed information about the 
overarching themes of my thesis, and what I would require from them in terms of time and 
                                                 
7 Research interview period fell between May 2018 and September 2018 
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information. There were some instances in which participants consented to giving an interview 
from the information I’d provided in this initial email, and others in which participants requested 
a little more information or detail about what questions I would be asking them, in order to 
prepare. I provided the questions prior to the interview in these cases, which meant there was 
some variation with regards to the spontaneity of the answers provided by my interviewees. Prior 
to the interviews, all interviewees were sent an information sheet (appendix 2.2), which provided 
more details about the conditions of their participation, and how the information would be used. 
All participants were also sent consent forms which were signed using e-sign software (appendix 
2.3). Signatures were attained for all of the interviews I conducted.  
 
For the most part, I asked each participant the same set of pre-defined interview questions8. 
Largely, I asked the participants about what it was that interested them about anti-work, and what 
they saw to be the core issues (sample interview appendix 6.2). I enquired about how they were 
personally responding to issues around anti-work, how the issues were being addressed by 
Autonomy, and where it was that they envisaged Autonomy having an impact. Notions of ‘post-
work’ were also discussed, where I asked them what they understood a ‘post-work’ society to be, 
whether they saw a ‘post-work’ society to be a feasible prospect, and the role they envisaged 
technology playing within prospective ‘post-work’ futures. This tied into my broader thesis themes 
around capitalist realist imaginaries, and how and where this is tied with the epistemological and 
material conditions of digital environments.  
 
2.8 Digital Humanities Methods and ‘Blockchain for Good’ 
 
I will now detail the methodologies that I employed for the ‘blockchain for good’ case study, which 
is comprised of two parts: the first is a CDA of two ‘blockchain for good’ texts, which were 
attained via ‘snowballing’ through internet links; and the second is a data-scrape of Twitter that 
was undertaken with some natural language processing software. In this section I will also reflect 
upon some of the ethical considerations that were encompassed with these digital methods: while 
the data gathering for the ‘blockchain for good’ chapter did not necessitate formalised ethical 
clearance from the University of Sussex, there were nonetheless ethical considerations to be made 
regarding my use of internet data.  
                                                 
8 Occasionally questions were missed or asked in a different order to the basic structure I’d initially 
planned, if I felt the question was not appropriate for the discussion at the time. There were also times 
when I veered from the set of pre-defined interview questions, if the interviewee had provided an answer 
which had prompted further discussion. 
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By ‘snowballing’, I mean that I browsed through a series of internet articles via links or references 
provided within a given text. This was thus - as with all of my research data - also heavily influenced 
by my own biases and choices pertaining to what I deemed to be most relevant to my broader 
research. In order to eliminate some of this bias, I only selected texts which specifically invoked 
the slogan ‘blockchain for good’ (and not, for instance, initiatives that featured in some ‘blockchain 
for good’ discourses, such as specific digital identity initiatives, or initiatives for financial inclusion). 
While ‘blockchain for good’ is a discourse that provided ample scope for a case study, I was not 
able to find a wealth of texts with - what I considered to be - sufficient data for a CDA. I thus 
selected the two texts that were labelled with the slogan ‘blockchain for good’, and contained the 
most amount of text that would then be lucrative for exploring and corroborating key ‘blockchain 
for good’ themes. Another factor in the selection of these texts was that I initially conducted my 
searches via Google. I used Google as I wanted to explore the most hegemonic applications of the 
slogan ‘blockchain for good’, which I felt would be most likely generated via Google due to it 
being the most popular search engine globally (StatCounter, 2020). However, when conducting 
the same searches via search engines such as DuckDuckGo - which does not store any personal 
user data and is less influenced by corporate agendas (for instance, it does not sell personal data 
to advertisers) - I discovered that I encountered very similar search results to those that were 
generated by Google. It is thus difficult to accurately state how heavily influenced my research 
data were through using Google specifically, and its various procedures for compiling and ordering 
search results.   
 
I conducted the data scrape of Twitter using Method52, which is a piece of proprietary Natural 
Language Processing (NLP) software. Access to this software was again granted by the University 
of Sussex. I used Method52 to crawl Twitter for all Tweets9 containing the term ‘#blockchain’ 
across a six-week period between July and August in 2018. It was also subsequently used to 
automate the analysis of the scraped data. Via engaging with this experiment in digital methods, I 
sought to explore the ideological and epistemological limitations of this particular digital 
methodology, and how power was materialised in the various stages of this data scraping process: 
each within myself and my own decision-making processes; within my institutional setting; within 
the material affordances of the software; and in relation to the agencies of the code-writers and 
                                                 
9 There were various moments in which the network connectivity fluctuated, which caused a few 
disruptions to the scrape. These disruptions were minor however, and since the scrape accumulated such 
a vast span of data, we decided that the effects upon the final results would be very minimal, or at least, 
would not have a significant effect upon what I was intending to explore. 
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developers. I also intended to critically explore what this particular digital method allowed me to 
see, the forms of intelligibility that were offered by the software, and how this was significant to 
some of the narratives embedded in ‘blockchain for good’ discourses. 
 
The scrape was largely assisted by Jack Pay, a member of the Text Analysis Group (TAG) at the 
University of Sussex. TAG conduct research into AI and Natural Language Processing (NLP), 
and have developed approaches to ‘classification, information extraction, influencer analysis, 
automatic tagging and automated dialogue’ (Tag Laboratory, 2019). The current TAG team 
includes fourteen men and two women. Their NLP technologies are utilised for the analysis of 
text documents and social media data. Their main foci, as stated on their home page, pertains to 
the study of ‘the impact of social media on politics, policy-making and law enforcement’, as well 
as ‘associated emerging social phenomena including radicalisation, community intolerance, 
information spread and coordination (e.g. in disaster response), and approaches to health and 
wellbeing’ (ibid). 
 
The ‘Major Projects’ page of the TAG website lists a series of projects that the Method52 software 
has been used for. Some of these were for commercial projects, such as ‘Mobile Commerce as a 
Service’ in 2014, which was intended to help businesses understand the ‘intent’ of their customer 
base via social media data and text messages. Another project entitled ‘Policing Hate Crime: 
Modernising the Craft, an Evidence Based Approach’, undertaken between 2015 and 2017, 
explored how ‘the policing of hate crime might be improved through the application of NLP 
technology’, where ‘community temperament’ – as indicated via social media platforms – was 
examined in correlation with incidents of hate crime (TAG Laboratory, 2019). These projects were 
funded by groups such as Innovate UK, The Metropolitan Police Service, the Police Knowledge 
Fund, and Demos. As highlighted in section 2.3, that Method52 is mobilised within these spheres 
indicates that there is a significant relationship between securitisation, consumer analysis and the 
epistemological formulations that are specific to such forms of software. TAG also work alongside 
governments and businesses, and co-founded the Centre for Analysis of Social Media, which 
works closely, as the TAG homepage foregrounds, with the think-tank Demos (ibid). Demos 
define themselves as ‘a champion of people, ideas, and democracy’ and are oriented towards 
‘policy solutions’ (Demos, 2018). They utilise machine learning and big data to ‘understand social 
trends as well as people’s lives and experiences’, and are ‘authentically cross party’, working with 
governments and ‘social and community leaders, businesses and campaigners to renew Britain’ 
(Demos, 2018). Their website information also lends specific attention to ideas for the future, 
 51 
where, they write, ‘we innovate and look forward […] we don’t see problems, we see the 
opportunity to come up with new solutions’ (ibid).  
 
The Method52 software combines two approaches to analysing semantics: a compositional 
approach, and a distributional approach. The compositional approach explores how an infinite 
number of sentences and meanings can be generated via a limited vocabulary (TAG Laboratory, 
2019). A distributional approach delves into the meanings of the words themselves, and how the 
meaning of a word is contingent upon its surrounding context (ibid). This is premised upon the 
idea that certain words are more likely to occur within certain contexts, and will have a closer 
relation – if drawn mathematically – than others (ibid). ‘Mathematically these contexts are typically 
represented in vector space’, TAG writes, ‘so that word meanings occupy positions in a 
geometrical space’ (2019). They provide the example of the words ‘cat’ and ‘dog’ being more likely 
to be closely related in ‘vector space’ than the words ‘dog’ and ‘television’.  
 
This was the first time that I’d interacted with any NLP software. I learned how to operate the 
software through a series of meetings with Jack, where he explained much of the software’s 
functionality, and as I then interacted with the data during my own time. Jack constructed the 
initial settings for the scrape, oversaw the process as it was underway, and advised me on how to 
proceed with each stage. I chose an autoethnographic approach to narrate this process, where I 
purposefully make no make no claims to objectivity or ‘political neutrality’ (Grande, 2008); rather, 
part of my objective in using these methodologies conjunctively was to foreground the non-
neutrality of each of these methods. It was each an ethical, ontological and epistemological exercise, 
where I could explore and challenge the forms of knowledge and relationality that my engagement 
with this data-scraping method encouraged (Kim, 2018, p. 484). 
 
I chose Twitter as the resource for the scrape for several reasons. Twitter is a social networking 
platform that allows users to post, interact with and follow brief snippets of information that have 
been posted by other users. While user-produced content is a primary component of the Twitter 
platform, much of its functionality is proprietary and black-boxed (Kim, 2018). While I was in a 
position of privilege, in that I was working with an academic institution that had the financial 
means to crawl Twitter data (Boyd and Crawford, 2011; Crawford and Finn, 2014), there were still 
limitations upon what we were able to gather, and how we were able to engage with what was 
gathered. Since the data-set was so large, creating filters or viewing samples of the data were 
necessary for analysing the data within the timeframe of my thesis writing. We were also not able 
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to crawl Twitter for history that went beyond the previous week. This was due to limitations with 
Twitter’s Standard Search API and Method52, which are in place largely due to the technical 
difficulties of making Twitter data beyond this scope indexable and searchable. There are also legal 
limitations which meant that crawling data on Twitter beyond this timeframe is limited (Twitter 
Developer, 2019).  
 
I was curious to explore Twitter as a result of a series of claims I’d read pertaining to Twitter 
having a more diverse user-base than other social-networking platforms (Smith, 2011; cited in 
Brock, 2012, p. 529). In this regard, some have highlighted how Twitter is not limited to certain 
forms of Internet access; users can contribute to the platform via SMS from a non-smartphone 
platform, which has been part of Twitter’s functionality since it began in 2005. Citing Smith, Brock 
has noted that of Black internet users, 25% use Twitter, in comparison to 9% of online Whites, 
and suggests that the reasons for this may be down to the variety of ways that users can post to 
the platform (ibid, p. 529). These claims to Twitter’s diversity were interesting as I felt there were 
links between this and the claims to inclusivity put toward in some of the ‘blockchain for good’ 
discourses; while Twitter may be considered a more inclusive platform than others, my research 
into the biases within corporate technologies in particular had led me to believe that the various 
material affordances of the platform would nonetheless favour certain politics, cultural 
frameworks and social groups above others.  
 
Boyd and Crawford also highlight some more generalised methodological considerations when it 
comes to crawling data from Twitter that were relevant to this case study. Their article, ‘Six 
Provocations for Big Data’, posits that questions of ‘who gets access? For what purposes? In what 
contexts? And with what constraints?’ must always be foregrounded when researching with or 
about big data (2011, p. 12). Regarding Twitter specifically, they note that specific ethical 
considerations might pertain to how consent might be given for the use of Tweets. ‘It may be 
unreasonable to ask researchers to obtain consent from every person who posts a Tweet’, they 
write, ‘but it is unethical for researchers to justify their actions as ethical simply because the data 
is accessible’ (ibid, p. 11). While Tweets - unless protected - are written for public viewing, they 
argue that this might not necessarily mean that the authors of Tweets (or other online content) 
had anticipated that their content would be scrutinized for the purposes of  research (ibid). Other 
considerations that Boyd and Crawford highlight include: acknowledging that data from Twitter 
does not represent ‘all people’, since access to the Internet is not universal, and not all Internet 
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users have a Twitter account; that some Tweets may be generated from bots; some users may have 
multiple Twitter accounts; and some accounts may be utilised by more than one user (ibid, p. 6).   
 
Thus, while my institutional setting did not require formalised ethical approval for this case study, 
there were nonetheless several ethical considerations to be made regarding the use of public 
internet data. While all Tweets used in this study were made public, this did not - as highlighted 
above - necessarily mean that the authors of the Tweets consented to the use of this data for my 
research. It was however impossible to gain consent from the authors of all of the Tweets used in 
my study. One measure that I took to mitigate this issue slightly was anonymising the Tweets that 
I use in my case study, meaning that there was less chance of the authors of the Tweets facing any 
negative consequences as a result of the Tweets being used in my research. The Method52 software 




This chapter has outlined the methodologies that were used for gathering and analysing the 
empirical components of this thesis. I have outlined how these methodologies were specifically 
enacted for each case study, and what ethical considerations these each came to encompass. My 
hopes in using mixed methodologies were that engaging with a synthesis of approaches would 
provide greater scope for exploring any epistemological limitations that might be bound with using 
one singular methodology. This is something I confront most extensively in my case study of 
‘blockchain for good’, where I use an autoethnographic approach to narrate a data-scrape process 
to specifically explore the epistemological limitations of this digital method, and vice versa. 
However, I also extensively engage with a variety of tools and approaches for my case studies of 
Camp Wild and Autonomy, where I used qualitative data analysis software NVivo to compliment 
and shed new light upon any hypotheses drawn from my close readings, and engage with materials 
that were generated from participant observation, semi-structured interviews and discourse that 
was written specifically for public reading. This variation in scales thus offers an array of 












This chapter will explore and critique a series of theoretical accounts that engage with forms of 
sociomateriality. This will lay the conceptual foundations for the empirical case studies undertaken 
later in the thesis, which were both informed by, and developed in response to, some of the 
perspectives outlined in this chapter. Sociomateriality, as I use it here, refers to the social norms 
and processes that are entangled with matter, and how these entanglements recursively shape and 
influence the conditions and practices of everyday life (Orlikowski, 2007; Shotter, 2013). The 
perspectives I outline in this chapter chiefly emerge from feminist, de-colonial and post-colonial 
science and technology studies (STS), among which I situate my own work. I provide a route 
through the arguments offered by these writers, and draw upon a series of central threads within 
these: firstly, some of the ways that technological determinism has been conceptualised, and within 
this, how technologically deterministic ideology can be understood to be constitutive of an 
epistemic framework that helps propagate corporate and state power (Wyatt, 2008); secondly, how 
this epistemic framework is intertwined with histories of colonialism, and concomitant systems of 
heteronormative patriarchy; and thirdly, how these logics are manifest in the material conditions 
of digital environments, and are embroiled with forms of cognition, relationality, imaginaries and 
subjectivities.  
 
This chapter will thus proceed as follows. In the first section, I explore a series of ways of 
understanding technological determinism. This has been variously conceptualised amongst a wide 
range of accounts10, but technological determinism can be defined, broadly, as an approach that 
positions technologies to be the core drivers of social change (Wyatt, 2008; Cherlet, 2011). This 
rests upon a conceptual binary split between humans and nonhumans, which allows for 
technologies to be distinguished as their own ontological entities, distinct from the influence of 
politics and culture (Latour, 1993). While it has been described as ‘old fashioned’ within a series 
of STS accounts (Cherlet, 2014), technologically deterministic discourse frequently occurs within 
contemporary debates surrounding the ‘effects’ of digital technology upon cognition and 
behaviour (Carr, 2007; 2011; Sullivan, 2016; Lewis, 2017), as well as in discourses used in spheres 
                                                 
10 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to give a comprehensive overview of each of these accounts and 
theoretical positions. I therefore chiefly explore the accounts on technological determinism that bare 
relevance to the thesis’s empirical case studies. 
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such as advertising and developmental aid (Cherlet, 2011). For these reasons, I argue that it remains 
important to consider where and how technologically deterministic ideology occurs, and what 
forms of power this might propagate. These considerations provide some of the key theoretical 
framework for the arguments I develop in later chapters. In chapter four, discursive binary splits 
between humans and digital technologies were integral to Camp Wild’s ethos of digital 
rejectionism, and were thus, I argue, an essential part of the discourse that prompted the 
community to gather at this ‘digital detox’ site. In chapter five, I explore forms of techno-
solutionism in ‘blockchain for good’ discourses, within which technological determinist discourse 
helps ambiguate what I argue to be contemporary forms of neo-colonial power. In chapter six, I 
explore how technological determinism occurs in the discourses of left-wing think-tank 
Autonomy, where notions of harnessing ‘automation’ for their leftist ‘post-work’ agendas are a 
core part of their public facing discourse.  
 
In the following section of the chapter, I then turn to an exploration of feminist, de-colonial and 
post-colonial accounts that have worked, in part, to destabilise such discursive binarisms. These 
accounts foreground how these binary formations are constitutive of a broader epistemic order 
that helps sustain specific hierarchies and cultural assumptions, pertaining specifically to notions 
of race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality and class (Haraway, 1991; Vazquez, 2011; Mbembe, 2017). I 
draw upon the work of Browne (2015) and Mbembe (2017), who highlight how the epistemic 
tendencies of contemporary techno-science have been a fundamental component in the 
subordination of marginalised groups by Western apparatuses. By ‘contemporary techno-science’, 
I mean, drawing on the works of Haraway (1991), Vazquez (2011) and Mbmebe (2017), the 
epistemic configurations that have derived from modernity, and have come to consolidate 
economy, science and technology in the West.  
 
The final section of the chapter then turns to an exploration of literature that highlights how 
identity and subjectivity are constituted across a network of life and matter (Haraway, 1991; 
Bennett, 2005a; Stiegler, 2012b; 2015a; 2015b). I pay particular attention to the notion of 
‘individuation’ as it occurs within the work of Bernard Stiegler, who develops the term from 
Simondon (2015a; 2015b). Individuation, broadly, refers to a continual course of transformation 
that occurs across a network of people and things, one in which the individual alters, or is altered, 
by their material and social environment; always as relation, never as ‘stasis and identity’ (Stiegler, 
2015b, p. 52). I then link these theories to the works of Haraway and Jane Bennett, who advocate 
for a ‘radical kinship of people and things’ (Bennett, 2005a), where identity is always bound in a 
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‘relational […] web or dance of life and being’ (O’Riordan, 2019). These accounts argue that 
relationships between life and matter are, at their heart, political, and foreground how digital 
technologies – often forming extensions of capital – are embroiled with forms of relationality, 
imaginaries, and ways-of seeing.  
 
3.1 Technological Determinism 
 
Technological determinism, put simply, is an ideology that positions shifts in technology to be the 
driving force behind social change (Wyatt, 2008; Cherlet, 2011). While the extent to which 
technology is understood as the fundamental driver of social change varies from account to account, 
technologically determinist thought generally posits that technologies bear a greater influence over 
societal conditions than any other factor (Smith, 1994, p. 2). Although it has been dismissed as 
‘old fashioned’ (Cherlet, 2014, p. 775), ‘wrong-headed’ (Smith, 1994, p. 172) and ‘intellectually 
poor’ (Bijker, 1995) within a series of STS accounts, technologically deterministic rhetoric is 
embroiled with a great deal of contemporary discourse surrounding digital technologies and their 
perceived ‘effects’ (Carr, 2014; Sullivan, 2016; Lewis, 2017; Cherlet, 2011). For this reason, I would 
contend that rather than dismiss technological determinism as ‘old fashioned’, it is important to 
consider the various ways in which technological determinism occurs within contemporary 
discourse, how and where such discourse has emerged, and whose worlds technologically 
deterministic discourse might propagate. As Wyatt notes, 
 
Technological determinism persists in the actions taken and justifications given by 
many actors; it persists in analysts’ use of it to make sense of the introduction of 
technology in a variety of social settings; it persists in manifold theoretical abstract 
accounts of the relationship between the technical and the social; it persists in the 
responses of policy makers and politicians to challenges about the need or 
appropriateness for new technologies; and it persists in the reactions we experience 
when confronted with new machines and new ways of doing things (2008, p. 167) 
 
A common thread throughout technological determinist discourse is the labelling of ‘whole 
historical epochs and societies by their dominant technological artefacts’ (Wyatt, 2008, p. 168). 
This can be seen in notions such as the ‘age of the smart machine’ (Zuboff, 1989), the ‘network 
society’ (van Dijk, 2006; Castells, 1996), the ‘information society’ (Crawford, 1983; van Dijk, 2006; 
Webster, 2006), the ‘datafied society’ (van Es & Schäfer, 2016), the ‘information age’ (Castells, 
1996; Fuchs, 2008), and etcetera, which each broadly11 refer to the involvement of digital 
                                                 
11 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail the various nuances of these categories.  
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technologies with shifts in the organisation of econom(ies) and societ(ies). Often, these accounts 
articulate notions of epochal ‘breaks’ with the past, invoking discourse of newness, such as the 
‘new frontier of power’ (Zuboff, 2019), the ‘new digital age’ (Schmidt and Cohen, 2013), or a ‘new 
brave world’ (van Es & Schäfer, 2016, p. 13). Such linguistic tendencies, as highlighted by cultural 
studies theorist Raymond Williams, recur throughout history: Williams notes how ‘people often 
speak of a new world, a new society, a new phase of history, being created ‘brought about’ - by 
this or that new technology: the steam engine, the automobile, the atomic bomb’ (1974, p. 1). 
Williams positions his own work in opposition to McLuhanesque medium theory, and rejects ‘any 
form of technological determinism’ (Silverstone, 2003, p. viii). Instead, he maintains that 
technological development occurs principally in accordance with shifting economic and social 
pressures. ‘Industrialisation and modernisation had created new demands and new challenges’, 
Silverstone writes in regard to Williams, ‘for order, for control and for communication’ (ibid, p. viii, 
emphasis added). This tension - between technological determinism and what is sometimes termed 
‘cultural determinism’ - is one that recurs throughout a wealth of STS debates (Mumford, 1934; 
Winner, 1978; Bimber, 1994; Wyatt, 2008).   
 
Lewis Mumford was one of the early leading practitioners of the tendency of defining societies in 
relation to their dominant technological artefacts. In his 1934 account Technics and Civilisation, 
Mumford documents the ‘profound modifi[cations]’ to Western civilisation that he associates with 
the advent of the ‘machine’ (1934, p.3). Throughout the text Mumford voices concerns around 
agency, and the influence of the ‘machine [of] automatic action’ upon the cognition of its user(s) 
(ibid, p. 10). Mumford labels his own technological environment to be ‘inhuman’, and envisages 
an ‘earth-centred, organic and human model’ to which society must ‘return’, in order to resist 
machinic domination (ibid; Winner, 1978, p. 5). Mechanisation, for Mumford, is framed as a force 
that hinders skill and cognitive function: machines, operating according to rationalistic logics, are 
bound with discourses of ‘inhumanity’, while the ‘earth’ and the ‘organic’ are positioned as the 
machine’s opposites. Mumford’s discourse is frequently predicated upon this discursive binary 
distinction between ‘human’ and ‘machine’, where the ‘human’ is framed as having sets of inherent 
qualities that render it ontologically distinct from the machine. He believed, Rosalind Williams 
notes, that ‘the first step in reorienting our civilization was understanding the machine, as a means 
of understanding society and ourselves’ (Williams, 2002, p. 141). The influence of the machine 
upon the cognition of its users is a key concern in Mumford’s work, and how this is tied up with 
wider political and economic dynamics. 
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Mumford’s critique of the ‘machine’ is intimately tied with concerns around mechanisation, and 
the impact that this had upon the capacities of the working class to understand the labour process 
in its ‘totality’. Mechanisation, for Mumford, refers to the process of replacing physical labour with 
machines (1934). He describes how the measurement technics that were pivotal to the expansion 
of Taylorism during this period allowed elements of the labour process to be broken down into 
discrete elements, geared toward the optimisation of speed, productivity and profit. ‘Technics’ 
became capable of undertaking certain tasks at much lower costs than human labourers, which 
bought about significant shifts in the ways in which workers engaged with the labour process. 
While workers once conducted the majority of the labour, their roles shifted to operating the 
machines that conducted the labour they had previously undertaken. Mumford posits that the 
capacities of the proletariat to understand the ‘totality’ of the labour process became reduced to 
mere ‘fragments’, who thus lost the ‘capacity for intelligent response’ as they came to embody 
‘machine-like precision and regularity’ (1934, p. 96). He speaks of a materially induced ‘paralysis’, 
yet remains hopeful that a shift toward an ‘organic ideology’ could emerge, where the machine 
would be contracted ‘to those areas in which it directly serves as an instrument of human purpose’ 
(ibid, p. 427, emphasis added). For Mumford, the ‘machine’ divides, and makes the worlds it 
touches more efficient, in accordance with the motives of capital; the ‘human’, on the other hand, 
is ‘whole’, and seeks ‘human satisfaction and cultural achievement’ (ibid, p. 433). This is a linguistic 
and epistemological tendency that persists within much of the discourse featuring in my empirical 
case study materials, which I will continue to explore, and unpack the significance of, in coming 
chapters.  
 
Within a series of early technologically deterministic STS accounts, digital technologies are often 
framed as having their own inherent qualities, and are thought ‘almost exclusively in artefactual 
terms’ (Heilbroner, 1967). Bruce Bimber’s work on technological determinism cites Robert 
Heilbroner’s article, Do Machines Make History, as a prime example of one of these accounts 
(1994). In this article, Heilbroner understands history to be bound by a specific scientific order 
that would sequentially be uncovered by living-beings, and explores whether technological 
development follows a ‘fixed sequence’, along which ‘technologically developing societies must 
travel’ (Heilbroner, 1967, p. 336; Bimber, 1994). ‘I believe there is such a sequence’, he continues, 
‘that the steam-mill follows the hand-mill not by chance but because it is the next “stage” in a 
technical conquest of nature that follows one and only one grand avenue of advance’ (ibid, emphasis 
added). Such rhetoric is deeply entangled with the culture of modernity, where technological 
developments are often equated with unilinear notions of progress (Brey, 2003; Wyatt, 2008). 
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Bassett aptly frames this narrative as an ‘optimism as a belief in Progress that produces an 
orientation towards the future made myopic by the given-ness of the present (the givens of the 
market producing the endless repetition of the commodity form)’ (2019, p. 5). Such narratives, it 
might be said, are predicated upon a form of adumbrating of the ‘technological’ that is as much 
imaginary as much as it is material.  
 
Braybrooke and Jordan’s enquiry into a series of ‘technomyths’ pulls on similar threads, 
highlighting how narratives of progress in relation to digital technologies allow it to become ‘a self-
fulfilling prophecy’ (2017, p. 27). Citing Dourish and Bell, they show how ‘myths’ surrounding the 
development of ‘ubiquitous computing’ in the early 1990s became ‘foundational to scholars in 
computer science and related fields’, a force that then came to shift social relations, which in turn 
‘shape[d] future innovations in their own image’ (ibid; Dourish and Bell, 2011, p. 3). These 
considerations are important as they illustrate how such discursive formations are constitutive of 
broader structures of power, where these technocratic imaginaries became expedited through a 
recursive shaping and being-shaped. While, of course, the realisation of such imaginaries is not a 
foregone conclusion, there is a powerful relationship between who constructs these imaginaries, 
how and through what they become woven into public discourse, and how these dynamics are then 
encompassed with the establishing of hegemony. Progress as ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ is thus not 
inevitable, but a belief that is recurrently manifest within technologically deterministic discourse and 
its broader epistemological configurations.  
 
Langdon Winner is a prominent figure within accounts that explore the various facets of 
technological determinism, who provides - what I would argue to be - a more nuanced approach 
to some of the interrelationships between technology, politics and identity than some of 
technological determinism’s cruder forms. By ‘cruder forms’ - drawing on the aforementioned 
works by Wyatt and Bimber - I mean accounts that essentialise digital technology and position it 
as the sole determinant of social change. Winner departs from technologically deterministic 
accounts that situate technology as exclusively following its own ‘sequence’, and posits that the 
advent and introduction of a technology to a given society encompasses a series of unforeseeable 
consequences that cannot be sufficiently anticipated by social actors (Winner, 1980; Wyatt, 2008, 
p. 174). In his widely cited ‘Do Artefacts Have Politics?’, Winner explores how the low-hanging 
overpasses, built in New York between the 1920s and 1970s, were used to discourage buses from 
using particular parkways (1980, p. 123). Poor citizens and people of colour were most likely to be 
using the buses, while those owning cars - most likely to be ‘upper’ or ‘comfortable middle class’ 
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white citizens - were freely able to use the parkways for their commutes and recreational purposes 
(ibid, p. 124). Technological change, Winner notes, is bound with a series of political imperatives, 
where the ‘deck has been stacked long in advance to favour certain social interests’, and thus, ‘some 
people [are] bound to receive a better hand than others’ (ibid, p. 126). This counters the lines of 
thought outlined above which envisage technological developments as instigating a predetermined 
set of effects, and foregrounds instead that: firstly, the ‘effects’ that a given technology may or may 
not have is dependent on a complex network of cultural, social, political and economic factors, 
and is thus not bound to one singular and predictable lineage; and secondly, that those in positions 
of power are more likely to influence the course of technological development, and how such 
technologies then become entwined with the establishing of hegemony.  
 
Another of the central issues within critiques of technological determinism is that framing 
technologies as their own autonomous force often leaves little scope for political accountability, 
as it allows the role of the actors involved in developing such technologies to be abstracted from 
discourse (Winner, 1977; Wyatt, 2008). This is an issue that I will return to throughout the 
empirical case studies of this thesis. An example of this can be seen in Sen’s work12, who provides 
one – among the many that exist (see Eubanks, 2018) – example of some of the intensely 
discriminatory politics that are encompassed with Google’s Autocomplete algorithm. Upon typing 
the words ‘schizophrenics should’ into the search bar, Sen had found that the search suggestions 
provided by Google included ‘schizophrenics should be locked up’, ‘should schizophrenics be 
forced to take medication’ and ‘should schizophrenics be euthanized’ (see appendix 3.1). These 
automated search suggestions are established, broadly, according to two primary factors: one is 
the number of times in which other Google users have made similar search queries; and the other 
is predictions deemed to be most relevant to a given user based on their personal data. Google 
does however censor some autocomplete suggestions according to a few ‘automated rules’, 
including whether or not a ‘potentially disparaging or sensitive term was associated’ (Google, 
2017). Precisely who or what decides what these ‘automated rules’ are is not made transparent, 
however, Google claims that ‘human involvement’ is not part of the process (ibid). The binary 
formation of human/nonhuman, in this instance, helps obscure the influence of corporate power 
that shapes the autocomplete process. This leaves little scope for the political accountability of the 
actors involved: while an automated algorithm will undoubtedly assist this process, ‘human 
involvement’ is of course required for writing the algorithms, reporting inappropriate search terms, 
and deciding upon which search terms are then prohibited.   
                                                 
12 Conference paper delivered at Brighton’s Messy Edge conference, 2017 
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Jan Cherlet’s work draws upon similar discursive tensions, and identifies examples of where 
technological determinism functions within developmental aid discourses. Here, she illustrates 
how notions of digital technologies ‘enabling’ development within areas of the Global South are 
pervasive within language used by organisations such as the World Bank and UNDP, which often 
frame technologies as apolitical and autonomous (2014, p. 18). For Cherlet, such discursive 
framings are bound with issues of ‘technology transfer’, which is a term she uses to refer to the 
notion that a given technology can be removed from one social context and implemented in a 
different one, bringing with it the same social, political and economic dynamics as it did within its 
original context (2011, p. 4). Here, the technology in itself is considered to bring about specific 
social effects that are non-contingent on cultural or political context. Challenging this model, 
Cherlet notes that ‘barriers’ always exist within technology transfer, which occur ‘between two 
persons, between different departments within the same organisation, between different 
organisations, between nations or between cultures’, meaning the ‘effects’ of introducing a 
technology to a new social context cannot be sufficiently anticipated by developmental aid 
organisations (2011, p. 5).  
 
Her work draws links between technological determinisms and epistemic determinisms, 
emphasising the ties between specific epistemic tendencies and digital technologies. While 
technological determinism, she notes, does not adequately consider the interrelatedness of 
technology and the social context(s) in which it came into being, epistemic determinism does not 
consider how ‘all knowledge is situated’, and encompasses the assumption that knowledge is ‘an 
immaterial good [that] can be transferred, without much effort, to another social reality where it 
will have similar meanings and effects as in the original social reality’ (Cherlet, 2011, p. 6-7). For 
Cherlet, the interrelatedness of these two ideologies helps maintain and uphold specific political 
powers within developmental aid contexts. While, she notes, ‘plain’ technology transfer is 
contingent upon both sides sharing ‘enough common knowledge, both sides know[ing] the 
differences in their knowledge, and hav[ing] sufficient access to the domain-specific knowledge of 
the other side’, she contends that technology transfer from areas of the Global North to more 
impoverished countries is unquestionably bound with power asymmetries that render ‘plain’ 
technology transfer impossible (p. 5). The obscuring of Western-centric agendas via their own 
epistemological biases has, for a long time, propagated and maintained imperial and colonial 




Geo-politics of knowledge goes hand in hand with geo-politics of knowing. Who 
and whey, why and where is knowledge generated? […] Why did eurocentered 
epistemology conceal its own geo-historical and bio-graphical locations and succeed 
in created the idea of universal knowledge as if the knowing subjects were also 
universal? (Mignolo, 2009, p. 160) 
 
These are points I return to in chapter six, in which I argue that specific ‘blockchain for good’ 
initiatives that have been developed in Western contexts have been wielded to have particular 
economic effects within areas of the Global South, and have been heavily predicated upon 
Western-centric epistemologies.  
 
3.2: Epistemology and Materiality 
 
 
This section of the chapter will now turn to an exploration of some of the intersections between 
epistemology and materiality. I focus specifically upon the epistemic tendencies of contemporary 
techno-science, and some of the implications this has for those marginalised by Westernised 
notions of race, class, and gender. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, by ‘contemporary 
techno-science’, I mean the epistemic configurations that have derived from modernity, and have 
come to consolidate economy, science and technology in the West. I will pave a route through 
perspectives offered in a series of feminist, de-colonial and post-colonial accounts, where 
questions of racism and sexism are at stake within the functionalities of digital technologies, and 
their surrounding discourses. These accounts highlight the manifold ways in which bias is 
entangled with matter, and how these biases are partially enabled through materialisations of 
specific epistemic configurations. These perspectives also illuminate the inadequacies of progress-
is-all narratives explored in the previous section. I will explore how these epistemic tendencies 
propagate the motives of heteronormative, colonialist and patriarchal power, and where and how 
this relates to the notions of ‘translation’ and ‘erasure’ (Vazquez, 2011; Mbembe, 2017).  
 
The destabilising of binary forms has been a central thread amongst many accounts that explore 
and problematize the epistemic tendencies of modernity and contemporary techno-science, 
highlighting how such binaries have, for a long time, been constitutive of Eurocentric and 
modernistic understandings of the world. Haraway argues the dualisms of ‘self/other, mind/body, 
culture/nature, male/female, civilized/primitive, reality/appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, 
maker/made, active/passive, right/wrong, truth/illusion, total/partial, God/man’ to be some of 
the most pressing in this regard, highlighting how they have helped sustain notions of hierarchy, 
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difference and otherness (1989; Hall, 1997). Whether, she writes, these dualisms are understood 
‘functionally, dialectically, structurally, or psychoanalytically’ (Haraway, 1988, p. 290), they have 
been widely flagged to be constitutive of modernity’s epistemic order, which has long served 
imperialism, coloniality, and concomitant systems of capitalist-heteronormative-patriarchy 
(Latour, 1993; Hall, 1997; Suchman, 2008; Vazquez, 2009). These binary forms are thus tightly 
encompassed with a geopolitics and biopolitics of knowledge, as Walter Mignolo elaborates: 
 
The imperial classification and ranking of regions (for example, developed/underdeveloped 
or First/Second/Third Worlds, where the imperial and the colonial differences can be seen 
working in tandem) goes hand in hand with classification and ranking of people (for example, 
civilized/barbarians, humanitas/Anthropos; black, yellow, brown, white; heterosexual/gay 
and man/woman in the First, Second, or Third Worlds, etc.) (2011, p. xxi) 
 
A core issue at stake within a series of de-colonial accounts of modernity is that of translation, 
which is an issue that I believe to be particularly pivotal when seeking to generate a better 
understanding of the non-neutrality of digital (and non-digital) technologies: not just in terms of 
the discourses, behaviours and forms of governmentality that they might be designed to encourage 
and propagate, but also in terms of the epistemological configurations that become erased when 
control is exerted via technologies that have been developed within (predominantly) Western 
contexts (Vazquez, 2009). Translation, as I explore it here, also shares close similarities to the 
issues surrounding ‘technology transfer’ explored in the previous section (Cherlet, 2011). Rolando 
Vazquez’s article, Translation as Erasure: Thoughts on Modernity’s Epistemic Violence, highlights how 
translation has been pivotal to the maintenance of Western colonial powers (2011). Citing 
Mignolo, Vazquez frames modernity as an epistemic structure that transforms ‘people, cultures, 
and meanings into what is legible and controllable for those in power’, where knowledge forms 
that are not encompassed in modernity’s epistemic framework are unnamed or invisibilised 
(Mignolo, 2005, p. 144; cited in Vazquez, 2011, p. 30). He uses translation to refer to the ‘borders’ 
that surround specific systems of meaning, extending it beyond its use within literature to apply it 
more expansively to the ways in which forms of understanding that are not part of modernity’s 
epistemology become appropriated and incorporated into its monolithic framework. He 
continues, 
 
The epistemic territory of modernity establishes its field of certainty, its reality, by a movement 
of incorporation that subdues the multiple, the discontinuous, difference into the realm of 
presence. Incorporation is the reduction of difference into sameness, of contingency into 
continuity (Vazquez, 2011, p. 28) 
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I draw upon the issues foregrounded by Vazquez and Mignolo above as digital technologies 
necessitate materialisations of specific epistemic configurations, which are often - but not always 
(see Braybrooke and Jordan, 2017) - bound with Western-centric ideologies and forms of 
translation. This can be further seen in Os Keyes work, which demonstrates some pressing 
examples of where erasure occurs within Automatic Gender Recognition (AGR) algorithms 
(2018). They highlight how research into formulations of gender within Human-Computer 
Interaction (HCI) has often critiqued how such systems disempower women, while relatively little 
research has been conducted into how they reinforce dichotomous notions of gender, and 
invisibilize genders that do not fall within the woman/man binary, such as (non-exhaustively) non-
binary, trans, and gender-fluid gender identities. Keyes shows how HCI and AGR systems are 
predicated upon understandings of gender that overwhelmingly frame it as each: binary, 
distinguished only in terms of women and men; immutable, meaning that once a person has been 
assigned a gender category, this cannot then be changed; and physiological, where a person’s 
gender is distinguished according to elements of their physical appearance - chiefly genitals, but 
also attributes such as facial hair and differences in bone structure (ibid, p. 2). Keyes argues that 
the operationalising of binaristic understandings of gender within HCI and AGR systems subjects 
trans and non-binary persons to erasure, reinforcing the normative view that ‘trans people do not 
exist as a population with needs’ (ibid, p. 12). It also erases those who do not fall at the top-end 
of the division and hierarchizes according to the man/woman binary. This non-recognition of 
genderqueer identities, they argue, will also prevent trans and non-binary communities from being 
researched within prospective studies deriving from AGR data (ibid, p. 12). Erasure thus functions 
here through the operationalisation of normative gender biases, and the replication and 
materialisation of existing inequalities.  
 
Readings of the body manifest in contemporary AI systems, developed within commercial and 
military contexts, are located within culturally specific and essentialist ecologies of signs, where 
specific attributes of the body are equated with assumptions about how a body can be categorised, 
and what it should or might do. This is an issue Simone Browne also draws upon in Dark Matters: 
On the Surveillance of Blackness, where she highlights that the ways in which facial recognition 
algorithms measure and categorise faces are often derived from anthropometry. She notes that 
during the nineteenth century, anthropometry was deployed alongside pseudoscience’s such as 
craniometry – the practice of measuring parts of the skull to assess intelligence - and phrenology, 
which similarly drew links between the physicality of the skull and mental abilities (2015, p. 112). 
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These practices helped ‘legitimise’ racial and gendered prejudices during the nineteenth century, 
and were practiced on the bodies of prisoners, where racially specific aspects of the body became 
equated with notions of criminality. While developed in 1882 as a way of measuring and 
categorising the body for forensics, anthropometry continues to be defined as the ‘scientific study 
of the measurements and proportions of the human body’ (Oxford Dictionary, 2019, emphasis 
added; Browne, 2015, p. 112). This is just one example of how the mechanisms of control manifest 
in digital environments were also manifest in histories of colonialism, and further illuminates the 
reductivism in notions of societal ‘newness’ explored in the previous section (Browne, 2015; 
Mbembe, 2017). 
 
Browne highlights how, citing one biometric study, ‘statistical knowledge of anthropometry’ 
continues to be invoked within research and development for facial recognition algorithms (ibid, 
p. 11). She further draws upon a study by Gao and Ai (2009), which assesses a facial recognition 
algorithm that was designed to function within a ‘multi-ethnic’ environment, in order to distinguish 
a subject’s race and gender (2015, p. 111). This study found that when a gender recognition AI 
was programmed to distinguish the genders of ‘all ethnicities’, the algorithm was predisposed to 
constituting the faces of ‘African’ women as male, and ‘Mongoloid’ men as female (ibid, p. 111). 
These authors developed an algorithm that was trained on images of faces categorised as 
‘Mongoloid’, ‘Caucasoid’ and ‘African’, which was fed on vastly unequal quantities of data: 2400 
images of ‘Mongoloid’ males, and ‘Caucasoid’ males and females; 2500 of ‘Mongoloid’ females; 
1800 ‘African’ males; and 1600 ‘African’ females (Gao & Ai, 2009, p. 174). Unsurprisingly, even 
when using the ‘Ethnicity Specific Gender Classifier’, African women were the least successfully 
identified (Gao & Ai, 2009; Browne, 2015, p. 111).   
 
It is important to highlight however that digital technologies are not inherently bound to 
discriminatory politics, or politics that favour white heteronormativity. Rather, what I have argued 
in this section is that digital technologies - developed predominantly within marketised and 
militarised frameworks - are oriented towards the privileging of specific social groups and 
subjectivities. This is achieved through processes of translation and erasure, where digital 
technologies both translate according to the logics that they have been designed to operationalise, 





3.3: Individuation and Identity 
 
 
I will now turn to a series of accounts that work to destabilise the human/nonhuman binary 
iterated within technologically deterministic discourse, and contend that identity and subjectivity 
are constituted and manifest across a network of life and matter (Haraway, 1991; Bennett, 2005a; 
2005b; Stiegler, 2012b; 2015a, 2015b). This further develops concerns from the previous two 
sections, where foregrounding the co-evolution of bodies and things can help counter the 
binaristic tendencies of technologically deterministic discourse, and provides the conceptual space 
for understanding how materialisations of discriminatory politics are bound with, and influence, 
forms of subjectivity and relationality. I will turn briefly to aspects of Haraway’s Simians, Cyborgs 
and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, as an influential text within feminist STS, but will focus chiefly 
upon a handful of works by Stiegler (2010; 2012b; 2015a; 2015b) and Bennett (2005a). A central 
thread among these accounts pertains to the agencies exhibited by bodies and things, where 
humans and nonhumans are understood not as two distinct ontological spheres, but rather as 
continuously bound in a process of co-influence. This process of co-influence, in each of these 
accounts, is understood to be deeply historical, where thought, movement, and forms of 
relationality are bound to those of the past and present: it concerns the ‘union of the political and 
physiological’, and how this union is entwined with structures of power (Haraway, 1991).  
 
Haraway’s Cyborg Manifesto presents a conception of identity as dispersed and distinguished across 
all forms of life and matter (1991). This, for Haraway, is pivotally embroiled with the notion of 
the cyborg, which she constitutes as a ‘disassembled and reassembled, postmodern collective and 
personal self’ (ibid, p. 163). Latour describes Haraway’s figure of the ‘cyborg’ as a ‘hybrid term, 
half cybernetic, half organistic, that was made to designate the prosthetic character of our 
posthuman, postmodern, end-of-century existence: half a psychological body, half a high-tech 
robotic one’ (1999, p. 1). Identity for Haraway is thus both ‘singular “I” and a collective “we”, 
‘always relational in a web or dance of life and being’ (O’Riordan, 2019). The Cyborg Manifesto is 
chiefly an ethical account, foregrounding the significances of conceiving of machines as ‘us’: not in 
the McLuhanesque sense of media as ‘extensions of man’, but rather as always shaping and being-
shaped, an ‘aspect of our embodiment’ (1991, p. 180). In locating the machines as ‘us’, the systemic 
violence embroiled within colonial and patriarchal histories can be understood as constitutive of 
our lived embodiment. This is particularly pertinent to my own project, as it seeks to explore how 
the material conditions of ‘digital ubiquity’ influence imaginaries and forms of relationality. This 
thus also understands digital technologies and their underlying politics as indistinguishable from 
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lived experience. The Cyborg Manifesto has been an influential text within feminist STS, and, while 
heavily foregrounding the interrelationships between the instruments of capital and experiences 
of oppression, Haraway’s account is principally non-essentialist in that it delves into the potential 
spaces for feminist intervention, and does not resign itself to readings of digital technologies that 
frame them as inherently oppressive. ‘Liberation rests on the construction of consciousness’, she 
writes, ‘the imaginative apprehension, of oppression, and so of possibility’ (1988, p. 2). She seeks 
an ‘elsewhere’ to the ‘hostile order of relationships among people, animals, technologies and land’, 
where the figure of the ‘cyborg’ functions between gender categories, between ‘nature’ and 
‘machine’, between individual and collective (Sollfrank, 2017).  
 
I will now turn to the work of Stiegler, who similarly conceives of relationships between life and 
matter as bound in a process of co-evolution, and binds these concerns to forms of attention, 
education and industrial technologies (2012b). Stiegler’s work builds upon Simondon’s work on 
individuation, which, Stiegler notes, encompasses two significant theses: firstly, that a ‘psychic 
individual’ should not be understood as a fixed or stable identity, but rather as always undergoing 
a process of transformation; and secondly, that the process of psychic individuation is never 
complete, and is embroiled with a wider process of social and collective individuation (Stiegler, 
2012b, p. 13). Individuation, then, is not a process that one undergoes in isolation; it is a continual 
course of transformation that occurs within a wider network of people and things. Living-beings 
shape and are shaped, while cognitive capacities exist with and through technical apparatuses, 
prosthesis and ‘organised inorganic matter’ (Roberts, 2012, p. 8; Crogan, 2010). This, for Stiegler, 
is intrinsically political, where the ‘technical traces’ that are now ‘placed under the control of global 
industry’ are argued to have profound implications upon the ‘psychic apparatuses, […] the social 
apparatus, and knowledge itself’ (2015b, p. 8).  
 
Memory is a key focus within much of Stiegler’s work, and how it becomes ‘exteriorised’ within 
technical apparatuses via forms of grammatisation. This, for Stiegler, forms the history of ‘human 
memory’ (2010). Grammatisation refers to the process through which memory becomes recorded 
in discrete marks; this is traced back to the ‘unintentional’ memory support of the lithic tool, later 
developing into forms of grammatisation that were more purposefully intended for aiding 
memory, such as ideogrammatic writing and the alphabet (Hansen, 2010, p. 64). While these forms 
of recording memory constitute what Stiegler labels as mnemotechniques - methods used for 
developing and improving one’s memory - digital environments are now saturated by 
mnemotechnologies, which he understands to be detrimental to the process of remembering, 
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engendering a widespread ‘loss of knowledge’ (Stiegler, 2010, p. 82). I draw and extend upon 
memory as it is used by Stiegler for two main reasons. Firstly, it helps elucidate the notion of ‘co-
becoming’, not only in terms of how cognition is bound and influenced by marketised digital 
technologies and platforms (which might be thought, for instance, in terms of the politics that are 
embroiled with reminding oneself of a term through conducting a search on Google, instead of 
recalling information without a memory ‘aid’, or instead perhaps of using a non-digital glossary 
that does not also contain a multiplicity of marketised links intended to influence ones attention); 
but also, as an extension of this, it allows us to think through how the politics of what and whose 
memories are privileged via digital platforms, and how this then also become part of lived 
embodiment.  
 
There are, however, some inconsistences within Stiegler’s writing, which are pertinent to some of 
the tensions that I explore throughout the thesis. Within his discussion of memory, Stiegler draws 
upon Plato, who he describes as the ‘first thinker of the proletarianisation’ (2012a). Plato’s work 
understood the practice of writing to constitute a form of ‘false’ knowing as he saw it to represent 
an ‘exteriorisation’ of thought; a form of ‘loss of know how’ (2012a). Stiegler borrows two 
concepts from Plato: anamnesis, a theory of memory that refers to the process of remembering 
without ‘memory aids’, embroiled with notions of a human ‘essence’ that exists separately from its 
material environment; and hypomnesis, which refers to the process through which memory 
becomes ‘exteriorised’ via mnemotechniques. Stiegler rejects the idea that memory can exist in 
isolation from its material environment; ‘human memory is originally exteriorized’, he writes, ‘and 
that means that it has been technical from the start’ (2012a). This said, however, he often invokes 
notions of cognitive technologies, or mnemotechnologies, ‘causing us to lose an ever-greater part 
of our knowledge’, and is recurrently concerned with the ‘obsolescence of the human’ by 
mnemotechnologies (2010, p. 68). This is a thread that also occurs in the accounts – albeit far less 
critically – provided by Carr and Sullivan earlier in the thesis, who also argue that digital 
technologies are supplanting and succeeding ‘human’ capacity. Stiegler provides a similar example 
to Carr, with regards to the skill involved with driving a car: ‘the more improved the automobile 
becomes’, he writes, ‘the less we know how to drive – the GPS system assisting the driver in his 
driving will replace him altogether […] we lose our sensori-motor schema formalized by the system 
as it becomes automatic’ (2010, p. 68, my emphasis). I would posit that although Stiegler vigorously 
highlights the co-becoming of people and things, notions of ‘human obsolescence’ are nonetheless 
embroiled with the human/nonhuman binary that he critiques. This thus not only overlooks the 
fact that ‘humans’ have had a very significant part in creating the car that renders ‘him’ a less 
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competent driver, but is further encompassed in epistemic tendencies that conceive of 
technologies in terms of rationalistic ‘progress’ that will, at some point, supplant ‘humanity’. 
 
It is for these reasons that I believe Bennett’s Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things to offer a 
more sensitive and nuanced account around some of the interrelationships between living-being, 
agency and matter (2005a) than that provided by Stiegler: in relation, at least, to the problematics 
surrounding ‘obsolescence’ foregrounded above. Her approach makes arguments for a ‘radical 
kindship of people and things’, and again opposes epistemic tendencies of dividing humans and 
non-humans into distinct ontological spheres. She problematizes notions of ‘agency’, arguing that 
the ‘history of agency as a philosophical concept is, in general, a history of attempts to mark the 
uniqueness of humans’ (2005b, p. 461). Bennett explicitly resists anthropocentric tendencies of 
conceiving of agency as an intrinsically human attribute, embedding her approach within a sphere 
of ‘vital materialism’ (Bennett, 2005a, p. xvi). This approach advocates the agentic capacities of 
‘things’, which are understood to be capable of following their own trajectories that lie outside of 
human intention (ibid, p. viii). While she recognizes that political theory has engaged with the 
importance of materiality for some time, she argues that the focus has often remained upon the 
‘human’ attributes that are embedded within material structures (ibid). Her argument does not 
negate the fact that the choices, movements and habits of living-beings become inscribed in 
landscapes and technologies, but rather aims to de-centralise focuses on the ‘human’ within 
discourse of materiality (ibid, p. xvi). Her motivation here is largely ecological: ‘these material 
powers, which can aid or destroy, enrich or disable, ennoble or degrade us, in any case call for our 
attentiveness, or even “respect”’ (2005, p. ix).  
 
It is pertinent to highlight how this approach is distinct from other technological determinisms; a 
distinction that might be usefully articulated via the ways in which Bennett frame’s causality. She 
cites Connoly’s term ‘efficient causality’, referring to an ‘active force [that] is isolated as the author 
of a clearly identifiable effect’ (2005b, p. 458). Technological determinisms often fall within this 
framework, where a given technology, isolated from its surrounding multiplicity of social, cultural 
and economic factors, is bound with notions of cause, effect and progress. ‘Efficient causality’ is 
thus linear and reductive, singular and essentialist. ‘Emergent causality’, conversely, refers to a 
nonlinear causality, where ‘one finds circuits where effect and cause alternate position and rebound 
back upon each other’ (ibid, p. 459). Bennett argues that this, then, unsettles ‘a host of inherited 
concepts, including cause, time, culture, nature, event, life, kinship - and also responsibility’ (ibid, 
p. 452). She invokes Gilles Deleuze’s term ‘assemblage’ to highlight the ways in which ‘people, 
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animals, artefacts, technologies, and elemental forces’ work alongside one another (ibid, p. 461), 
forming groupings which then also exhibit agential capacities. This does not differ significantly 
from the perspectives highlighted earlier by Winner and Stiegler, but might be more adequately 
described as a shift in emphasis. While Winner and Stiegler strenuously highlight the politics that 
are inseparable from material artefacts, Bennett’s approach foregrounds both that: firstly, the 
agential capacities that non-human formulations possess are indeed political; but further, that non-
human formulations possess their own trajectories that lie outside of human intentionality 
altogether. This then allows for a conception of technology that recognises that it determines social 
dynamics to a degree; that the ‘effects’ a technology may or may not have are not limited to what is 
anticipated within the human imaginary; and for a non-anthroprocentric conception of the world 
that does not value technology or matter in terms of its capacities to imitate or embody qualities 




In this chapter I have outlined a series of theoretical accounts, stemming predominantly from 
feminist, de-colonial and post-colonial STS, that offer ways of understanding sociomateriality. I 
have paved a route through a series of accounts which discuss various iterations of technological 
determinism (Mumford, 1934; Heilbroner, 1967; Bimber, 1994). Drawing on Winner, Wyatt, and 
Cherlet, I argued that technological determinism can help propagate market agendas through the 
obscuring of the political influences that shape the functionality of a given technology or 
technological apparatus. I highlighted how technologically deterministic discourse is often bound 
with an ideology of progress that is based upon a form of adumbrating of the ‘technological’ that is 
as much imaginary as it is material. By this, I mean that deterministic discourses surrounding 
technological becoming often anticipate that it will always continue in ‘one grand avenue of 
advance’ (Heilbroner, 1967). Such assumptions, as myself and others have argued, are predicated 
upon hegemonic narratives surrounding the development of technology throughout history 
(Bassett, 2018; Braybrooke and Jordan, 2017).  
 
I then highlighted how such narratives in relation to technology are bound with specific epistemic 
configurations that have historically disempowered social groups that are marginalised by 
Westernised notions of race, gender, and class. I principally drew on the works of Vazquez (2011) 
and Haraway (1988) to show how the ‘epistemological privilege granted to modern science from 
the seventeenth century onwards, which make possible the technological revolutions that 
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consolidated Western supremacy’ (de Santos, Nunes & Meneses, 2007, p. xv) has been a pivotal 
component in this process of marginalisation, particularly with regards to the notions of translation 
and erasure. Translation here referred to the process of adapting multiple systems of meaning into 
one epistemic framework, while erasure highlights the meanings and forms of cultural 
understandings that are lost via the process of translation (Vazquez, 2011). I then drew on more 
recent accounts by Browne (2015) and Keyes (2018), who highlight how such dynamics occur 
within contemporary digital apparatuses and propagate Westernised structures of power. 
 
In the final section, I went on to explore and critique a series of theoretical accounts that emphasise 
how identity and subjectivity are constituted across a network of life and matter. Conceiving of 
identity in this way has pivotal implications for understanding forms of governmentality, and how 
the hegemonic forces shaping digital environments become embodied. It also provides the 
conceptual space for conceiving of how the ‘horizon of our imagination’ is shaped by our material 
conditions (Poulsgaard, 2019). As Poulsgaard highlights, the ‘nature of our technical prostheses 
profoundly impact the nature and scope of our creative imagination’ and the ways that we 
understand temporality (2019). I aligned my own work most chiefly with that of Bennett, whose 
perspective allows for an unsettling of notions of progress, and highlights that ‘artefacts, 
technologies, and elemental forces’ are very much capable of following their own trajectories that 
lie beyond the limits of the human imaginary. How we imagine, and how this is shaped and limited 
via engagements with the digital, is a core focus of this thesis, and is a tension I will continue to 
unpack throughout the upcoming critical case studies. These each, in some way, offer different 
ways of understanding the ‘horizons’ of the thinkable, and how these horizons are bound with the 











4.0 In the Digital World, We Work; At Camp, We Play:  




This chapter reports on an ethnography I undertook at a ‘digital detox’ retreat located in North 
America in June 2017. At this particular ‘digital detox’, participants were invited to relinquish use 
of their digital devices, discussion of their professions, and use of their ‘real names’ for a four-day 
period. It accommodated two-hundred-and-fifty attendees, who were, for the most part, part of a 
community of friends, and friends-of-friends, which had grown over the three-year period since 
the camp was founded13. When I attended the retreat in 2017, this particular ‘digital detox’ was 
non-for-profit14. With a few exceptions15, participants of the ‘digital detox’ paid a ticket fee of five-
hundred-and-eighty dollars, in exchange for meals, drinks, snacks, a full schedule of activities, 
transport to and from the retreat, and accommodation. I attended the camp as a participant 
observer, which meant that I experienced the camp in a broadly similar capacity to other paying 
guests, in that I paid the same ticket fee, camped in the same spaces, and partook in the same 
activities. I did, however, have a different agenda, in that I was at the camp for my own 
ethnographic research purposes, meaning that I was in some senses, at ‘work’. I combine the 
findings from my time spent as a participant observer with insights gathered from fourteen 
research interviews that I undertook with fellow attendees subsequent to the retreat.  
 
In this chapter I use this empirical material to address a series of questions that I have bought to 
the fore in the thesis thus far. I consider the pertinence of why a ‘detox’ from the ‘digital’ and from 
‘work’ were enveloped with one another, and how the centrality that was accorded to ‘work’ at 
this retreat was interlinked with a cultural framework that prioritises ‘digital ubiquity’. I draw upon 
themes of neoliberal wellness already briefly mentioned to consider why themes of mental 
wellbeing emerged as central to the camp’s ethos of digital rejectionism. I explore what might be 
revealed about the forms of psychic and collective individuation made manifest in ‘digitally 
ubiquitous’ environments through a critical engagement with the discourses used to describe and 
                                                 
13 This was information I’d gleaned during conversations had with campers whilst I was at the ‘digital 
detox’ site: it was not publicised in emails sent from the camp, or on the website information provided at 
the time 
14 The following year the retreat became ‘for-profit’ 
15 Some attendees of the digital detox could apply for subsidised tickets if they were on a low-income. 
How many of these tickets were available was not publicised, nor was the reduced price 
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market a space in which ‘digital technologies’16 had purposefully been removed, and how the 
discourses invoked by the ‘digital detox’ retreat and its attendees alluded to a wider cultural 
framework of capitalist realism. 
 
The structure of this chapter will thus proceed as follows. In the first section, I describe the process 
that led me to choose Camp Wild17 as the site for my field research. This will outline some of the 
characteristics of the other ‘digital detox’ retreats that I contacted before deciding upon Camp 
Wild as my site of study. In the following section, I will detail some of the characteristics of the 
camp, including what activities were on offer, how the camp was structured, and how it was 
described in the information provided by the camp. I will also briefly recap some of the 
methodological considerations outlined in chapter two, and detail the demographics of the 
participants that I interviewed. In the third section, I gather together and analyse my research data 
using a CDA approach, and identify key themes that emerged throughout the research data. These 
chiefly came to include: meanings that participants associated with the ‘digital’; how their 
relationships with digital technologies were tied with sentiments of anxiety and social isolation; 




My interest in ‘digital detoxing’ emerged following my research into how some of the relationships 
between digital technologies and cognition had been conceptualised within a series of public 
debates. The discourses invoked by writers such as Carr (2011) and Sullivan (2016), discussed in 
the introduction to this thesis, had been emblematic for me in this regard: both narrativised the 
‘digital’ as something that was impeding upon their sense of what it meant to be ‘human’. While, 
on the one hand, these pop-technology accounts were framing the ‘digital’ as a damaging force 
within their day-to-day lives, on the other a wealth of self-tracking and wellness apps - some 
prominent examples being Headspace (meditation), Strava (running, swimming and cycling), and 
Sleep Cycle (sleep) - were also growing in popularity, each claiming to help users improve their 
health in some way. There was thus a tension here that I wished to explore in more detail, in which 
the so-called ‘digital’ was acting as both poison and cure; what might be described as a pharmakon 
(Stiegler, 2012b). I was intrigued, given the growing prominence of apps such as these, as to how 
the ‘digital’ had become intertwined with the term ‘detox’ – a term which is affiliated with the 
                                                 
16 I use quotation marks here as there were some inconsistencies in which digital technologies were 
permitted at the retreat, which I will explore later in the chapter 
17 This is a pseudonym, as it was agreed with the organisers that I keep any identifying details anonymous 
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removal of harmful substances – literally ‘toxins’ – and physical and mental dependencies upon 
addictive entities (Cambridge Dictionary, 2019). I wanted to explore what precisely it was about 
digital technologies that ‘digital detoxers’ sought to ‘detox’ from, how this distinction was made, 
if and how these distinctions were tied in with the public debates that I’d previously explored, and 
what the significance of a digital ‘detox’ was within a broader climate of neoliberalised ‘wellness’ 
(Cederström and Spicer, 2015). 
 
I began my research by exploring a series of ‘digital detox’ retreats online, to get some sense of the 
‘digital detox’ landscape: where these retreats were located; what discourses were used to describe 
the retreats; and what - and if - were the generalised themes that ran throughout each of these 
retreats. I wanted to explore the most commercially prominent ‘digital detox’ sites as I thought 
these might be the most pertinent in terms of exploring hegemonic understandings of the ‘digital’. 
I thus used Google for these investigations due to its own commercial prominence and hegemony 
within the spectrum of search engine platforms. Camp Grounded, under the domain 
digitaldetox.org, was the most ‘relevant’ link to be returned by Google, which was sloganized with 
the phrase ‘disconnect to reconnect®’. This particular retreat was held at various different locations 
in the United States, and invited participants to relinquish use of phones, clocks, and other digital 
devices for a period of three-days. The website invited its readers to attend the camp and embrace 
‘childlike wonder’, and remember ‘what being human really feels like’. It offered activities such as 
yoga, analogue photography, ‘primitive skills’, meditation, hikes, and an array of crafts (Camp 
Grounded, 2017). Drugs and alcohol were forbidden from this camp, and were framed as 
‘belong[ing] to the world of adult distraction’. Instead, the camp embraced a ‘holistic’ view to 
mindful eating. Alongside the ‘detox’ from digital devices, participants of this camp were also not 
to speak of their professions whilst at the camp. Despite this rule about work however, the camp 
did offer specific packages for companies, which purported to ‘help leadership create and maintain 
an integrated culture of balance, play and Digital Detox so the program doesn’t end when we say 
goodbye’. At the time, this was accompanied by testimonials from employees of Google, which 
noted how the experience at Camp Grounded was beneficial for working relationships amongst 
their Google cohort.  
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The camp which I attended, Camp Wild, was the next ‘digital detox’ site that I explored online18. 
While their website information was a lot more limited than that of Camp Grounded, it appeared 
to share many similar characteristics: no digital devices for a four-day period, no discussions of 
professions whilst at camp, and notions of discovering ‘what it means to be a kid again’. There 
were however some differences: while Camp Grounded permitted analogue photography, Camp 
Wild prohibited cameras of all types, encouraging visitors instead to take ‘mental pictures’. Other 
smaller scale ‘digital detox’ retreats that I discovered during this preliminary research stage also 
came to include It’s Time to Log Off, a UK based company that held retreats in the UK, Italy and 
Hawaii. This seemed to be more explicitly targeted towards upper-middle-class audiences, and 
advertised a package that appeared to be more luxurious and less oriented toward a child-like camp 
atmosphere. Here, activities predominantly included yoga, surfing and guided walks, and 
accommodation took the form of apartments and villas with a minimalistic aesthetic. At these 
sites, talking about one’s profession was ‘discouraged’, not prohibited, and the schedules appeared 
to be less oriented toward group activities.  
 
Having conducted some preliminary research around each of these retreats, I decided that the US-
based retreats which heavily revolved around the ‘summer camp’ trope would be of most relevance 
to my thesis: I was intrigued as to why there were such marked emphases on notions of ‘play’ at 
these sites, how this was intertwined with the prohibition of discussion around ‘work’, and what 
the significance was of the repeated emphases on returning to ‘childhood’ and ‘nature’. I thus set 
about getting in touch with the two summer-camp style retreats. Camp Grounded was my first 
choice, since, from the information available online, it appeared to have the most well-established 
identity, and made its aims, rules, and ethos clear. However, within communications made with 
the camp, I initially received only automated responses signed with the moniker ‘Popcorn’, before 
getting another generalised response informing me to buy a ticket. When I’d asked for further 
specifics about the possibility of conducting research after buying a ticket, I was informed ‘You 
can do whatever research you want at camp but you cannot talk about what you do for a living at 
camp. One of the main rules is that there is no "W" talk (work talk). You must be discrete about 
your research. :)’. It was thus seemingly difficult to get an adequate enough response for me to be 
sure I could safely conduct my research; if I was to carry out my research ‘discretely’ as they’d 
suggested, this would bring about significant issues with regards to informed consent. Camp Wild, 
                                                 
18 This wasn’t the second most ‘relevant’ link that Google returned, however it was the second ‘digital 
detox’ site that was returned in my search query. Links in-between contained news or blog articles on the 
topic of ‘digital detoxing’ 
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however, were far more responsive, and were intent upon both parties (myself and the organisers 
of the camp) being clear about what precisely I would be doing at the camp, how my research 
would be conducted, and how the safety of those attending the camp would be ensured. After a 
series of email exchanges, Skype meetings, and the signing of a contract by the organisers, my PhD 
supervisors and myself, I was to attend Camp Wild. 
 
4.2 Overview of the Camp 
 
This section will provide a more detailed description of some of the most significant characteristics 
of Camp Wild, to provide context for my analysis of the key themes that emerged throughout the 
research data. This description is drawn from the notes that I compiled as participant observer 
(appendix 4.4), as well as information distributed by the camp in both email exchanges and 
leaflets. To briefly reiterate how these research materials were gathered19, all notes during my time 
spent as a participant observer were made using pen and paper, and were usually taken a few 
minutes after conversations had taken place. Other research materials consisted of email exchanges 
and leaflets provided by the camp, which are shown in the appendices of the thesis. 
 
The camp sent a group email two weeks prior to the camp taking place, which primarily provided 
information about what attendees should and shouldn’t bring to the retreat (appendix 4.1). In this 
email, the camp generally presented itself as ‘eco-friendly’, and the language used was jovial and 
informal. Attendees were asked not to bring any snacks or perfumes to the venue, as there may be 
some in attendance who had sensitivities to scents and certain foods. On the subject of snacks, 
the email went on to note that ‘our Wellness team has been hustling like you wouldn’t believe to 
ensure we have brought on some amazing partners who will be providing us with loads of snacks’. 
The camp’s ‘eco-friendly’ ethos which was iterated in statements such as ‘[bring] your receipt for 
proof of payment (shown on your phone is fine – let’s save those trees!)’, and a request that 
attendees bought eco-friendly toiletry products with them. Other items in the pack-list included 
three fancy dress costumes for attendees to wear themselves (‘a super-fun way to get all dressed 
up however YOU want!’) and ‘any additional costumes you’d like to donate to the Camp Wild 
Tickle Trunk’. The list also included items such as yoga mats, ‘camp fun’ (‘we do not serve alcohol 
at camp. But you are welcome to BYOF (Bring Your Own Fun), whether that’s alcohol, herbs or 
elsewise. Just remember, camp is no fun hungover!’), sitting pillows, and other general clothing 
items. The end of the email was signed off ‘in love and play’, with a ‘PS’ inviting attendees to add 
                                                 
19 More extensive detail of methodologies provided in chapter two. 
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their favourite music to a collaborative Spotify playlist. There was thus some indication from this 
email that the camp wasn’t rejecting or prohibiting digital technologies entirely: phones were 
evidently permitted at some stages of the retreat for displaying tickets - framed here as a preferable, 
eco-friendly option - and using digital app Spotify to share music was encouraged. This non-
rejection of all digital technologies was also iterated when I attended the retreat: those running the 
retreat often had laptops, sound systems and other pieces of equipment that were used for 
conducting the workshops. For the most part, however, participants did not actively engage with 
these. By this I mean we were not controlling, for instance, how the laptops or sound systems 
were used, but we engaged with these technologies in the sense that we could hear sound produced 
from speakers, and so forth.  
 
The retreat began off-site for most of the participants, at a meeting point that was local to most 
of those in attendance. While here, most of us were still in possession of our digital devices (some 
noted that they had left their devices at home altogether), and everyone I met at this meeting point 
was already using their camp nicknames. These nicknames generally followed similar themes, often 
referring to animals, colours, retro children’s entertainment, or food. Many arrived at this meeting 
point wearing fancy dress costumes (these often also assumed animal themes, or nineteen-sixties 
and nineteen-seventies hippie tropes), and many were singing children’s summer-camp style 
chants. A cluster of yellow school buses took us to the camp from this meeting point, which 
resembled the yellow school buses that most campers would have ridden to school or summer 
camps during childhood. This I saw to contribute to the overriding tropes of nostalgia and 
childhood that the camp regularly emphasised.  
 
Upon arrival at camp, we were greeted by a setting of wooden cabins, fields, and a lake, decorated 
with large illustrations of Apple’s emoji symbols (these included a large pizza slice, a face that was 
crying with laughter, and an aubergine), which I learned – to my confusion at the time – had been 
put there specifically for the ‘digital detox’ camp. There was also a large dining hall, where we 
would meet for meal times, coffee breaks, and sign up for workshops, as well as large 
entertainment hall, which was kitted out with a stage, an auditorium, and large illustrations of 
characters from children’s films and television shows (these illustrations were part of the normal 
décor of the campsite, and were not there specifically for the ‘digital detox’). We would meet here 
for activities that involved everyone at camp, including the ‘un-talent show’, the ‘day breaker’ event 
(an early morning ‘sober rave’, undertaken in fancy dress costumes), and the end-of-camp closing 
party, where attendees would do conga lines and wear fancy dress costumes.  
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Along one of the walls in the dining hall area were imitations of social media and search engine 
sites drawn on large sheets of paper. The ‘Ask Me’ board – which used a similar font design and 
colour scheme to that of Google – provided a public medium for campers to share their skills and 
interests with other campers. These included suggestions such as ‘ask me for a tennis lesson’, ‘ask 
me for a flamenco dance lesson’, ‘ask me for a tarot reading’ and ‘ask me about Bitcoin, Blockchain, 
and Ethereum’. Another board, entitled ‘Chirpr’, imitated some of the design characteristics of 
Twitter, where campers could write short snippets of text or draw pictures onto post-it notes, and 
stick them to the ‘Chirpr’ board. The content of these was on-the-whole light-hearted, on which 
attendees would draw pictures of cats or other animals, or replicate hashtag trends that were 
circulating on social media at that moment in time (‘#blessed’ featured frequently). The third board 
was labelled ‘Kudos’, which followed a system broadly similar to ‘liking’ on social media, where 
people could accredit other campers with behaviours that they’d seen to be noteworthy. These 
were indicated using the ‘@’ symbol (e.g. ‘@bobcat’), mimicking its usage on social media apps. 
The presence of these on the walls of the camp thus also indicated that these forms of social media 
weren’t rejected entirely, and rather indicated how central these forms of social media were to the 
imaginary of the ‘digital detox’.  
 
There was also a marked absence of clocks at the camp. Clocks were not prohibited, but since 
phones were prohibited and there were no clocks on the walls, the only source of time was from 
those campers who had bought a watch. It is also relevant to note here that watches did not feature 
on the pack-list sent to attendees prior to our arrival (appendix 4.1). In spite of the marked 
absence of clocks however, the camp’s schedule was timetabled. On the timetable were mealtimes, 
‘workshops’ and ‘events’; ‘events’ and mealtimes were for everybody in attendance, whereas the 
‘workshops’ were optional, from which attendees could choose from a wide series of options and 
split off into smaller groups. These workshops were coded according to a classification system of 
either ‘play’, ‘connect’ or ‘transform’:  
 
Play: In these workshops, you’ll have fun without any cares in the world. These 
workshops are designed for pure play. 
 
Connect: In these workshops, you’ll create a deeper relationship with your beautiful self 
and/or other beautiful things. 
 
Transform: In these workshops, you’ll self-reflect, become aware of your present self, 
and choose to make positive changes. Consider if you’re ready. These workshops 
occasionally bring out intense feelings (appendix 4.2)  
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Examples of ‘play’ workshops included activities such as playing drums (‘percussion jam’), silent 
hikes, body painting, basketball, ‘super soccer session (in costumes)’, and ‘intuitive development 
for busy people’. ‘Connect’ workshops often assumed ‘mindfulness’ themes, and were given titles 
such as ‘mind medicine’, ‘feeling into intimacy’, ‘pulse meditation’, ‘self-empowerment’ and ‘heart 
work’. Finally, the ‘transform’ workshops also followed ‘mindfulness’ themes, often with a focus 
on self-empowerment and productivity, with titles such as ‘taxonomy of personal growth 
approaches’, ‘speaking power with truth’, ‘follow your bliss’, ‘gtfo your comfort zone!’, ‘building 
authentic strength’, ‘empowered self-love: daps to your inner child’, and ‘jump out of bed with 
purpose!’.  
 
Since we were, for the most part, without clocks, measures were put in place by the camps 
organisers to ensure that people were able to get up on time for the morning’s activities. A 
‘morning band’ visited the cabins in the mornings to ensure that campers were up for early 
morning activities, who sang a song with the lyrics ‘have an awesome day’. The morning band was 
made up of a few of the camps ‘counsellors’ and a series of volunteers, who would wander around 
the camp with a ukulele singing ‘have an awesome day’ to those who were still asleep. Other 
activities where the entirety of the camp would meet included the ‘un-talent show’, at which people 
would perform particular skills that they were ‘exceptionally bad at’; the ‘superhero summit’, for 
which campers would dress up in costumes, assume the identity of a superhero and join in the 
main hall to ‘network’; and a silent disco, at which people were each given a set of Bluetooth 
headphones, connected to a music set played by one of three live DJs. This was an instance in the 
retreat in which attendees were invited to actively engage with a ‘digital’ technology, where they 
could choose between one of three tracks on the Bluetooth headphones. 
 
The handing in of our digital devices (this largely meant mobile phones, but for me, also meant 
my laptop, as I had bought this abroad with me for my research and was unable to leave it outside 
of the camp) felt like a very significant moment of the retreat. Once we had arrived at the camp 
and unpacked our belongings at our cabins, we were divided into our groups, who were our 
designated camp ‘families’ for the duration of retreat. These loosely contained the same number 
of men and women and a mix of ages, and consisted of small groups of around twelve. In my own 
group (entitled ‘Wild’), we each introduced ourselves, and discussed why it was that we wanted to 
relinquish our mobile devices for the weekend. It was clear at this point that mobile devices were 
the main focus point of the ‘digital detox’. One person (male, of middle-aged appearance) likened 
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his relationship with his mobile device to that of his relationship with alcohol, and noted that he 
engaged with it when he felt he needed to isolate himself and distract himself from the issues in 
his life. Another person (female, of a similar age) likewise bought in the topic of addiction, and 
claimed that in the ‘outside world’ she was a ‘workaholic’, and at the camp, she intended to become 
a ‘playaholic’. She noted that handing in her mobile device would help enable this. I introduced 
myself here as the UK based researcher that was mentioned in group-emails, and noted that I was 
also interested to explore how I felt without my phone for a few days since I was aware that I 
compulsively check it during anxious moments, or when I was trying to avoid concentrating on 
challenging thoughts when writing my academic work. I didn’t discuss what I saw to be the politics 
of this as this wasn’t part of the discussion with the other participants, and was curious to see if it 
would emerge without my own prompts.  
 
It transpired that other conversations held at this stage did not explicitly pertain to the politics that 
participants associated with habitual engagements with their mobile devices. One person (early 
thirties, female) commented that her constant engagement with her mobile device determined her 
sense of how tired she is. She commented that it helped her quantify the number of times she 
experienced disturbances in the night, and her awareness of how many hours she had slept then 
had an impact upon how she behaved throughout the day. Other discussions in this circle revolved 
around how becoming ‘disconnected’ from our mobile devices would help bring about a deeper 
‘connection’ with others whilst at the camp. There seemed to be a mutual understanding that we’d 
all come to the camp to have ‘deep’ and ‘meaningful’ conversations, which was also iterated in the 
information leaflet provided by the camp (e.g. in a page detailing the camp’s ‘vision’, their aims 
included ‘ask hard questions’ and ‘stay open and true’). This reflected discussions I had later on in 
the retreat, where attendees noted that the ‘digital detox’ was attending to feelings of ‘loneliness’ 
or an emotional lack. Once we’d discussed our reasons for ‘digital detoxing’, we each put our 
mobile devices in a sealed wallet that was to go in a locked box, and in return, we were handed a 
necklace with the word ‘wild’ on it. We were told that we would get our digital devices back at the 
end of the retreat. 
 
Often between meal times, the camp provided snacks for the attendees. These were usually 
distributed from a shop-style counter at the centre of the camp, and often came from eco-friendly 
brands. Despite the aesthetic of a shop-counter, the ‘counsellors’ were not exchanging snacks for 
money: they were handed out freely. The only items that were available for purchase at the camp 
were branded camp t-shirts with the words ‘play hard’ on them, which attendees could pay for 
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with cash. As mentioned in the group email, alcohol was not distributed or sold on the site, but 
campers were allowed to bring their own alcohol to the retreat if they wished to do so. In this 
regard, it was generally understood that the culture around alcohol was one of sharing. The sharing 
culture amongst attendees also came to encompass other substances, most prominently 
hallucinogenic drugs such as magic mushrooms and LSD. This was vaguely alluded to in the 
‘BYOF (Bring Your Own Fun)’ section (see appendix 4.1), where it noted that ‘alcohol, herbs or 
otherwise’ were permitted at the camp, but since the email had noted that ‘camp is no fun 
hungover’ and also featured prominent themes around childhood, I had not anticipated that this 
was the meaning of ‘BYOF’ prior to my arrival. 
 
I attended a few workshops during my time at the digital detox, including a meditation workshop, 
a drumming workshop, and a workshop where we tapped on ‘pressure points’ on different areas 
of our bodies to ‘reset our mental hard-drives’. At this workshop, we were told to make sure we 
were sitting next to someone we hadn’t formerly met during the retreat. At the end of this 
workshop, everyone in the room was invited to hug the person next them (I personally felt 
uncomfortable with this but participated nonetheless). In the meditation workshop, the organiser 
(female, white) gave us ‘mantras’ for ‘self-empowerment’ to say quietly to ourselves during the 
session. These mantras included phrases such as ‘I deserve to be happy’, ‘I deserve to be loved’, 
and ‘I am a good person and I do my best’. At this workshop we were also to write love-notes 
(what the workshop’s organiser had titled ‘warm snugglies’) to the others – who for me, were 
mostly strangers – at the session. We were each to write something complementary on a folded 
piece of paper, and put it in a named ‘letter box’ which would go to each person in the room once 
the meditation workshop had come to an end. When I received my box of ‘warm snugglies’, the 
notes contained phrases such as ‘your energy lights up the whole room’ and ‘you have a wonderful 
smile’. 
 
On the final day of the retreat, after a weekend of workshops, events and ‘self-discovery’, all of 
the campers gathered for a final meeting in the main hall. Here, we split into our camp ‘families’ 
for the final time, and reflected upon our time at the retreat. Many commented that after the first 
twenty-four hours of the retreat, they had barely noticed the absence of their digital device. I noted 
that my experience of ‘detoxing’ was similar; at first I continually noticed the physical absence of 
a device in my pocket, which evoked a momentary panic around it being lost. This sensation 
however deteriorated throughout the course of the retreat. During this last meeting, we were also 
handed a blank postcard. Since we had no access to cameras or social media, we were told that 
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this was a way of recording something that we had learned or found memorable over the course 
of the retreat. We were to address this to ourselves, and the camp’s organisers would send these 
on to us a few weeks after the camp had ended. After writing our postcards, we all gathered as a 
group to partake in the only photograph of the retreat, showing all of the campers in a large group 
shot. This was taken on a mobile phone by one the camp’s ‘counsellors’.  
We were then finally handed back our digital devices, and, before leaving, many participants 
exchanged business cards. This was one of the only instances in the retreat in which I got a sense 
of what the professions of those at the ‘digital detox’ were. At this stage, I met several men who 
worked in blockchain and high-tech, several ‘holistic’ therapists, and several self-classified 
entrepreneurs. When I conducted my research interviews subsequent to the retreat, I asked my 
participants specifically about their professions as I wanted to gain some sense of the socio-
economic backgrounds of my participants and how these may have been tied to their motivations 
in attending a ‘digital detox’. Professions were often highly paid, with the lower paid professions 
being those working in education, or students. Professions that I classified as ‘highly paid’ included 
roles such as lawyers, government policy advisers, self-classified entrepreneurs and business 
developers, and those working in human resources, advertising and film.  
 
4.3 Analysis of Key Themes 
 
This section of the chapter will now thematically analyse the research data gathered for this case 
study. This is comprised of the notes I made whilst at Camp Wild and the research interviews that 
I undertook in the two-month period following the retreat (July and August 2017). To do this, I 
set out to identify the most frequently occurring themes that occurred within all of my research 
materials, which, as explored in chapter two, were identified via close reading techniques and 
through the use of qualitative data analysis software NVivo. 
 
4.3.1 Discursive Binarisms 
 
I will begin this section of analysis by drawing a table of some of the discursive binarisms that 
emerged throughout the research data. As previously mentioned, there was a repeated emphasis 
within much of the camp’s discourse around notions of ‘play’, which were often juxtaposed with 
the world outside of camp, at which participants would engage with ‘work’. This table shows the 
two different ‘worlds’ described by those at the camp - the ‘non-digital’ world of the retreat, and 




The ‘Digital’ World The ‘Non-Digital’ World 
Work, economy Play 
Logical, rational Emotional, vulnerable 
Artificial, fake Real, authentic 















Table 1  
 
The world at camp, the ‘non-digital’ world, was very often described as a world where attendees 
could engage in activities that were constituted as ‘play’. ‘Play’ - within the information leaflets, 
camp emails and in the discourses used by the participants - was often associated with states of 
‘authenticity’ and ‘vulnerability’. These were often seen to be more ‘natural’ states, or states that 
participants would have embodied during childhood. These states were associated with a sense of 
freedom, or of ‘being whoever you wanted to be’. These more ‘vulnerable’, ‘authentic’ and childlike 
selves were seen as more prone to engage in conversation and activities that could be constituted 
as ‘emotional’ - which included a marked emphasis on ‘plutonic touch’ - and were often described 
to be bought about by the ‘judgement free’ atmosphere of the camp. Inversely, the world outside 
of camp, the ‘digital’ world, was very frequently described as one in which participants would have 
less ‘authentic’ or less ‘real’ interpersonal interactions than those that they experienced at the 
‘digital detox’ camp. There was a sentiment of anxiety associated with the ‘digital’ world, and 
people described themselves to be ‘distracted’ there. This was often construed as being distinct 
from the state of ‘presence’ and ‘mindfulness’ that the camp bought about. Notably, the ‘digital’ 
world was very often associated with forms of responsibility and work.   
 
The lower section of this table shows the similarities that emerged between the two ‘worlds’ 
throughout my research data. Both were oriented toward self-improvement, however, the ways in 
which this was framed varied: in the ‘digital’ world, self-improvement was explicitly oriented 
towards ones professional development, while in the ‘non-digital’ world, self-improvement was 
oriented towards more effectively managing ones emotions, most prominently sentiments of 
anxiety. While discursive affiliations with these terms differed according to which ‘world’ they 
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referred to, they gesture toward broader ties between notions of wellness, self-improvement and 
neoliberal governmentality, where the imperative to improve one’s mental health is co-aligned with 
one’s capacity for economic productivity (Cederström and Spicer, 2015). It was also pertinent that 
forms of social validation emerged within both worlds. This wasn’t an association that participants 
explicitly gestured toward, however it was a theme that I personally noticed in terms of how the 
camp was structured, and how participants spoke about their experience at the camp. Within the 
‘digital’ world - that participants and the ‘digital detox’ camp itself generally affiliated with social 
media and emails - social validation takes the form of ‘liking’ or ‘views’ on social media platforms; 
in the ‘non-digital’ world, it took forms such as ‘warm snugglies’ (the notes that we wrote to one 
another during the meditation workshop), the ‘kudos’ post-it notes, and the repeated emphases on 
hugs and ‘plutonic touch’. This, I would again argue, is chiefly tied with a neoliberal climate 
oriented towards self-improvement; a psychic landscape in which consumers are continually 
prompted to be better (Pearl, 2014; Cederström and Spicer, 2015; Davis, 2015).  
 
4.3.2 The ‘Digital’ Meaning ‘Phones’, ‘Social Media’ and ‘Email’ 
 
A major theme amongst the research data was that the terms ‘social media’, ‘phones’ and ‘email’ 
were often used interchangeably with the term ‘digital’. ‘Digital’ seldom referred to its dictionary 
definitions of ‘recording or storing information as a series of numbers 1 and 0’ or ‘using or relating 
to digital signals and computer technology’ (Cambridge Dictionary, 2020). This association was 
one that was also partially encouraged by the camp, since the ‘digital detox’ was primarily focused 
upon the relinquishing of mobile phones for the four-day period. Aspects of the camp’s aesthetic, 
such as the large cardboard cut-out of emojis, and imitations of social media on the walls of the 
main hall of the camp, also reinforced this association.  
 
In a discussion about their use of a digital (non-smart) watch, one participant specifically discussed 
what the word ‘digital’ meant to them. We spoke about how, although their watch could be 
constituted a ‘digital’ object, it did not correspond with the understanding of the ‘digital’ that was 
encompassed within the culture of the ‘digital detox’. For them, this form of digital watch was not 
considered to be a breach of Camp Wild’s ethos:  
 
I11: So, for me, at least digital, while maybe that distinction in grade 4 
would have been ‘oh the thing with the arms is analogue, and the thing 
with the numbers with the kind of black on grey kind of look is digital’… 
Digital to me now is this [gestures toward computer], digital is effectively 
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I11: But to me that’s not cheating, that’s not the spirit of the thing. 
Because it just felt like a… I’m not addicted to my watch, how about that. 
I’m not obsessively looking at my watch and playing with it 
 
In this instance, the forms of digital technology which were considered to be a breach of the ‘spirit’ 
of the ‘digital detox’ were those that are designed to encourage addictive behaviours in users. It is 
also notable that this participant did not comment upon the political significance of these addictive 
behaviours, or the role that high-tech companies play in designing digital objects that might 
encourage addictive behaviours (Hayles, 2007; Hussain & Pontes, 2019).   
 
There were many other forms of digital technology present at the site, including microphones, 
speakers, flashing strobe lights, and sound-desks. During conversations held with other attendees, 
it was rarely flagged that these pieces of equipment were digital items. However, one participant 
did query the presence of Bluetooth headphones in a conversation that we shared during the silent 
disco. The silent disco had three separate DJs, who were each playing their own sets 
simultaneously. Those participating in the silent disco could choose which DJ channel they wanted 
to listen to through pressing a button on their headphones. This meant that while everyone was 
dancing together in the same space, those in the space weren’t necessarily listening to the same 
music. This particular participant and I were discussing my research at this point, and they gestured 
to the headphones and said, ‘this is digital, is it not?’. I agreed, and asked whether they thought it 
detracted from the experience of the ‘digital detox’. They said yes, but not because the headphones 
were ‘digital’: they considered the headphones to detract from the ‘digital detox’ because it meant 
that ‘people [were] isolated from one another when they [were] dancing’ (appendix 4.4). This 
participant, then, attributed this sense of isolation to both: the headphones themselves, which 
meant that people could not speak with one another; and to the fact that those in the silent disco 
space were listening to one of three tracks, which meant that it was difficult for those participating 
to share the experience of a song with the others around them. They said that if the music was 
playing from speakers - thus allowing everyone to dance together to the same song - it would not 
have detracted from the experience of the ‘digital detox’. In this instance, it was the individualising 





Discourse of addiction was very frequent throughout all of my research data for this case study. 
The understanding that digital devices – phones, laptops, and social media – are addictive was 
usually taken as a given; as an implicit element of the social reality that those at the camp shared. 
As previously noted, part of this understanding might be attributed to the notion of a digital ‘detox’ 
itself, where ‘detox’ bares connotations of addiction and dependency. It is also notable that, within 
a great deal of public debate surrounding digital technologies, different forms of technology are 
often described as having the effect of ‘addicting users’: many have flagged how phones, in 
particular, are engineered to be habit-forming and encourage users to stay engaged with their 
screens for prolonged periods of time (see e.g. Sullivan, 2016; Lewis, 2017; Klass, 2019). In these 
instances, as explored in chapter three, terms such as ‘technology’ or ‘phones’ can often be 
reductive and de-politicised, in that such ‘addictive’ effects are attributed to the technologies in 
themselves, rather than the broader corporate apparatuses that engender these dynamics.  
 
One interviewee revealed the strategies that they personally put in place to manage the length of 
time they spent engaging with their phone, in order to establish a more ‘mindful’ relationship with 
their mobile device subsequent to the ‘digital detox’ retreat. This involved purchasing a box with 
a lock and a timer on it, which was used for storing their mobile device. They would then set the 
timer to the amount of time that they wished to spend away from their mobile device, and once 
set, the box would prevent them accessing their device until the timer had expired. They 
understood their digital device to be detrimental to their personal well-being; as something that 
hindered their sense of personal agency and ability to engage in ‘me-time’. They described the 
‘enforced digital detox’ of the box as a way of retaining some agency around how much time they 
would spend engaging with their screen. For this interviewee, simply choosing not to engage with 
the device was not a sufficient enough measure for preventing their engagement with it. This, I 
felt, represented a self-managed and individualised response to the perceived effects of the ‘digital’, 
where these ‘effects’ were again not attributed to any broader corporate dynamics. This 
participant’s attempt to establish some form of control in relation to their mobile device reflects a 
broader neoliberal dynamic in which consumers are offered micro-opportunities to manage whilst 
being managed (Braybrooke and Jordan, 2017; Bassett, 2018). This might pertain to, for example, 
engineering one’s own content within the parameters of a social media platform (Braybrooke and 
Jordan, 2017), or, more latterly, using digital ‘wellness’ apps such as Apple’s Screen Time, which 
inform users about how much time they are spending engaging with their device to help them 
‘make more informed decisions about how [they] use [their] devices’ (Apple, 2020). In these cases, 
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and in this participant’s response, ways of intervening with the ‘effects’ of the digital are only 




The most frequently occurring term throughout my interview data was ‘connection’ (or words 
using the same stem, i.e. ‘connect’ or ‘connecting’). When referring to the ‘non-digital’ world at 
the camp, attendees tended to be referring to emotional bonds established between others who 
were present at the camp, which can be seen in comments such as ‘this year one of my motivations 
was to engage in the freedom of not having the devices and the opportunity to open up with and 
connect with other people more’ (I7). Another interviewee invoked similar discourses: 
 
I8: And it was just so nice that we were hanging out and not doing much of anything but 
we just didn’t have ours phones with us for a while, so it was really… And I think it will 
just help me be more aware of how disconnected you are when you are connected  
 
In discussions of the ‘world’ outside of the  camp – i.e. the world in which attendees were in 
possession of their mobile devices – ‘connection’ was used to refer to engagement with digital 
devices and the Internet which, in nearly all instances, came to mean communications made via 
email or social media. Additionally, when referring to the ‘world’ outside of the camp, 
‘connections’ also referred to professional ties and business networks. Although digital devices 
were seen to facilitate instantaneous and multitudinous ‘connections’ with others, these 
‘connections’ were seen to be less ‘authentic’, or less personally fulfilling, than the ‘connections’ 
that participants established during face-to-face interactions. This was often attributed to physical 
distance, or the mediation of the screen. Factors such as corporate or state surveillance, or 
corporate ownership of data, didn’t feature in these discussions. The toxicity here thus pertained 
to how participants described mediation or ‘work’ to influence their social bonds or relationships 
to the self, as opposed to, again, the forms of power that might influence social interactions online. 
While some commented that what they ‘craved’ when it came to the ‘digital detox’ was ‘connection’ 
and ‘deep conversations’, others noted that the ‘digital detox’ had helped them become more 
‘mindful’ about how and when their digital devices were impeding upon face-to-face interactions 
within the ‘outside world’. The notion that digital devices have an effect of ‘impeding’ was usually 
assumed; participants often shared the understanding that digital devices (namely, mobile phones) 
pulled them away from the social interactions they would preferably have, but that their capacities 
to create a more ‘mindful’ dynamic around this outside the sphere of the camp, were limited.  
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What is also pertinent here is that writers such as Fred Turner have described the politics of high-
tech businesses such as Facebook and Google to be that of ‘connectionism’ (2017). Indeed, the 
term is frequently invoked within Facebook’s rhetoric: when a user sends a ‘message request’ to 
another user who is not on their current list of ‘friends’, the recipient is informed that this user 
wishes to ‘connect’ with them; similarly, Facebook’s official @facebook page informs users of 
Facebook’s ‘mission’ of coming together to celebrate ‘how friends inspire us, support us, and help 
us discover the world when we connect’ (Facebook, 2018). While many participants described 
social media and ‘technology’ as entities that hindered their ‘connections’ with others, the use of 
the term ‘connection’ also often echoed its usage within the discourses of high-tech. For instance, 
I4 noted that they thought ‘most people were very similar, like they really appreciate and they 
thrive in the environment in which they’re forced to connect with people’. There was thus a 
blurring of meanings here: at times, ‘connection’ meant emotional bonds, in a way that was often 
reminiscent of - but not necessarily replicative of - its use within high-tech spheres; in others, it 
was used to refer to communications made via social media; and in others, it was used to refer to 
business networks. While it would perhaps be too presumptuous to state that the prevalence of 
this language was directly tied with its use within high-tech spheres and neoliberal discourse more 
broadly, I would suggest - drawing on the aforementioned readings of the term by Turner - that 
the frequency with which the term ‘connection’ was used serves as some indication as to the extent 
to which the language of high-tech was intertwined the imaginaries and vocabularies iterated within 
the ‘digital detox’ space.   
 
4.3.5 No ‘Work Talk’ 
 
As aforementioned, discussion of our professions was not permitted whilst we were at the retreat. 
Attendees were informed of these rules prior to the retreat, which were subsequently policed, for 
the most part, amongst ourselves. Although I was never ‘policed’ and told not to speak of my role 
as researcher, I did experience the policing of this rule with others. In one instance, subsequent to 
discussing the details of my research with another participant, the topic of conversation veered 
towards how it was relevant to much of what he did in his daily life and within his job. I then 
proceeded to ask him what this was, and he told me that ‘we’re not supposed to be talking about 
this’, and that we should discuss it at the end, once the retreat had finished. From what I could 
gather, it seemed to be the general consensus of the camp that the rules of the ‘digital detox’ were 
purposeful, and that it was the sake of our collective wellbeing to abide by these rules. 
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In several research interviews, participants attributed the rule of no ‘work talk’ to a way of 
removing social inequality from the space. At times this was attributed to the forms of cultural 
capital that are interlinked with certain lines of work, and how this is tied with class. By cultural 
capital, I mean the forms of social identity that are often conflated with forms of power (Bourdieu, 
1984). One participant remarked upon how the embodiment of certain professional identities, was, 
for them, constitutive of social inequality, and how the removal of these professional identities 
bought about a sense of ‘unity’ within the space: 
 
I1: When you don’t talk about work everyone’s equal and you’re able to like bond and hang 
out without judgement. And that is also connected to the whole commodification thing as 
well, and de-commodification. The concept of unity that comes together when work is not 
involved, and there aren’t these various levels of like, ‘oh you’re a CEO, you’re a taxi cab 
driver’, like, that doesn’t exist cause it’s not discussed and it’s not part of the energy there   
 
Another participant made a similar comment when I prompted them to speak more about the ‘no 
work talk’ rule, who likewise used the example of a CEO as one of the professional identities that 
would contribute to a sense of social inequality:  
 
I2: a lot of people define themselves by their workplace and what they do, and how they do 
it, and if I read into it a little bit it kind of like shows some societal hierarchies, in a way, kind 
of by the title of their job, and where they are, and you know, are you a plumber or are you a 
CEO? Like, really? Does it really matter? But in society there is that inbuilt hierarchy, so I felt 
like not being able to talk about work forced people to see who they are 
 
This interviewee then went on to discuss how this absence of social ‘hierarchy’ forced participants 
to think about factors outside of their professions that contributed towards their sense of self. 
This was articulated in terms of an inside/outside dichotomy: work was articulated as an external 
force, as a thing we ‘have’, while identity was articulated as something intrinsic, as something 
inherent about incarnation:  
 
I2: I loved the fact that there was no societal hierarchies, everyone was on the same page and 
we had to like look into ourselves to see what defined ourselves, versus, looking at what we 
have to define ourselves 
 
This sense of collectivity - of everyone being on the ‘same page’ - thus came to encompass the 
fact that all of those in attendance had relinquished the use of their digital devices, all belonged to 
an economic background that enabled access to the space, and all had entered into the same form 
of social contract with regards to relinquishing use of their real names and discussion of their 
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professions. This social contract also bought with it the overarching expectation that in adhering 
to these rules, attendees would get a heightened benefit from their interpersonal interactions, in 
the sense that they were seen to be more honest and more in keeping with who they ‘truly’ were.   
 
Participants also commented that there was a sense of collectivity that emerged from the mutually 
held knowledge that nobody at the camp would be able to take a picture, which was seen to 
eliminate the forms of self-consciousness that participants associated with the ‘digital’ world. 
Cameras, both digital and otherwise, were prohibited from the camp: this was the only non-digital 
item that was not permitted on the site. Some participants commented that this helped severe ties 
with the world outside of camp. One female interviewee noted that the absence of cameras might 
allow one to be ‘in a swimsuit that they might not wear somewhere else’, and also noted that her 
profession as a teacher meant that her ‘public image matters’. She described the experience bought 
about by the absence of cameras to be ‘very authentic’. This dynamic thus wasn’t necessarily bound 
with the fact that cameras are sometimes digital objects, and was rather tied with the forms of 
surveillance and self-consciousness that this participant associated with the presence of cameras.  
 
Throughout the retreat, I only experienced two instances in which the veneer of ‘no work talk’ 
was lifted. The first was early evening, on the final day of the retreat. A group of people, 
comprising of three women and one man, were chatting together, and when I sat down to join 
them, they told me that ‘we’re talking about privilege’. This transpired to be the only self-
consciously political conversation that I would have during the retreat. At this point, contrary to 
the rules of camp, a couple of the participants in this group revealed what they did as their 
professions, which included charity and NGO based work. They commented that they felt 
exasperated with the space at the camp, as they saw it to be detached from politics and ‘reality’ 
(which, within the context of the conversation, I took to mean systemic social inequality). This 
detachment from ‘reality’ was not attributed to the absence of technology at the retreat, but instead 
to the demographics of those who attended the camp, and the attitudes that were broadly held. 
This group noted that the camp was a white-dominated space, which was the only 
acknowledgement of this that I’d personally encountered. One participant in this discussion 
commented that when they had remarked to another camper that their choice of attire was 
culturally appropriative, they had been told that the camp was a ‘safe space’ in which people could 
be ‘free’ from political issues. The participant informing the group of this felt frustrated with this 
attitude, and noted that it was damaging and prevented the ‘detox’ site from being a ‘safe space’ 
for marginalised social groups. This incident was significant as it broke the social contract that the 
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organisers had put in place: once the camp was no longer seen to accommodate for the collective 
good of all in attendance, the social contract was broken.  
 
As noted earlier in the chapter, another instance in which the ‘work talk’ rule was lifted was at the 
end of the retreat, once we had collected our belongings and were waiting for the ‘magic school 
buses’ to take us back to the meeting spot in the city. We had reflected upon our time at the camp 
during the camp’s closing ceremony, and were handed back our digital devices. At this point, 
people were also revealing their given names to each other, and in presenting their non-camp 
identities, had also begun to exchange business cards. This was an interesting shift: while at the 
camp, measures were put in place to remove forms of economisation from the space (for example, 
‘no work talk’, limited exchange of money for goods), attempts were – immediately - made to 
capitalise upon the relationships established within the ‘detox’ space once it had come to an end. 
On a similar tac, one interviewee noted that the prohibition of ‘work talk’ did not prevent people 
thinking about ‘networking and business’ while at the ‘digital detox’ site, and noted that the 
absence of such discussions allowed him to ‘raise [his] value’: 
 
I1: People are still thinking about work and networking and business so it does come up. 
And I find that like, the ability to not talk about it and say like ‘oh we’re not talking about 
it’… for one, it’s clearing for me, I love that shit, sometimes. And two, the way in which 
I talk about it - or like, the way in which I don’t talk about it - I could actually raise my 
value 
 
For some, then, part of the appeal of ‘no work talk’ was to establish relationships that could then 
be capitalised upon subsequent to the retreat. While ‘work’ was purposefully not part of the 
discourse of the ‘digital detox’, it was nonetheless present in the social interactions and forms of 




The theme of play frequently occurred throughout research interviews. The associations 
participants made of play with the ‘non-digital’ world, and work with the ‘digital’ world, were very 
marked. This was also a discourse that was frequently iterated by the camp’s organisers in leaflets, 
group emails and merchandise (for example, t-shirts featuring the slogan ‘play hard’, and emails 
signed ‘in love and play’, see appendix 4.1). Throughout the interview data, play was often 
associated with ‘doing things’ with our ‘hands and bodies’ (examples of this included ‘painting a 
rock’, ‘running around’ and ‘hula hooping’), and was seen as distinct from the forms of 
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embodiment that became manifest in the ‘digital’ world. ‘Play’ was also associated with ‘letting go’, 
‘being ourselves’ and ‘authenticity’, and was very often described to be one of the most beneficial 
aspects of the experience of the camp. On the whole, ‘work’ and ‘play’ were often articulated in 
mutually exclusive terms (for example, in the ‘outside world’ I’m a ‘workaholic’, at camp I’m a 
‘playaholic’), or ‘play’, at least, was not seen as something that was undertaken in the world beyond 
the sphere of camp (for example, ‘my motivations were to separate from my daily life and play’). 
 
I will depart briefly from the ethnographic analysis here to highlight how ‘play’ has been 
conceptualised amongst philosophical and sociological literature, as these conceptualisations bear 
relevance to some of the understandings of ‘play’ that were articulated throughout the research 
data. While there is a great deal of debate around what may precisely constitute ‘play’, it is generally 
understood to be an activity that is an end in itself (Henig, 2008; Feezell, 2013; Ryall, 2013). Some 
attribute the concept of play to an ‘apparent purposeless’, while others argue that it is 
‘unproductive, insofar as it is not obviously pursued for the sake of satisfying material needs’ 
(Feezell, 2013, p. 16). Roger Caillois’ work on play, which critiques and builds upon early 
definitions outlined by Huizinga, is frequently invoked in relation to play as an exceptional state. 
Huizinga describes play as an activity ‘quite consciously outside “ordinary” life’, ‘not serious’, 
‘connected with no material interest, and no profit can be gained by it’ (cited in Caillois, 1961, p. 
4). Caillois foregrounds however that such a conception of play bypasses considerations of games 
that are played for money, and ‘affirms or implies the absence of economic interest’ (ibid, p. 5). 
He contends instead that play does not preclude economic interest. Its chief characteristic is rather 
that it is unproductive: that is, while property may be exchanged, ‘no goods are produced’. It is this 
which renders it distinct from work or art (ibid). He continues,   
 
Nothing has been harvested or manufactured, no masterpiece has been created, no capital has 
accrued. Play is an occasion of pure waste: waste of time, energy, ingenuity, skill, and often of 
money for the purchase of gambling equipment or eventually pay for the establishment 
(Callois, 1961) 
 
Stuart Brown’s definition of play shares some similarities with Callois, in that it is ‘done for its 
own sake’, but departs from Callois in that it emphasises notions such as a ‘diminished 
consciousness of self’ and play’s ‘improvisational potential’: 
 
Apparently purposeless (done for its own sake); voluntary (not obligatory or required by duty); 
inherent attraction (‘it’s fun. It makes you feel good… it’s a cure for boredom’); freedom from 
time (‘when we are fully engaged in play, we lose a sense of the passage of time’); diminished 
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consciousness of self; improvisational potential (‘we aren’t locked into a rigid way of doing 
things. We are open to serendipity, to change’); continuation desire (‘we find ways to keep it 
going […] and when it’s over, we want to do it again) (2009: 9–10; cited in Ryall, 2013).  
 
Throughout the research interviews, discourse around ‘play’ encompassed similar philosophical 
assumptions to the conceptions of ‘play’ outlined above: the focus wasn’t necessarily on the non-
pecuniary status of play, but instead upon freedom from time constraints and the feeling of less self-
consciousness that many participants noted they felt at the retreat. As previously discussed, within 
the ‘digital detox’ space, there was a marked de-emphasis on ‘time constraints’; although the 
structure was timetabled, clocks were notably absent from the premises, and many attendees noted 
the lack of pressure to adhere to the given schedule. Similarly, the efforts that were put in place to 
reduce levels of self-consciousness on part of the participants - prohibition of cameras, repeated 
discourse of the site being a ‘safe space’ - also meant the camp shared similarities with the 
conceptions of play outlined above. 
 
As noted in the introduction to the thesis, notions of ‘play’ have also been invoked within a series 
of neoliberal workplace environments as a way of heightening the productivity of workers  
(Flemming and Sturdy, 2010; Stewart, 2013; Cederström and Spicer, 2015). Flemming and Sturdy’s 
ethnography of a call-centre work environment argues that discourses of ‘play’, ‘being oneself’ and 
‘authenticity’ were often invoked by management as a way of distracting employees from the 
‘stultifying effects of […] otherwise low discretion environments’, while James Stewart highlights 
how the Google offices, a ‘place to work and play’, are specifically engineered to establish the 
‘happiest, most productive workplace in the world’ (Stewart, 2013). I would posit that many 
similarities can be drawn between the discourses utilised in these spaces and those invoked within 
the sphere of the ‘digital detox’. Elements of the ‘digital detox’ space - such as the imitations of 
social media on the walls of the main hall of the camp, and the large cardboard cut-outs of Apple’s 
emojis - indicated that while there was an emphasis on ‘detoxing’ from digital devices, this ‘detox’ 
was not a rejection of the high-tech spheres that produce such technologies. Further, while there 
was an emphasis on no ‘work talk’, workshop titles such as ‘intuitive development for busy people’ 
and ‘jump out of bed with purpose’ indicated that there wasn’t necessarily a critical stance towards 
‘work’ held within this space, or a permanent rejection of ‘work’ wasn’t part of the imaginary of 
the space. Rather, the prohibition of ‘work talk’ was a way of returning to work in a more productive 
manner, and ‘play’ a way of mitigating some of the detrimental psychological effects of ‘work’.  
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4.3.7 Authenticity and Vulnerability 
 
Throughout the interviews, the ‘digital’ was seen as detrimental to establishing ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ 
connections. This differed to the ‘connections’ that participants noted that they experienced whilst 
at the ‘detox’ retreat. A common thread throughout the interviews was that in stripping away each 
our given names, ‘technology’ and ‘what we do’ in our professional lives, we are able to establish 
an understanding of our more ‘authentic’ selves. The camp’s themes of childhood were also 
significant in this regard; notions of origins, or of returning to a time in which digital technologies 
were less omnipresent, were also embroiled with these notions of ‘authenticity’: 
 
I4: I guess we are still a generation that fortunately lived without big-tech devices 
consuming our lives for a while. So I think for me in particular it was getting back to that 
 
 
The vast majority of those I interviewed were between the ages of twenty-eight and thirty-five. It 
is therefore likely that those belonging to this age group remember a period in their lives in which 
digital devices were far less pervasive. This was reflected in much of the discussion held with 
attendees: returning to childhood, nature and notions of ‘authenticity’ were often encompassed in 
the same discourses. I would also posit here that there was a strong link between the themes of 
childhood nostalgia and the lack of ‘responsibility’ that participants associated with the camp; 
childhood as not only a time where digital devices were less present, but also as a time when 
participants felt less ‘responsibility’ (whether this be in terms of professions, or the social pressures 
that participants associated with digital environments, such as the presence of cameras and body 
image).  
 
‘Vulnerability’ was also a term that featured frequently throughout the research data, and was often 
used in relation to notions of ‘authenticity’. ‘Vulnerability’ was usually associated with the 
‘emotional selves’ that participants felt they embodied whilst they were at the camp. These 
emotional selves were seen to have more ‘authentic’ and ‘genuine’ conversations, be more open to 
‘plutonic touch’, and be more inclined to engage in activities that could be constituted as ‘play’. 
Also, notably, the ‘emotional’ selves of the camp environment were usually seen as distinct from 
the selves that participants described themselves as embodying in the ‘digital’ world. 
 
 4.3.8 ‘Being Whoever You Want to Be’ 
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Throughout all of my research data, participants often expressed that they could ‘be whoever they 
wanted to be’ within the sphere of the camp. This echoed discourse that was used by the camp to 
some degree: for example, the pamphlet that we had each received told us that we had ‘permission’ 
to ‘feel all the feelings, play all the things, and be silly, fun, and above all else, you’. Often, the lack 
of digital technology was seen as enabling of this dynamic. The reasons behind this were mixed. 
Some attributed the sense of ‘being yourself’ or of ‘being whoever we want to be’ to the fact that 
a digital device wasn’t mediating social interactions, or acting as a distraction: 
 
I5: showing up without being hidden by our day-to-day kind of stuff, and I do think 
that specifically around technology, that that absence of it meant that there wasn’t 
anything else to do except be yourself 
 
The absence of cameras was also very frequently associated with ‘being whoever you wanted to 
be’. Many commented on how the ‘safe space’ of camp was facilitated by the absence of cameras 
and smartphones, as there was no fear that evidence of their behaviour could be captured or 
distributed beyond the sphere of camp. As previously noted, these fears were often expressed in 
relation to responsibilities that participants experienced at their workplaces, or pressures around 
body image. Aside from the scenario discussed in the previous section, in which the topic of 
privilege was discussed amidst a few attendees at the camp, I did not encounter instances in which 
‘being whoever you wanted to be’ was problematized. In this regard, notions of ‘being whoever 
you want to be’ have close ties with neoliberal imaginaries that propagate individualism and 
ideologies of choice (McGuigan, 2014, p. 225). Choice architectures are pivotal to a broader 
constellation of neoliberal ideologies that emphasise that anyone can achieve anything should they choose 
to work hard enough, regardless of broader economic structures that systemically disadvantage 
marginalised social groups. I did not experience such problematisations within the sphere of Camp 
Wild. For the most part, ‘being whoever you wanted to be’ was celebrated and foregrounded as 




Discourse around anxiety was a frequently occurring theme throughout my research data. Many 
noted that they felt anxieties in the first twenty-four hours of the retreat, subsequent to handing 
in digital devices. This was often linked with the sensation of having something missing, 
particularly the physical sensation of pockets being empty. While I would not consider myself a 
heavy user of my mobile device, this was also something that I personally experienced while ‘digital 
detoxing’; I often felt panicked when I realised my mobile device was not on my person. Some 
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participants described the anxieties as ‘momentary’ or as an ‘awkward twitch’, while others used 
bodily gestures to describe the sensation that occurred:  
 
I10: The first day of camp I definitely noticed in myself like moments where I’d be like… 
[gasps] gotta check my phone! Like that [jolts forward, in a whip-lash motion]… whatever 
that is that happens inside of me like ‘gotta check it!’. I have that awkward twitch a few 
times, the first day or so 
* * * 
I10: I remember last year having some itchy moments of when you’re walking somewhere 
during downtime or something and feeling the pocket and feeling nothing there and the 
sense of yeah… a momentary anxiety? 
 
Another participant described the sensation of the absence of their mobile device in a similar way, 
as an experience of momentary panic: 
 
I11: And it's just weird not having... when I put my hands on my hip, right? Or on my... 
you know what I mean? When I put my hands in my pocket? And this moment of panic, 
'oh my god, where's my phone?', right? I lost my phone somewhere... and then the 
realisation, oh no... So it felt weird because this thing that has literally almost become a 
part of me 
 
Many noted that they felt these anxieties in moments when they were not having their attention 
directed towards something; during times when they were walking alone from one area to another, 
or when they were using the bathroom. One participant (I11) noted that these were usually the 
times where they would check their mobile device. It was also often noted that had the retreat not 
provided extensive activities for the duration of the stay, and had rather left participants to create 
their own entertainment, attendees would have found it more difficult to be without their ‘digital 
devices’ for the duration of the retreat.  
 
4.3.10 ‘It Wasn’t the End of the World’ 
 
Many participants of the ‘digital detox’ noted that giving up their digital devices for the duration 
of the retreat ‘wasn’t the end of the world’. Several interviewees alluded to a sense of inescapability 
when it came to the presence of digital devices within their day-to-day lives, and how this presence 
had become reified to form a given component of their existence: 
 
I1: I wasn't sure what was going to happen. I didn't know if people were going to be 
like 'no, no, I don't know if I can handle this!' or whatever 
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* * * 
 
I2: I think that going to Camp Wild* [audio cuts] taught me what is possible when you 
focus on the things besides technology 
 
Within my research interviews, and my time spent at the camp, giving up digital devices subsequent 
to the retreat was never articulated as a sustainable life choice. Instead, it was something that could 
only be achieved in temporary environments such as the ‘digital detox’. This was further iterated 
in the repeated notions of ‘origins’ and returning to ‘nature’ that were iterated by the ‘digital detox’ 
retreat and its attendees; life beyond daily presence of high-tech devices was only envisioned in 
terms of drastic returns to primitivism. This, for me, gestured towards the politics of capitalist 
realism (Fisher, 2009), where alternatives not only to capitalism, but capitalism as it is manifest 




This chapter has explored the data gathered from an ethnography I undertook at Camp Wild. I 
have analysed the field-notes from my time spent as a participant-observer, and fourteen semi-
structured interviews that I conducted with some of its attendees subsequent to the retreat. Camp 
Wild was a space that invited its participants to relinquish use of their digital devices, discussion 
of their professions and use of their real names for a four-day period. In undertaking this case 
study, I aimed to explore what precisely it was about the ‘digital’ that attendees sought to ‘detox’ 
from; what the significance was of the ‘digital detox’ encompassing both a prohibition of ‘digital 
technologies’ and discussion of one’s profession; and how attendees of the retreat understood the 
removal of the ‘digital’ and ‘work’ from the space to influence their behaviours and interpersonal 
relationships. I found it important to explore what attendees of Camp Wild were seeking to detox 
from as it would gesture toward sets of mutually held meanings that pivoted around a nexus of 
the digital: how the digital was imagined; and how the materiality of high-tech, and its surrounding 
discourses, influenced imaginaries, forms of relationality, and subjectivities.  
 
Camp Wild spoke to a series of cultural dynamics that attendees attributed to anxiety, stress, and 
loneliness. Attendees were invited to attend the retreat and remember what being ‘human really 
feels like’ without the presence of their digital devices. In attending the ‘non-digital’ world of Camp 
Wild, many described their experience as being more emotional, more authentic, more mindful, and 
more free. Inversely, in the ‘digital’ world of work, participants understood themselves to be more 
distracted, isolated, responsible and anxious. This dichotomy between the two ‘worlds’ was pertinent, 
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and is, I argue, bound with a broader epistemic order in which ‘humans’ and ‘digital technologies’ 
are often distinguished as their own ontological entities (Latour, 1993; Haraway, 1991). This 
epistemic order further paves the way for the de-politicisation of ‘digital’ technologies, which was 
manifest both in the discourses propagated by the camp, and in those of my research participants. 
The detrimental effects that participants associated with the ‘digital’ and ‘high tech’ were bound 
principally with emails, phones and laptops in themselves, rather than the broader corporate spheres 
that play a key role in instigating ‘addictive’ and anxiety provoking sentiments and behaviours.  
 
As a commercialised response, then, to sets of mutually held meanings pivoting around the ‘digital’, 
Camp Wild was tailored towards the forms of governmentality that are made manifest in digital 
environments. It offered short term coping mechanisms as a way of mitigating the dynamics of 
neoliberal capital; it did not offer challenges to the political spheres that are bound with the 
detrimental dynamics that participants associated with ‘work’ and ‘digital technologies’. Similarly 
to Flemming and Sturdy’s study, which explored how discourses of ‘play’, ‘authenticity’ and ‘being 
oneself’ were employed within a call centre environment to distract employees from the ‘stultifying 
effects of […] otherwise low discretion environments’, I argue that such discourses made manifest 
within the sphere of Camp Wild were oriented towards similar ends; as a way of personally managing 
the dynamics of neoliberal capital as it is manifest through high-tech (2010). This was iterated, for 
example, in the ‘mantras’ provided in meditation workshops, where myself and other participants 
were told ‘I deserve to be happy’, ‘I deserve to be loved’, and ‘I am a good person and I do my 
best’. Amidst a culture of neoliberal discourse that perpetually instructs consumers to be better, 
these momentary reassurances offer short-term antidotes that allow subjects to continue 
participating in the mechanisms of capital.  
 
While hyperbolic, many participants noted that relinquishing their digital devices for the four-day 
period of the retreat wasn’t the ‘end of the world’. Themes of returning to ‘nature’ and ‘childhood’ 
- established by the retreat and iterated within the discourses of the ‘digital detoxers’ - were also 
pertinent. This alluded to a sense of inescapability around digital devices and daily life; life beyond 
these dynamics was bound to drastic returns to primitivism, and was only potentiated within the 
sphere of the retreat. This, as argued in the final section of the analysis, is further bound with a 
wider cultural framework of ‘capitalist realism’, where capital - and by extension, digital devices - 
‘seamlessly occupy the horizons of the thinkable’ (Fisher, 2009). For the ‘digital detoxers’, digital 
devices, their ties with work and responsibility had become a reified component of everyday life from 
which the ‘digital detox’ offered them the opportunity to temporarily withdraw. 
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5.0 ‘Blockchain for Good’:  







This chapter examines the emergence of the discourse of blockchain, with a specific focus upon 
the question of whether notions of ‘blockchain for good’ can be understood as distinct from this 
more general formulation. When I began work on this thesis, my motivations for exploring 
blockchain as part of my key empirical work were quite different to how they stand currently. I 
was then primarily interested in forms of collective action, and what role the digital would or could 
play within contemporary social movements. With respect to these motives, blockchain 
encompassed many interesting possibilities. An array of political positions, ranging from socio-
anarchism to far-right technolibertarianism, had speculated about how blockchain technologies 
could be harnessed for their respective agendas. For the conservative techno-libertarian, 
blockchain was finally a way to bring about collective participation amongst individuals who were 
all ultimately seeking out their own self-interest (see Tapscott and Tapscott, 2016). For the socio-
anarchist, blockchain represented a way of eschewing government or corporate intervention, and 
could potentially pave the way for self-organisation and mass collaboration at scale (Scott, 2016). 
With the latter speaking to my own personal politics, and a piqued curiosity about how it could be 
that this digital technology was attracting interest from such a diverse array of political 
perspectives, I commenced my research into blockchain. 
 
Since these beginnings for my research in 2015, blockchain has shifted a great deal. What had first 
seemed to be a potentially subversive medium has gained immense commercial momentum, and 
has – in a similar vein to the Web – become readily developed and adopted by banking, corporate 
and governmental sectors. While initially conceptualised to function as the underlying ledger for 
Bitcoin, uses for blockchains have extended far beyond cryptocurrency, to include applications 
such as smart contracts, decentralised labour models, and initiatives for digital identity and financial 
inclusion (Adams, Kewell and Parry, 2017). Notions of ‘blockchain for good’ have emerged 
following the advent of these blockchain applications, and have featured in Twitter hashtags such 
as #BlockchainForGood and #BC4G (Adams, Kewell and Parry, 2017; Blockchain for Good, 
2018; Wells & Llopis, 2017). For some, ‘blockchain for good’ pertains to notions of sustainable 
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development, which encompasses initiatives for financial inclusion, revised supply chain models, 
prospective sharing economies, and so-called ‘innovations in governance’ (Adams, Kewell and 
Parry, 2017). For others, ‘blockchain for good’ pivots around humanitarian and digital identity 
schemes (Blockchain for Good, 2018; Wells & Llopis, 2017; Casey and Vigna, 2018b). While there 
is some continuity in terms of what constitutes ‘blockchain for good’ across each of its contexts, 
universalistic notions of ‘good’ are of course ambiguous, and are encompassed with specific 
cultural imaginaries and epistemologies (Alasuutari & Qadir, 2013). 
 
Blockchain is, on the one hand, a networked operation of code layers and protocols that can be 
used for a variety of purposes. On the other hand, it is a discursive formation arising in popular 
technology writing, trade press, policy documentation and academic fields. As a force for ‘good’, 
blockchains are often mobilised for philanthro-capitalist and libertarian paternalist political 
agendas. Philanthro-capitalism can be described as a branch of capitalism that positions 
‘philanthropic’ activity as a central part of its business model, where companies ‘accumulate capital 
by leveraging moral economies’ (Burns, 2019, p. 130; Morvaridi, 2012; Fridell and Konings, 2013). 
Tech big-names such as Google, Microsoft and Ebay have each been involved in philanthro-
capitalism, while private organisations such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation have been 
formed with the proclaimed intentions of reducing extreme poverty and improving healthcare 
across the globe. Libertarian paternalism, as outlined in the introduction to the thesis, is associated 
with policies that are ‘selected with the goal of influencing the choices of affected parties in a way 
that will make those parties better off’, where what is ‘better’ is usually equated with what is 
‘rational’ or most economically beneficial for particular sets of social actors (Thaler & Sunstein, 
2003, p. 175). This outlook maintains that citizens can be ‘nudged’ into undertaking specific 
decisions and behaviours, while still respecting maxims pertaining to ‘freedom of choice’ (Thaler 
and Sunstein, 2008). These ideologies have a specific relationship to notions of ‘social good’ that 
are prevalent within ‘blockchain for good’ discourses, which, I argue, both obscure and propagate 
neoliberal and neo-colonial agendas.  
 
In this chapter, I relay these considerations to Fisher’s notion of ‘capitalist realism’, and argue that 
discourses of ‘blockchain for good’ advocate ideas for the future in which ‘capitalist realism’ is 
materialised as a ubiquitous force in everyday life (2009). I also consider these themes in 
conjunction with the ideas around sociomateriality, highlighted in chapter three, where I 
highlighted how Western-centric epistemologies and materialisations thereof, have, and continue 
to, disempower marginalised social groups and propagate Western structures of power. In the first 
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section, I will provide a brief history of blockchain and some of its key characteristics. This 
background is intended to contextualise the empirical work undertaken later in the chapter. In the 
chapter’s second section, I detail what methodologies were utilised for compiling and analysing 
the data for this chapter. In the third section, I then undertake a close reading of pop-technology 
literature that orbits notions of ‘blockchain for good’. I analyse some pieces of writing that are 
explicitly labelled with a title of ‘blockchain for good’, which include the Blockchain for Good 
Manifesto by the think-tank ‘Blockchain for Good’, and a chapter in Casey and Vigna’s book The 
Truth Machine: Blockchain for Good and the Future of Everything entitled ‘Blockchain for Good’. My 
analysis of these pieces focuses primarily upon relationships between bodies and digitality, and 
how these relationships speak to specific structures of power: not simply in terms of an 
intensification of the accumulation of big data by Western apparatuses20, but also in terms of the 
epistemological and ideological ‘erasures’ that emerge when populations are rendered digitally 
legible in this way (Vazquez, 2011).  
In the fourth section I provide an auto-ethnographic account of a data-scrape process, which 
involved the use of some proprietary natural language processing (NLP) software to crawl Twitter 
for all Tweets containing the term ‘blockchain’ across a six-week period during July and August 
2018. Here, there were several intentions: to explore how I might go about abstracting Tweets 
pertaining to ‘blockchain for good’ from other Tweets about blockchain; how this could be 
undertaken using digital methods; and how the systems of visibility and intelligibility offered by 
the software influenced how I conducted myself in relation to the data. I reflect upon how these 
forms of visibility and intelligibility are bound with specific cultural politics, and what can be 
revealed about the hegemonic assumptions underlying ‘blockchain for good’ via an engagement 
with large-scale Twitter data. I tie these considerations into the epistemological concerns explored 
throughout the course of the chapter, and what limitations were involved with engaging with a 
data-scrape methodology that centrally entailed automation.  
 
5.2 About Blockchain and ‘Blockchain for Good’ 
 
                                                 
20 I use the term ‘apparatus’ here as it is framed in Agemben’s work, What is an Appartus?. This work 
expands upon the dispositif (apparatus) as it is used by Foucault, to refer to ‘literally anything that has in 
some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, 
behaviours, opinions, or discourses of living beings’ (2009, p. 14) 
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This section of the chapter will now provide a brief history of blockchain. Blockchains are 
cryptographic distributed ledgers, which allow anyone on a given network to exchange forms of 
economic value from peer-to-peer, without the intermediation of an external third-party. While 
governments, corporations or banks usually act as the bodies that legitimise transactions within 
centralised exchange frameworks, blockchains substitute the role of these third-parties with 
distributed consensus mechanisms, which allow other users on the network to discern fraudulent 
activity (Scott, 2014; Adams, Kewell and Parry, 2017). A growing list of records is stored on every 
computing device on the blockchain network, which is then updated, verified and stored every ten 
minutes. This means that modifying the list of records would require such an immense amount of 
computing power that overriding or tampering with blockchain data is considered to be 
theoretically impossible (Scott, 2014; Brekke, 2018). Blockchains are frequently described as 
‘disruptive’ platforms due to their purported immutability and capacities for disintermediation, as 
these attributes are often considered to act as building blocks toward establishing alternatives to 
centralised business models and forms of governance (ibid). 
 
Blockchain was initially conceptualised to function as the underlying transaction ledger for Bitcoin, 
as a way of mitigating the ‘double spend’ problem. This refers to the possibility of spending the 
same money a series of times that can occur with other forms of digital currency (Davis, 2011). 
The Bitcoin protocol attempted to address this issue through making all transactions public, where 
all machines on the Bitcoin network are able to discern that a transaction has been made between 
party A and party B, and through the implementation of a series of cryptographic protocols that 
prevent the same transaction being undertaken a series of times (ibid; Scott, 2014). Users of the 
Bitcoin network can earn Bitcoin via the Proof-of-Work protocol, for which they are required to 
solve a cryptographic ‘puzzle’ which is then used to complete and verify transactions (Bulkin, 
2016). Since Bitcoin, many other applications have been written to run on blockchains. A 
particularly prominent example is Ethereum, which allows for the creation of smart contracts 
between two or more parties. Other uses for blockchains include: the recording of birth and death 
certificates, marriage licenses, educational qualifications, health data, and insurance claims; 
movement of goods within supply chains; tracking uses of funds within charities; and distributed 
alternatives to centralised labour models such as Uber or Airbnb. 
 
A great deal of rhetoric surrounding blockchains describes these networks to be ‘trustless’ (Adams, 
Kewell and Parry, 2017; Casey and Vigna, 2018b). ‘Trustless’ within these contexts usually refers 
to the sets of algorithms and infrastructures that allows for data or value to be safely transferred 
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from party A to party B: party A doesn’t have to rely on other measures of trust in party B for the 
transaction to safely occur, nor do they have to go via an intermediary to ensure that the transaction 
is valid. It is thus usually considered that this ‘trustlessness’ is achieved through both: the 
transparency of blockchain data, in that all users of a given network are able to discern fraudulent 
activity; and ‘incentivisation’ mechanisms, which allow users to reap economic rewards when they 
act in accordance with the consensus of the blockchain network (Adams, Kewell and Parry, 2017; 
Casey and Vigna, 2018a; Casey and Vigna, 2018b; Magas, 2018).  
 
Blockchain value is constituted within the parameters of a given network, and remains 
independent, to some degree, of the currency systems of countries and states. Besides uses for 
cryptocurrency, this can also be exemplified in initiatives such as La’Zooz, which provides ideas 
for where prospective ‘sharing economies’ could exist (Adams, Kewell and Parry, 2017). Differing 
to the ‘Proof of Work’ protocol that Bitcoin runs for the creation of value, the La’Zooz token 
system functions according to a protocol of ‘Proof of Movement’. Users of La’Zooz are ‘rewarded’ 
either by providing their own movement data, or by helping the community grow so that more 
people are able to share their movement data (La’Zooz, 2018). These behaviours are then 
tokenised and made spendable within the parameters of the La’Zooz platform, allowing users to 
essentially exchange one service (such as providing movement data) for another service (such as a 
lift in a car). The purposes of this, according to La’Zooz, pertain to disintermediation and 
sustainability: La’Zooz replaces the role of third-party corporations such as Uber with distributed 
consensus mechanisms, and encourages more sustainable car use by providing a platform that 
helps drivers and passengers share unused vehicle space. There are several notable themes here 
which I will carry forward in the rest of the chapter, pertaining to: who sets the terms and 
conditions for ‘rewardable’ behaviour; how that behaviour is ‘incentivised’ and quantified; to 
whose and what ends the ‘Proof-of-Movement’ data serves; who has access to the ‘Proof-of-
Movement’ data; and finally, how such ‘proof-of’ mechanisms continue to utilise quantitative data 
to speak some form of ‘truth’ on part of the subject.  
 
‘Blockchain for Good’ is a specific formation within the broader blockchain discourse, which – as 
I will explore and argue throughout this chapter – cannot be rigidly defined. It has, however, been 
briefly explored in the academic work of Adams, Kewell and Parry in Blockchain for Good? Digital 
Ledger Technologies and Sustainable Development Goals (2017). Adams, Kewell and Parry thematically 
explore a series of existing and prospective blockchains that are intended for use within ‘social 
impact’ settings, and divides applications of ‘blockchain for good’ into four overarching categories. 
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These include: supply chains; innovations in governance; prospective sharing economies; and 
financial inclusion (2017). The ‘supply chain’ category gets very brief attention in their work, and 
refers to blockchain initiatives that facilitate the tracking of goods, in order to reduce the likelihood 
of fraud or corruption between origin and destination. Examples of such blockchains can be seen 
in initiatives such as Everledger, which tracks the movement of assets, and applications for green 
energy markets, which allow for party-to-party trading of excess solar-generated energy (ibid, p. 
134).  
 
The ‘innovations in governance’ category draws upon notions of substituting ‘code […] for trust’ 
(ibid, p. 134). When ‘appropriately designed’, they note, self-executing smart-contracts can be run 
on blockchains, thus paving the way for new forms of ‘economic and social governance’ (ibid, p. 
134). No detail is provided however in terms of what might constitute ‘appropriate design’, but 
the writers do acknowledge that there are dangers when it comes to who is writing the code for 
smart-contracts, and how the ‘individual’s free will’ might be affected when engaging with them 
(ibid, p. 134). It is worth noting here that the term ‘innovation’ is often a term that is invoked 
within business rhetoric, to refer to ‘creating value from ideas’ in relation to other ‘competitors’ in 
the market (Rahim, 2017). The ‘sharing economy’ category is also very brief, and explores how 
blockchains might address issues with ‘decentralising and disintermediating’ (ibid, p. 135). Here, 
they draw upon the example of La’Zooz previously explored, noting that it is predicated upon 
‘truer sharing economy principles, rather than monetary incentives’ (ibid, p. 135). The writers do 
not elaborate upon what precisely constitutes ‘truer sharing economy principles’, however in 
relation to La’Zooz, they note that ‘value is created amongst those who created it, offering greater 
reward and opportunity for inclusion’ (ibid, p. 135). 
 
The final category offered by Adams, Kewell and Parry then explores blockchains that might be 
used for ‘financial inclusion’. Here, they discuss initiatives that have (purportedly) been 
orchestrated to help those living in poverty access financial aid and services with greater ease and 
less corruption. The writers argue that identity is crucial for ‘enabling’ greater financial inclusion, 
under the rationale that ‘the “identityless” exist on the margins of society, unable to formally 
participate in democratic, educative, healthcare and economic activity’ (ibid, p. 136). Examples of 
blockchain initiatives that are seeking to address these aims here include ID2020, BitNation, 
BlockchainBorderBank, BanQu, and NevTrace (ibid, p. 137), which largely revolve around 




There are thus several themes running through the categories offered by Adams, Kewell and Parry, 
and their conceptions of what constitutes blockchain ‘for good’. One pivots around ideas for 
party-to-party ‘sharing’, which occurred within both the green energy initiatives and lift-sharing 
platforms. A theme of risk mitigation and securitisation is also prevalent; smart contracts and the 
tracking of goods are both explicitly geared towards such ends, as well as notions of code replacing 
‘trust’. There is also a focus upon spheres that are intertwined with the activities of the public 
sector, and notions of ‘identity’ acting as a gateway out of poverty. The themes provided by 
Adams, Kewell and Parry are by no means comprehensive, but provide a preliminary framework 
surrounding notions of ‘blockchain for good’ that I will take forward and expand upon within my 
close readings.  
 
5.3 Close Reading of ‘Blockchain for Good’ Texts 
 
5.3.1 Close Reading of Pop-Technology Literature on ‘Blockchain for Good’ 
 
This section of the chapter will now undertake a CDA of discourses featuring in the Blockchain for 
Good Manifesto: Humanising the Blockchain, provided by think-tank ‘Blockchain for Good’ (2018), and 
a chapter in Casey and Vigna’s book The Truth Machine: Blockchain and the Future of Everything entitled 
Blockchain for Good (2018b). I chose these texts as they were two of the most prominent throughout 
my process of ‘snowballing’ through internet links. By most prominent, I mean they occurred 
most frequently throughout search engine searches, and were cited most frequently in blog posts 
and posts on other forms of social media, such as Twitter. They also spoke to themes that I had 
previously encountered in the Blockchain for Good piece by Adams, Kewell and Parry, cited above, 
which allowed me to establish some preliminary understanding of the discourses and politics that 
‘blockchain for good’ might come to encompass. I was hoping to explore how the themes in my 
selected ‘blockchain for good’ texts were iterative of broader blockchain discourses, and how the 
notions of ‘good’ articulated in these texts were iterative of capitalist realism. I have divided 
prominent discourses within these texts into thematic subsections for this analysis. As highlighted 
in chapter two, these themes were established via close reading techniques, which were 
corroborated with findings established using qualitative data analysis software NVivo.  
 
To provide some brief background around these texts, the Blockchain for Good think-tank uses 
‘blockchainforgood.com’ as its web domain, under which one can find a manifesto, a white paper, 
links to associated Twitter and Medium accounts, and an ‘about’ section. They describe themselves 
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as an ‘industry’ think-tank, who bring together the ‘greatest minds around the world to explore 
and debate the development of blockchain, for the greater good of humanity, society, economy 
and our environment’ (2018). The think-tank is based in California, however the website states 
that panel discussions have also been held in London in the United Kingdom. There is no overt 
mention of the think-tank’s politics within information provided on the website, however brief 
detail is provided around the professional backgrounds of some of those who have participated 
in think-tank discussions. Blockchain for Good was founded in 2015 by a woman named Cécile Baird, 
who came from a background of working for financial publications such as Coin Telegraph and 
Coindesk. Other participants include investors, CEO’s, film makers and producers, UK 
government officials from the Department of Work and Pensions and the Government Office 
for Science, employees of the Open Data Institute, charity representatives, employees of digital 
identity ‘non-for-profit public-private partnership’ ID2020, and employees from a handful of 
other tech companies, such as Decentrl and Plug’n’Play (ibid). The Blockchain for Good manifesto 
is a fourteen-page document that features on their website, and broadly centers around how 
blockchains might be used within humanitarian settings, as well as for extending the scope of uses 
for digital identity21. 
 
The chapter in Casey and Vigna’s pop-technology book The Truth Machine: Blockchain and the Future 
of Everything also goes by the title of ‘Blockchain for Good’ (2018b). Other chapters in this book 
tend to follow broadly neoliberal and technolibertarian themes, going by titles such as ‘The God 
Protocol’, ‘Enabling the Fourth Industrial Revolution’, ‘A Self-Sovereign Identity’ and ‘A New 
Constitution for the Digital Age’ (ibid). For Casey and Vigna - similarly to Adams, Kewell and 
Parry - the areas encompassed in their chapter Blockchain for Good include: initiatives for financial 
inclusion; ideas around how digital identity might benefit refugees and immigrants; how 
blockchain might be used within green energy sectors; and prospective blockchain registries for 
‘moveable assets’, such as cars and other vehicles (ibid). For the vast majority of the chapter 
however, the writers primarily focus upon how blockchains can provide ‘solutions’ to issues 
around digital identity and financial inclusion (ibid, p. 198).  
 
5.3.2 Trust and Digital Truth 
 
The most prominent theme within both of these ‘blockchain for good’ texts was around how 
blockchains were considered to bring about ‘new’ forms of ‘trust’ and ‘digital truth’. Trust was 
                                                 
21 ‘Digital identity’ here refers to identity documentation and biometric data. 
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very often situated here in terms of statistical recording, and the capacity of such records to 
mitigate ‘risk’ within specific social systems. Here, the Blockchain for Good Manifesto begins with the 
following:  
 
As a technology often described as trustless in its concept, it is delivering a new type 
of trust. 
This is compared with the current model of many organizations and businesses, 
where one party, whether it’s a bank or a government agency, is entrusted to maintain 
a “digital truth” (emphasis added) 
 
Such notions of ‘digital truth’ are embedded within modernistic understandings of the ‘real’ that 
are located within the realm of statistical recording and quantification, while the ‘digital’ is 
articulated as its own ontological entity (Skouteris, 2004, p. 15). Discursively framing the ‘digital’ 
and blockchain in this way allows it to be understood as distinct from the biases of living-beings, 
and paves the way for claims to its objectivity, then allowing it to speak the ‘truth’ for subjects 
who might otherwise be framed as unreliable, untrustworthy, irrational or ‘risky’.  
 
On a similar tack, the Blockchain for Good Manifesto also makes frequent references to ‘evidence’. 
The following exert is taken from a discussion around digital identity initiatives and their perceived 
prospective benefits: 
 
In a blockchain-enabled world, one can imagine a world where a shared, 
immutable ledger which brings evidence together can be used as a single shared 
truth. This can provide evidence of someone’s humanity and bring together the evidence 
to convict criminals. 
Trust is fundamentally at the heart of blockchain. (emphasis added) 
 
Language of scientific method is invoked here to substantiate claims around the posited benefits 
of digital identity. ‘Evidence of someone’s humanity’ and ‘evidence to convict criminals’ are 
further entwined with discourses of risk, invoking mistrust and anxiety. ‘Humanity’ is equated with 
persons whose information is recorded on digital identity systems, thus othering and dehumanising 
those who are not yet part of these systems.  
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Similar framings of ‘trust’ and ‘truth’ are articulated within Casey and Vigna’s work. In the book’s 
introduction, the writers note: 
 
[Blockchains provide] a societal system of trust, identity, and record-keeping that 
ties our past to our present, anchors us as human beings, and lets us participate in 
society (Casey and Vigna, 2018b, p. 2, my emphasis) 
 
Trust is again situated here in terms of statistical recording, and the capacity of such records to 
mitigate risk within specific social systems. This is also a theme that runs throughout their 
Blockchain for Good chapter, which begins by describing living conditions for Bolivian immigrants 
living in Beunos Aires. While, they note, a great deal of these living conditions are highly 
impoverished, they go on to discuss one area in which the housing is of a significantly ‘stronger 
foundation’, where residents are also able to access a local school, a health clinic, and a ‘host of 
other institutions’ (2018b, p. 175). Their reasoning for why this area of Beunos Aires is 
‘comparatively blessed’ in relation to its surrounding neighbourhoods pertains to ‘two words: 
property title’ (ibid, p. 175): 
 
The Charrúa families didn’t earn higher incomes than those in other parts of the 
neighbourhood, and they weren’t more educated or better connected. The difference 
was that they had the capacity to prove home ownership with the indisputable seal of 
government (Casey and Vigna, 2018b, p. 175, emphasis added) 
 
Such discourses frame such interventions as inherently desirable for those living there, and are 
distinctly reductive; rather than critique the capitalistic and bureaucratic frameworks that engender 
inequality, the roots of poverty are framed in terms of lacks of governmental documentation. 
Furthermore, as Korkmaz’s work concerning ‘Blockchain for Refugees’ highlights, legally 
recognised documentation does not disrupt unstable economic conditions within potential host 
countries, and, in the most optimistic of scenarios, refugees would be subject to the same financial 
opportunities as local residents (2018). This however does not account for issues such as local 
prejudices, language barriers, struggles with mental health, or issues with asylum applications. In 
this way, such notions of ‘identity’ are constitutive of a reductive technoscientific epistemology, 
wherein all that does not belong within its parameters of legibility becomes invisibilised.  
 
Following this, the writers go on to discuss such notions of ‘proof’ and how they perceive it to 
relate to poverty. These discussions pertain largely to the prospect that without ‘official’ 
documentation - that which is ‘accepted by the government or bank’ - immigrants and refugees 
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will continue to be subject to highly impoverished conditions (ibid, p. 176). Their reasons for this 
chiefly concern the mitigation of risk from the perspectives of banks and businesses, wherein, 
without proofs of ‘who I am, what I do, and what I own’, a business faces ‘uncertainty’, which 
then prevents potentially ‘risky’ subjects from accessing financial services, due to the costs that 
banks or businesses might incur (ibid, p. 177). The ‘immutable’ records that blockchain-backed 
identity schemes offer are thus framed as the solution to such ‘uncertainties’, providing banks, 
businesses and governments with information about a subject’s ‘on-time payments, property 
ownership, and other forms of trustworthy behaviour’ (ibid p. 178, emphasis added). ‘Trust’ is again 
articulated in overtly economic terms, while businesses and banks are those who are principally 
affected by ‘risk’. ‘Risk’ does not pertain, for instance, to the impoverished living conditions 
subjects might face if they do not meet the conditions set out by banks, businesses and 
governments. 
 
Interestingly, within such discourses of blockchain data constituting ‘trust’, Casey and Vigna do 
give some consideration to the potentiality of ‘bad information being entered into blockchain 
ledgers’ (2018b, p. 177). On the topic of land rights, they note that in ‘poor countries where 
registries need to be built from scratch, there’s a risk that corrupt government officials charged 
with attesting to people’s ownership would embed harmful falsehoods into the blockchain-based 
registry from the outset’ (ibid, p. 177). Corruption is only potentiated here in relation to 
‘government officials’ in ‘poor countries’ however; no consideration is given to how corruption 
might occur within more economically affluent spheres of the world. It does however provide a 
rare instance in which a discord is highlighted, between the data stored on blockchains and that 
which the data represents. They continue,  
 
When a ledger is assumed to be an unquestioned truth, the issue of what information 
gets into it is a serious one.  
 
Nonetheless, if we take a macro view and assume that in the vast majority of cases 
blockchains will be used honestly, the wider benefits of cryptographically secure asset 
registry are pretty enticing. Peruvian economist and anti-poverty campaigner 
Hernando de Soto estimates that the amount of “dead capital”, the pool of untitled 
property around the world, is worth about $20 trillion (2018b, p. 177) 
 
Here, while brief consideration is given to the prospect that blockchain data could disempower 
those living in poor countries, this is immediately dismissed in favour of the ‘macro view’ that 




I am not the first to notice that there are distinct echoes of Hobbesian philosophy within a great 
deal of blockchain discourse (see Scott, 2014). Scott notes that the prospect that ‘self-regarding 
people realise that it is in their interests to exchange part of their freedom for security of self and 
property’ is often embedded within the assumptions underlying blockchain rhetoric (2014). I 
would posit that similar assumptions underlie the notions of ‘trust’ cited above, where living-
beings are understood as self-serving individuals, who are each willing to defraud one another in 
pursuit of their own ends. In pursuit of the mitigation of ‘risk’, statistical recording on the 
blockchain speaks the ‘truth’ for potentially unreliable subjects. While this might be advantageous 
for those already privileged under Western systems of governance, immutable data on subjects 
who are likely to be deemed as ‘risky’ within such frameworks is very likely to further entrench 
exploitative and authoritarian power relations. 
 
5.3.3 The ‘Human’ Blockchain and the ‘Financial’ Blockchain 
 
The Blockchain for Good Manifesto articulates a frequent discursive dichotomy between a ‘human’ or 
‘humanised’ blockchain and a ‘financial’ blockchain. Examples of this are iterated in the following: 
 
So far, the majority of investment has been concentrated within the financial 
industry, attracting the majority of headlines. Yet one area that has not yet received the 
same level of attention or investment is the human aspect of the blockchain – how it 
could underpin the technologies that impact our everyday lives (emphasis added) 
 
Here, the financial industry is argued to be the most affluent and well-known sphere of blockchain, 
while the ‘human aspect’ is articulated as distinct from this. Within a context of ‘blockchain for 
good’, which rests upon a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ binary, this then alludes to a series of implicit 
assumptions surrounding finance, and how the ‘human’ aspect of the blockchain is understood by 
contrast. More light is shed upon this in paragraphs that follow, which go on to discuss the 
ambiguity encompassed in notions of for the ‘good’. Here, it is acknowledged that the meaning of 
‘for good’ is dependent upon its context, and the motives of a given party: 
  
We are living in a world where ‘for good’ has become zeitgeist and is often 
interpreted as “social good”. However to set the scene of the discussion it is really 
important to note that “for good” is not limited to non-profit activities or the third-sector. 
Businesses that will continue to thrive tomorrow, will be those with a clear purpose 
which is underpinned by a commitment which balances the triple bottom line of 
people, profit and planet.  
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It is perhaps not surprising that in our discussion, there were incredibly varied views 
of what “for good” meant - for creative industries, it is transparency and fair 
distribution of royalties; for refugees, it is establishing or protecting identity; for 
charities, it is about accountability and for government, it is about delivering better 
services to the public (emphasis added)  
 
 
This encompasses a series of assumptions. Firstly, it is acknowledged that (within a collectivised 
and generalised ‘world’) ‘for good’ is often associated with ‘social good’, which is here associated 
with the activities of non-profit organisations and voluntary workers. This might otherwise be 
understood as organisations and groups whose aims are not (supposed to be) immediately bound 
with private profit. Notions of how these cultural understandings of ‘social good’ might be 
appropriated by businesses then follow, where, in accordance with philanthro-capitalist ideology, 
they note that adopting a commitment to the ‘good’ is imperative for the furthering of future 
profit. The ambiguity in meaning highlighted here provides another subtle example of how binary 
forms can propagate structures of power: capitalistic motives are obfuscated by normative 
assumptions surrounding ‘social good’, a notion that is reductive and culturally specific. 
 
The following paragraph then addresses these ambiguities, and describes what the term ‘for good’ 
might mean for a series of different groups, including creative industries, refugees, charities and 
governments. Here, discursive absences are pertinent. Toward the beginning of the Blockchain for 
Good Manifesto, a brief list of the think-tank’s participants is detailed, which in this instance includes 
the ‘greatest minds from the worlds of entrepreneurship, investing, academia, sustainability, 
charities and policy making’. There is thus a disjuncture here: although the think-tank’s participants 
are said to include those from the spheres of entrepreneurship and investing, these groups have 
no mention in the discussion of what constitutes ‘social good’; and although it is posited that 
‘digital identity’ is what constitutes ‘social good’ for refugees, refugee voices have no mention in 
the list of the think-tank’s participants. 
 
In the above passages then, there is a discord when it comes to framings of social ‘good’ and how 
financial spheres are discursively situated in relation to these; here, they are very often positioned 
as distinct. Further, it is pressing to note that while there is an explicit and generalised assertion of 
what constitutes ‘social good’ for refugees, they have no mention within the list of the think-tank’s 
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participants22. Notions of ‘for good’ pertaining to the ‘establishing and protecting [of] digital 
identity’ for all refugees are again dubious and highly reductive: as highlighted in the previous 
section, much of the discourse surrounding ‘digital identity’ within these ‘blockchain for good’ 
texts is oriented toward the privileging of businesses and banks over the impoverished.  
 
5.3.4 The Future of ‘Everything’: Claims to Universality 
 
Within both of these ‘blockchain for good’ texts, claims to universality are frequent, and are 
markedly Western-centric. As previously highlighted, the Blockchain for Good think-tank have noted 
that they bring together ‘the greatest minds around the world to explore and debate the 
development of blockchain, for the greater good of humanity, society, economy and our 
environment’ (2018, emphasis added). The list of the think-tank’s participants however comprises 
predominantly of CEO’s, government officials, tech-industry workers, and representatives from 
schemes such as ID2020. Notions of ‘humanity’, ‘society’ and the ‘world’ here assume a Western 
readership, and universalise this position, discursively erasing all that - and who - do not belong 
within the epistemic frameworks of Western techno-science.  
 
The Blockchain for Good Manifesto goes on to unpack further details around ongoing and prospective 
digital identity schemes, under a title ‘A Blockchain Utopia and Today’s Grassroots Innovators’. 
Following this title, it provokes the reader to ‘imagine a utopia where blockchain technology is used 
to underpin applications that addresses real-world problems - with a vision of shepherding a better future’ 
(emphasis added). This quote features twice on the page, and in the second instance is set apart 
from the rest of the text in bold italics. There are several important points to make here. Firstly, 
notions of ‘real-world problems’ within this context again universalise all worldly experience 
through a Western lens. ‘Shepherding’ here is also very ideological, and invokes theological 
connotations of guarding, watching over, herding, steering, and protecting. Notions of ‘a better 
future’ and ‘utopia’ are also ideological here, alluding to notions of progress in relation to 
technological shifts. This section has distinct echoes of libertarian paternalism, where the ideas 
expressed are imbibed with an heir of authority, and the notion that this is the best or correct way 
of doing things (Jones, 2018). The correct way of doing things here is again bound with the politics 
of risk, holding out a ‘promise of managing uncertainty and making an unknowable and 
indeterminate future knowable and calculable’ (Amoore, 2013, p. 7). 
                                                 
22 There is a more detailed list of participants featured on the Blockchain for Good website, and is also 
indicative of this: there are several representatives from humanitarian organisations, amidst CEO’s and 
UK government representatives, but no explicit mention of refugee voices 
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The Blockchain for Good Manifesto then goes on to discuss an ‘e-residency’ scheme currently being 
tested by the Estonian government, alongside its ‘partner’ Bitnation, which is an organisation that 
is orchestrating prospective ‘governance services’ via blockchain technologies (Bitnation, 2018). 
In this regard, Blockchain for Good Manifesto notes:   
 
Estonia’s e-residency scheme offers anyone, anywhere, a digital identity issued by 
the Estonian government, allowing non-residents to access the country’s services 
including having a local bank account. E-Residents can digitally sign and verify 
contracts online anywhere in the world, therefore reducing its borders, especially to 
businesses.  
 
In particular, the government has partnered with Bitnation, to offer a public notary 
service to e-Residents, underpinned by blockchain technology. This will allow 
individuals to electronically record their marriages, birth certificates and business contracts, 
regardless of their residency. (emphasis added)  
 
In the above section, the privileging of market-based principles is fairly explicit. Although refugees 
are argued to be the persons benefitting from ‘identity’ in previous passages, businesses in the 
above passage are situated as the primary beneficiary of such digital identity schemes and Estonia’s 
proclaimed ‘reduced borders’. Terms such as ‘partnered’ and ‘service’ also invoke neoliberal 
discourses, while the rationale behind why ‘e-Residents’ might benefit from such schemes pertains 
to ‘digitally sign[ing] and verify[ing] contracts anywhere in the world’, as well as recording 
marriages, birth certificates and business contracts. A brief look at the e-Residency scheme’s 
‘partner’ BitNation’s whitepaper also demonstrates an overt privileging of neoliberal as well as 
libertarian paternalist politics, and depicts a vision for a series of so-called ‘governance services’. 
The rhetoric here largely revolves around a desired shift away from nation state governance, under 
the rationale that it reduces ‘personal sovereignty’ and individual choice (2018). The whitepaper 
also features detail of the ‘incentivisation’ strategies that are embedded into BitNation protocols, 
as well as the processes (ideologies) that shape how its ‘jurisdiction’ becomes quantified: 
 
In digital space, everything must be quantified in order to be computable. The 
Pangea jurisdiction relies on reputation (automated and human scores, ratings, 
collaborative filtering, and digital representations of sentiment, opinion and 
thought) to incentivize opt-in contractual rule compliance and decide which peers, 
Nations, service providers and arbitrators receive a favourable rating (Bitnation, 
2018) 
 
Similar themes emerged within Casey and Vigna’s writing, whose book is titled ‘The Truth 
Machine: The Blockchain and the Future of Everything’ (2018b, emphasis added). Notions of 
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‘everything’ here are again markedly Western centric. Vazquez highlights how such discourse can 
be understood in terms of epistemic ‘erasure’, wherein the ‘all that doesn’t belong to [modernity’s] 
parameters of legibility and certainty’ is un-named and invisibilised (2011, p. 31). Within the 
context of this book, in which blockchains are offered as forms of solutionism to a series of ‘risks’ 
posed to businesses and states, notions of ‘everything’ are also indicative of capitalist realistic 
politics. The proposed ‘utopias’ offer an intensified vision of technoscientific and capitalistic 
rationalities: to borrow Fisher’s phrasing, capitalism here ‘seamlessly occupies the horizons of the 
thinkable’, and a ‘pre-emptive formatting and shaping of desires, aspirations and hopes by 
capitalist culture’ is offered in the notions of ‘everything’ proposed (2009, p. 8-9).  
 
 
5.3.5 The World’s ‘Unbanked’ 
 
Within Casey and Vigna’s chapter, discourse of the world’s ‘unbanked’ is frequent. The term 
‘unbanked’ is used almost interchangeably with ‘impoverished’, which is iterated in the following: 
 
For the more than 2 billion adults worldwide that the World Bank describes as 
“unbanked,” the good news is that a combination of humanitarian and financial 
motivations has produced a good global movement to move the unbanked into the 
world of modern finance (2018b, p. 179) 
 
Most of these systems are still based on an underlying banking infrastructure, and 
the banks that run them don’t have a good handle on the needs of “unbanked” 
customers, many of whom are confused by the demands placed upon them (ibid, p. 
191, emphasis added) 
 
The understanding of ‘good’ articulated here is one in which the world’s ‘unbanked’ are ‘move[d]’ 
into the ‘world of modern finance’. The term ‘modern’ can be likened here to modernistic notions 
of ‘developed’ and developing’, where Western-European and American systems are assumed to 
be the goal for the parts of the world that are not yet fully encompassed in its economic 
infrastructure. ‘Mov[ing] the unbanked’ is again bound with libertarian paternalist rhetoric, where 
the writers of the text and those at the World Bank are presumed to know what is most beneficial 
for those living in poverty. ‘Humanitarian’ and ‘financial’ motivations also function collaboratively 
here, demonstrating a further discursive blurring between ‘financial’ spheres and the activities of 
such ‘philanthropic’ organisations.  
 
Similar rhetoric pertaining to ‘unbanked’ persons can be seen in ongoing digital identity schemes 
such as ID2020 and BanQu, which both feature as examples of ‘blockchains for good’ in the 
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academic literature by Adams, Kewell and Parry (2017, p. 137). Echoing the discourse of Casey 
and Vigna, these digital identity initiatives frame ‘refugees, the displaced and the world’s poorest’ 
as ‘unbanked’, and use this terminology to help substantiate claims pertaining to the roots of 
poverty (see ID2020, 2018; BanQu, 2018). As opposed to a critique of the capitalistic frameworks 
that engender inequality - within which exploitation is pivotal to their very function - notions of 
poverty mitigation here are recast solely in terms of enveloping increasing spheres of the globe 
into the governance systems of the West. While I do not dispute that legally recognised identity 
documents constitute access to housing, work, education, medical care, and travel, this does not 
negate the resolute privileging of the interests of banks and governments within the discourse that 
surrounds blockchain digital identity initiatives. I would strongly suggest that the propositions 
made within these ‘blockchains for good’ discourses would not mitigate the epistemic injustices 
that propagate such forms of governmental and financial power. Rather, I contend that they are 
oriented towards further entrenching such power relations. I would argue that what these 
blockchain discourses propose is the further development of a sociotechnical apparatus for 
extending economic and technoscientific epistemologies, and the neoliberal and neo-colonial 
powers that are concomitant to these epistemologies. 
 
5.4 Analysis of a Data Scrape  
 
 
This section of the chapter will now turn to an analysis of the data scrape I undertook with the 
TAG laboratory using the NLP software Method52. This crawled Twitter for all Tweets containing 
the term ‘blockchain’ across a six-week period between July and August 2018. This was the second 
stage of my research into ‘blockchain for good’, and was largely informed by the discourses and 
themes explored in the previous section. To refer briefly to the methodological considerations 
discussed in chapter two, the purpose of this exercise was to explore what epistemic biases and 
cultural assumptions might or can be encouraged via digital tools through gathering data via a 
process that centrally entailed automation, and to consider the pertinence of these biases in relation 
to the discourses explored in the previous sections of this chapter. My main focus lay in how I 
might go about abstracting Tweets pertaining to ‘blockchain for good’ from other Tweets about 
blockchain. I wanted to explore how this distinction could be explored computationally, and how 
this exploration might be limited by the various material and epistemic affordances of the Twitter 
and Method52 platforms (Burns, 2015). This data-scrape process was undertaken alongside Jack 
Pay, a member of the TAG Laboratory at the University of Sussex. 
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The first stage of the process involved myself manually sifting through a data sample23 of ten-
thousand Tweets and labelling them as either ‘relevant’ or ‘irrelevant’ to my study (appendix 5.2). 
The purpose of this stage was to filter the contents of the data, so we could automate a process 
that would determine which Tweets were ‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’. Tweets that were labelled 
‘relevant’ here were ones that I felt related to notions of ‘blockchain for good’. Not all of these 
Tweets out of the ten-thousand were to be labelled; I was advised that I would likely have to label 
between three-hundred to five-hundred Tweets before the algorithm could adequately automate 
the process itself (by which I mean able to discern which Tweets pertained to ‘blockchain for good’ 
topics). Upon exploring the data set, there were very few – if any – Tweets that could definitively 
be labelled as ‘relevant’; many of them contained language or were phrased in a way that rendered 
them ambiguous. A more adequate way of describing this might be that the ‘relevant’ Tweets 
occurred across a spectrum, with some being closer to the ‘relevant’ end of the spectrum than 
others. Examples of these looked like the following:  
 
Read this review to know more about Energycoin blockchain technology. Read on 
to know how it works and how to buy ENRG. Read more reviews at: 
https://t.co/ctS6s9hdWh.. .. https://t.co/Z5IAY5ygI7 
 
FreightWaves - Blockchain: Helping out a trucker: 5 charities worth 
considering https://t.co/ty8PDuUGHEhttps://t.co/u7s1sS3hTa 
 
The project – made up of the National Archives, the University of Surrey, and the 
UK Open Data Institute and funded by the EPSRC – is creating a blockchain 
prototype that will show the audit trail of how a document has been edited. 
https://t.co/4I3bEqQLpz 
 
The content of these Tweets, then, pertained explicitly to sustainability, charity organisations, and 
ways of preventing data corruption, which were all topics that were touched upon in my earlier 
readings around ‘blockchain for good’. That I felt I could label these as ‘relevant’ was due only to 
these readings, meaning that any results acquired from this process of labelling were limited by the 
definitions, categories and conceptions of ‘social good’ that had been outlined by the writers of 
the ‘blockchain for good’ texts. I experimented with how much I was able to remove my own 
politics from the process, limiting myself only to the understandings of ‘for good’ that were 
outlined in my earlier readings. However, even within the Tweets that leaned toward the more 
‘relevant’ end of the spectrum, there was still some level of ambiguity, and thus a need for my own 
personal interpretation; I had not, for instance, explicitly read that charities oriented towards 
                                                 
23 A sample was needed as the data set was too large to explore in its entirety.  
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helping the lives of truckers are an example of ‘blockchain for good’. I had however read that ‘for 
good’ often involved ‘non-profit activities or the third-sector’ within the Blockchain for Good 
Manifesto, and thus referred to my own forms of cultural understanding to bridge these gaps in 
meaning.  
 
Tweets that were more ambiguous but I nonetheless categorised as ‘relevant’ might have touched 
upon some of the aforementioned topics, but were blurred by other content contained in the 
Tweet. These might have looked like the following:  
 
1. Why AI needs blockchain? Today AI needs data but this data is locked in 
insurance companies, FB, Google etc. But if consumers would own their data on 
blockchain with privacy protected computation, that would enable marketplace 
where consumers can sell bits of their data. https://t.co/dRDuOugima 
 
Similar language to this featured in the discourse of Bitnation, which heavily orbited neoliberal 
ideology of ‘personal sovereignty’ and individual choice, and featured recurrently as an example 
of ‘blockchain for good’ within various pieces of writing (Bitnation, 2018). For these reasons, I 
marked this Tweet as ‘relevant’. While - perhaps needless to say - this conflicted with my own 
personal politics due to its orientation towards the intensification of neoliberal infrastructures, I 
had to attempt to remove my own personal politics from the process if I was to attain a coherent 
data set; there was no scope within this process of marking ‘relevant’ or ‘irrelevant’ for nuances or 
multiple conceptions of what might constitute ‘blockchain for good’. There was also further 
ambiguity here as, within the Blockchain for Good Manifesto, distinctions were made between the 
‘human’ blockchain - which, in this instance, came to mean ‘blockchain for good’ - and the 
‘financial’ blockchain. Explicitly economic uses of blockchains were often not encompassed within 
the sphere of ‘blockchain for good’, which meant that this Tweet regarding both data security and 
a ‘marketplace where consumers can sell bits of their data’ fell within a grey area.  Another example 
of a Tweet that felt particularly ambiguous can be seen in the following: 
 
Season 2, Episode 3: Samson Williams (@hustlefundbaby), Co-Founder of 
@AxesandEggs ••• Samson talks about growing up in Texas, overcoming the 
industry’s racial and gender gaps, and the future of blockchain technology. ••• Hear 
how he's helping to #CloseTheGap on #iTunes! 🎧 https://t.co/3xQUztQNYE 
 
This was ambiguous as while notions of reducing gender inequality did not feature within any of 
the ‘blockchain for good’ texts that I explored, and notions of reducing racial inequality were vague 
(at best), discourses of equality did feature in examples of ‘blockchain for good’ initiatives (for 
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example, ID2020’s homepage states ‘closing the identity gap is an enormous challenge’ and 
‘imagine a world where safe and secure digital identities are possible, providing everyone with an 
essential building block to every right and opportunity they deserve’) (ID2020, 2018). I thus had 
to speculate about whether or not this should be labelled as ‘relevant’, both from my readings of 
the ‘blockchain for good’ texts and my understandings of their broader social and political contexts 
and how they invoked notions of ‘social good’. Further, it was difficult to decipher from the short 
amount of text featuring here whether or not discussions between ‘racial and gender gaps’ and ‘the 
future of blockchain technology’ were interlinked. However, Jack had advised that if I felt unsure 
about how to label a Tweet, then to mark as ‘relevant’, as this would mean that I wouldn’t lose 
data that could be potentially useful. This did however mean that, despite my efforts, the Tweets 
marked ‘relevant’ did begin to encompass a conglomerate of political discourses and ideologies. 
 
Tweets that were labelled as ‘irrelevant’ either revolved around banking, finance, or investing, 
contained a great deal of ‘@’ tags to other users on Twitter, or comprised mostly of hashtags (this 
however wasn’t an overarching rule, as occasionally Tweets featured long strings of hashtags 
contained words or phrases that were relevant to notions of ‘blockchain for good’). That these 
topics were labelled as ‘irrelevant’ was again due to my readings of the ‘blockchain for good’ texts 
where a distinction was made between the ‘human’ aspect of the blockchain - which came to mean 
the aspects of the blockchain that were considered to go towards philanthropic purposes - and the 
‘financial’ aspect. Tweets that I marked as ‘irrelevant’ then might have looked like the following:  
 
Five Questions to Ask Before Investing in a Blockchain Company 
https://t.co/o4DrX2Erkx 
 
Artificial Intelligence Influencers @mikequindazzi @ipfcoline1 @alvinfoo 
@juliosilvajr @ronald_vanloon @enkronos @machinelearn_d @fisher85m @ibm 
@ianljones98 Top hashtags #ai #iot #machinelearning #bigdata 
#blockchain#deeplearning via NodeXL https://t.co/4bqAaob00c 
https://t.co/aGIx259ro8 
 
Just published our take on #IBM ⁠  ⁠ ’s 2nd quarter as its growth turnaround 
continues to take shape. Big results in #mainframe & #security with progress in 
#cloud, industry #blockchain & enterprise #AI. All good ground for more 
confident story telling from Big Blue in 2018 https://t.co/ACr0rj8Zti 
 
From this process, the algorithm generated a series of keywords that it had assigned to the 
‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’ categories. Fairly generalised terms surrounding blockchain such as 
‘#cryptocurrency’ ‘#blockchain_#cryptocurrency’, ‘#bitcoin’ and ‘#eth’ appeared in the 
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‘irrelevant’ column, while the ‘relevant’ column generated more specific terms, such as ‘govt’ 
(government), ‘land_related’ and ‘health_care’. While I had tried to assign Tweets about finance to 
the ‘irrelevant’ category, the ‘relevant’ category nonetheless had come to incorporate terms and 
phrases such as ‘#malware_#fintech’, ‘companies_begin’, ‘care_companies’ and ‘revenue_dept’. 
The ‘relevant’ column transpired to be a lot longer than the ‘irrelevant’ column, and further terms 
that I wouldn’t have personally deemed to be relevant were also allocated to the ‘relevant’ column 
by the algorithm (for instance ‘#malware’, ‘liverpool’ and - to my amusement - ‘yogi’). These lists 
were generated by Method52’s combination of methods derived from compositional and 
distributional semantics (‘relations of words within a sentence’, and how the ‘meanings of words 
can be determined by considering the contexts in which the words appear in text’) (TAG 
Laboratory, 2019). This thus meant that these word lists were derived from how frequently they 
occurred with words and phrases that had been marked ‘relevant’ during the earlier stages of this 
process. 
 
I was not able to remove terms and phrases that I felt didn’t belong in either column, which meant 
after my labelling of Tweets as ‘relevant’ or ‘irrelevant’, it was predominantly down to hidden 














Jack had advised however that I could copy and paste keywords and phrases from Tweets into 
these columns if I felt they were significant, and that this might improve the accuracy of the 
‘relevant’ Tweets generated by the algorithm. The ‘irrelevant’ column again transpired to be a great 
deal shorter, wherein I copied phrases such as ‘Startups’, ‘Football’, ‘business’, ‘gaming’, ‘brokers’ 
Figure 1 Relevant/irrelevant columns, generated by Method52 Figure 2 Relevant column, continued 
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‘Enterprise_’, ‘profitable’ and ‘industry’. This was again down to my own interpretation; I had not 
explicitly read that ‘football’ or ‘gaming’ are not examples of ‘blockchain for good’. However these 
spheres had no mention within the texts that I’d read, nor are they (typically) intertwined with the 
normative notions of philanthropy that these texts invoked. In the ‘relevant’ column, I thus copy 
and pasted words and phrases that appeared in Tweets that I felt touched upon topics pertaining 
to ‘blockchain for good’, and the usernames of users that were writing on these topics. This came 
to contain phrases such as ‘_#sustainability’, ‘access’, ‘humanity’, ‘social_impact’, ‘sharing’, 
‘Estonian_ID’ and ‘#RenewableEnergy’. My own judgement was thus a pivotal component in all 
stages of the process thus far; in the initial labelling as ‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’, and with the 

















While, in principle, I knew at this stage how to operate the software, the process of marking as 
‘relevant’ or ‘irrelevant’ became more consistent as I grew more aware of general themes running 
throughout the data, and as I became more acquainted with the software. This meant that there 
was a difference between how I was filtering Tweets toward the beginning of the process, and how 
I was filtering them toward the end; I had become more specific in my discerning of what 
constituted ‘good’ or ‘relevant’, and conversely what constituted ‘bad’ or ‘irrelevant’. This was, in 
part, due to the fact that the ‘accuracy’ score wasn’t increasing as I was moving through the Tweets: 
my approach to labelling the Tweets shifted in response to this.  
Figure 3 Relevant column: words and 
phrases manually copy and pasted 
Figure 4 Irrelevant column: words 
and phrases manually copy and pasted 
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As I approached the end of marking my recommended sample size of five-hundred Tweets, the 
samples of ‘relevant’ Tweets that were being generated by the algorithm were not improving to 
the extent that we had hoped. The algorithm was able to mark ‘irrelevant’ Tweets with some 
accuracy (this was indicated by a score out of ten), however the score for the ‘relevant’ column 
was still relatively low, and was not improving as I sifted through the Tweets. I had noted that 
perhaps the fact that the algorithm wasn’t returning particularly ‘accurate’ results here was 
meaningful, and indicative of the ambiguity of universalising notions of social ‘good’. There was 
little scope within this particular method for nuanced interpretations of the Tweets (by which I 
mean, for instance, certain words or phrases would be part of a Tweet that was labelled as 
‘relevant’, while the same words of phrases, within different contexts, would be part of Tweet that 
was labelled as ‘irrelevant’), or training the algorithm to discern multiple political conceptions of 
‘social good’. The sample set of ‘irrelevant’ Tweets was fairly effective at recognising Tweets with 
long strings of financial hashtags, such as the following: 
 
#TokenizeTheWorld, #SharingEconomy, #SecurityToken, #STO, #ICO, 
#Blockchain, https://t.co/n5R55dgFXQ 
 
#Blockchain #DLT #altcoin #Fintech #tether #bitfinex #binance #investme
nts #Innovation #eCommerce #Finance #trading#Cryptocurrency #futurism
 #futuretrends #technologytrends #technologists #technology #digitization #
digitaleconomy#bitcoin #ethereum #BTC…https://t.co/hn00mJkRVa 
 
However, even though the accuracy score for the ‘irrelevant’ column was higher than the ‘relevant’ 
column, I nonetheless came across Tweets that were assigned to the ‘irrelevant’ column that I 
would have labelled differently if I had conducted the process myself. Examples of these can be 
seen in the following, which pertained to topics of tracking the movement of goods, and 
philanthro-capitalist notions around millionaires helping citizens of Puerto Rico:  
 
History made this week at @IBMBlockchain's #IBMFoodTrust event. World’s 
first #blockchain dinner made using participating partners’ ingredients that 
could be tracked back to source. Impressive. Still think it’s hype? 
https://t.co/XJaOiEAGUG 
 
Can crypto millionaires help the struggling island of Puerto Rico recover with 
blockchain technology? I met newcomers and locals with high hopes for this 
crypto tech as well as those sceptical of the new arrivals & their intentions - 
things get lively! https://t.co/OMywoaX2t4 
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The latter Tweet may have been deemed to be ‘irrelevant’ due to its featuring of terms such as 
‘crypto tech’ and ‘millionaires’. However, I had anticipated that terms such as ‘help’ and ‘Puerto 
Rico’ might have been deemed ‘relevant’ as there had been multiple reports in the media about 
blockchain entrepreneurs and their intentions to build a ‘crypto-utopia’ in Puerto Rico in order to 
rebuild its infrastructure following Hurricane Maria (Bowles, 2018; Baydakova, 2019). That this 
Tweet was deemed ‘irrelevant’ was due, then, to the number of times in which all terms in the 
Tweet had occurred in other contexts.  
 
Meanwhile, the ‘relevant’ sample returned a lot of Tweets around the topics of healthcare and 
climate change, but was missing many other of the topics discussed within the ‘blockchain for 
good’ texts. Further, interestingly, the topic of healthcare hadn’t occurred in my readings into 
‘blockchain for good’, but had been deemed ‘relevant’ by the algorithm. Jack noted that the large 
number of Tweets pertaining to climate change and healthcare was perhaps down to the specificity 
of the terminology belonging to these topics (e.g. terms such as ‘healthcare’, ‘health’, ‘health_care’, 
‘#pharma’, ‘climate_positive’ and ‘sustainability’ all featured in the ‘relevant’ column), while the 
topic of prospective sharing economies, for instance, might tend to use more context-dependent 
terminology (e.g. ‘fair’, ‘workers’, ‘supply chain’). Similar themes ran through many of the Tweets 
about healthcare to the discourses explored in the previous section, invoking notions of, for 
example, the wants of a universalised ‘humanity’. It is also pivotal to note that these Tweets were 
often geared towards the marketization and privatisation of healthcare, rather than blockchain uses 
for the public sector. This, similarly to other ‘blockchain for good’ discourses, thus gestured 
towards broader connotations surrounding philanthropy - here, pivoting around healthcare - while 
being underpinned by imperatives toward further marketization: 
 
Hu-manity wants to create a health data marketplace with help from blockchain 
https://t.co/23qTgEytrE https://t.co/vXRQx9aTTD 
 
Meet Dmirty Khan, our resident Blockchain expert and strategic advisor for 
startups and corporations who has worked in fields as diverse as healthcare and 
space industry 🎧 Read more on Medium: #blockchain #cryptocurrency 
#innovation https://t.co/P5I5rq089 
 
The next stage of the process involved conceiving of some overarching categories that could be 
used for keyword lists (appendix 5.3). We devised these keyword lists as there was very little 
coherence running through the dataset that was assembled through the process of marking Tweets 
as ‘relevant’ or ‘irrelevant’. Following this process, Tweets would still be marked either ‘relevant’ 
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or ‘irrelevant’ by the algorithm, but we hoped that it would do this would greater ‘accuracy’. These 
keyword lists would have to contain very specific terminology that would help the algorithm 
abstract Tweets that touched on a particular topic. From here, Jack noted that this ‘high precision’ 
method could be used to build ‘classifiers’ that would catch Tweets which used more general 
language. A ‘classifier’ is a component of the Method52 software that builds ‘semantically coherent 
sub-collections, classes, of the text’ (Robertson, 2018).  
 
Informed by my readings of the ‘blockchain for good’ texts and my interactions with the data up 
to this point, I decided upon categories of ‘climate change’, ‘education’, ‘financial inclusion-
humanitarianism’, ‘governance’, ‘health care’, ‘education’, ‘security’, ‘misc-equality’ and ‘work 
labour’. Some of these categories were informed by my engagement with the Tweets thus far, and 
what the algorithm had deemed to be relevant, aside from just the ‘Blockchain for Good’ texts; 
the Tweet featured below, for instance, featured the hashtag ‘#DecadeOfWomen’, within the 
context of discussing blockchain uses for helping those suffering with AIDS. While discussions of 
women and blockchains had not featured at all in the texts I’d explored, this hashtag was embedded 
within a bed of philanthropic discourse that did relate to the narratives offered within the 
‘blockchain for good’ texts: 
 
Can frontier #blockchain technologies help reach those most vulnerable & impact 
programming? RSVP for our #AIDS2018satellite session with #DecadeOfWomen 
honoree @janeathomason July 23. https://t.co/Iy1RQX0rIL 
#blockchaingetheworld@AIDS_conference https://t.co/rSeAE8EDwO 
 
For these lists, I pulled terms from Tweets that I’d seen within the data set thus far, terms that had 
occurred within the ‘blockchain for good’ texts, and words and phrases that I’d pulled from 
relevant articles that were found through search engine queries. Jack had advised that I make the 
keyword lists very specific; he noted that terms such as ‘world’ or ‘global’ that I’d initially put in 
the ‘financial inclusion-humanitarian’ list were too broad and would return lots of ‘irrelevant’ data. 
This, again, was due to the fact that these words were likely to appear in a wide range of contexts. 
More specific terms I thus decided on for this category included ‘birth certificate’, ‘global 
citizenship’, and ‘identityless’. What was notable about this process of categorisation is that it was 
limited according to what I had already seen; the data wasn’t able to tell its own story. Tweets in 
the ‘financial inclusion-humanitarian’ column returned Tweets with similar narratives to the texts 
I’d read, with notions of credit access being a ‘solution’ to poverty: 
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One of the biggest causes of #poverty is the lack of access to credit and escrow. 
Smart contracts are the solution to poverty! Worth a read: 
https://t.co/abQgw11nMd #blockchain #Rubius #ICO 
 
Further Tweets included techno-solutionist narratives, and notions of wealthy public figures 
instigating ‘philanthropic’ initiatives. What was notable here was that while terms such as ‘pop star’ 
and ‘startup’ had not been deemed irrelevant by the algorithm, for all intents and purposes, the 
logics were the same as those underscoring the Tweet earlier highlighted pertaining to ‘millionaires’ 
striving to rebuild infrastructure in Puerto Rico: 
 
The top two skillsets for blockchain entrepreneurs, in order: Technology 
development. Community development. That’s it. 
 
British pop star Peter Gabriel has invested in blockchain startup Provenance, whose 
goal is to create better transparency in food transportation by applying blockchain 
technology. https://t.co/mnpe1R82V 
 
There were thus a series of conclusions that can be drawn from this data-scrape process. Firstly, 
there was little coherence amongst the corpus of Tweets that Method52 produced after creating 
an automated process that would deem data as either ‘relevant’ or ‘irrelevant’. In other words, 
within the context of this study, this meant it was largely inept at distinguishing Tweets pertaining 
to ‘blockchain for good’ from Tweets that explicitly pertained to blockchain uses for banking and 
finance. As explored in the previous sections of this chapter, while ‘blockchain for good’ 
discourses invoke notions of ‘blockchains for good’ being distinct from financial blockchain 
applications, blockchain is, most prominently, a sociotechnical apparatus for extending economic 
and technoscientific rationalities. By and large, as I have argued throughout this chapter, the 
motives underscoring prospective ‘blockchain for good’ initiatives are not distinct from this. That 
the Method52 software could not make this distinction was therefore pertinent.  
 
What was also revealed during this data-scrape process was broader discursive affiliations between 
particular terms (as iterated in the English language and on the Twitter platform). From my initial 
process of marking Tweets as ‘relevant’ or ‘irrelevant’, the algorithm had discerned that blockchain 
applications for ‘healthcare’ might also pertain to ‘blockchain for good’; this wasn’t one of the 
topics that featured within the ‘blockchain for good’ texts I’d encountered. This meant that terms 
such as ‘health’ and ‘healthcare’ occurred in similar clusters of words to other ‘blockchain for 
good’ applications. What was interesting, however, is that while ‘health’ might here have been 
equated with ‘good’ by the algorithm, it wasn’t able to discern the marketised imperatives that 
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underlay the Tweets about healthcare. This or, perhaps, since capitalistic agendas arguably 
underscored the majority of the data, it was able to discern the marketised imperatives, but 
terminology around health was deemed to be more meaningful. This then gestures toward the 
broader epistemic frameworks within which such discursive affiliations exist, and toward the 




In this chapter, I have argued that blockchain is a sociotechnical apparatus for extending economic 
and technoscientific rationalities, and that ‘blockchain for good’ initiatives are constitutive of this 
more generalised blockchain formulation. ‘Blockchain for good’ discourses, I have maintained, are 
tightly bound with ideologies of philanthro-capitalism and libertarian paternalism. While 
philanthro-capitalism invokes moralistic discourse to further capitalist agendas, libertarian 
paternalism asserts that citizens can be encouraged to undertake specific, more ‘rational’ 
behaviours, without violating neoliberal maxims pertaining to ‘freedom of choice’. These 
ideologies are invariably geared toward the privatisation of the public sector and the extension of 
capitalist market economies, and have a specific relationship to notions of ‘social good’ that 
coincide within ‘blockchain for good’ discourses.  
 
Within the Blockchain for Good Manifesto, distinctions were explicitly drawn between notions of 
‘social good’ often pertaining to ‘non-profit activities or the third sector’ and the role of businesses; 
between a so-called ‘human aspect’ of blockchains and their ‘financial’ counterparts. This speaks 
to normative assumptions around ‘social good’, which were here positioned as distinct from the 
workings of capital. These distinctions were then utilised in discussions around how notions of ‘social 
good’ could bolster capitalist agendas, and were conjoined with conflicting beliefs around what is 
‘good’ or desirable; within these texts, this often pertained to making imagined futures 
determinable to specific social groups. In accordance with libertarian paternalism, rational choice 
was constructed as the correct way of doing things, and was often encompassed with a politic of 
‘risk’: where, to borrow Ewald’s words, decisions are made ‘not in a context of certainty, nor even 
of available knowledge, but of doubt, premonition, foreboding, challenge, mistrust, fear, and 
anxiety’ (Ewald, 2002, p. 294). That a theme of ‘trust’ recurred within much of the ‘blockchain for 
good’ discourse was indicative of this; living-beings were framed as self-serving and fraudulent, 
and blockchains as distinct from these ‘human’ flaws and biases.  
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Embedded within much of the ‘blockchain for good’ discourses were Eurocentric narratives 
around technological intervention into areas of the Global South being inherently desirable for 
those living there. This is both highly reductive and iterative of a wider neoliberal ideology in which 
causality is discursively abstracted from the experience of poverty. Technologically deterministic 
discourse that frames the introduction of such blockchain technologies as a gateway out of poverty 
bypasses considerations to the capitalistic frameworks that engender inequality. These dynamics 
are constitutive of a broader technoscientific epistemology that lends itself toward reductivism and 
universalism, where, to borrow Haraway’s words, ‘one language (guess whose) must be enforced 
as the standard for all the translations and conversions’ (1988). This thus means that those who 
are not accounted for within such frameworks become erased, which is a concern that becomes 
particularly critical when governance systems built upon these ideologies are presented as 
politically neutral and advantageous to all areas of the globe.  
 
The data-scrape that I undertook attempted to shed further light on the discourses I explored in 
section 5.3. Here, I explored whether it was possible to automate a process that distinguished 
Tweets pertaining to ‘blockchain for good’ from blockchain applications that are more explicitly 
entwined with the financial sector, and where the scope was for exploring notions of ‘blockchain 
for good’ that extended beyond the categories and sectors that were outlined in these texts. My 
engagement with the Method52 software was also an exercise in exploring the impossibility of removing 
personal biases and cultural assumptions from a process that centrally entailed automation. Via a process of 
marking Tweets as ‘relevant’ or ‘irrelevant’, the algorithm largely wasn’t able to discern Tweets that 
pertained to ‘blockchain for good’ from blockchain applications that were more explicitly oriented 
towards marketization. This, I have argued, was pertinent, as it alluded to the inseparability of 
‘blockchains for good’ from these more generalised financial blockchain applications. Secondly, 
the algorithm did pick up on some broader discursive affiliations; it deemed Tweets about 
marketised healthcare initiatives, for instance, as ‘relevant’ to my study of ‘blockchain for good’. 
This, I felt, was also pertinent, and gestured toward broader epistemic frameworks in which ‘health’ 
or ‘privatised health’ is equated with ‘good’. Thirdly, following a process of drawing up ‘keyword’ 
lists, the algorithm was able to more ‘accurately’ discern Tweets that pertained to ‘blockchain for 
good’ topics, that is, Tweets that invoked normative notions of ‘social good’ to propagate 
capitalistic agendas. It was only able to do this after we specifically searched terms that occurred 
in ‘blockchain for good’ texts, meaning that the data was limited according to what we had already 
seen; there wasn’t a great deal of scope for the data to tell its own story. Following this process, 
despite attempts to mark Tweets that explicitly pertained to financialisation as ‘irrelevant’, the 
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algorithm was able to more ‘accurately’ return Tweets about ‘blockchain for good’ which contained 
both philanthropic language and imperatives toward marketization. This then throws up two 
interesting tensions that bear relevance to the wider concerns of the thesis. Firstly, the algorithm 
was only able to return accurate data after we’d specifically coded it in accordance with what we 
wanted to see; and secondly, it gestures toward potential broader epistemic affiliations that allow 




























6.0 Harnessing Automation for ‘Pragmatic’ Post-Work Futures: 





This chapter will analyse the discourses invoked by UK-based left-wing think-tank Autonomy. 
Autonomy define themselves as an ‘independent, progressive think-tank’ who destabilise and 
rethink how work is understood, practiced and managed within the UK (2018). They are a left-
leaning non-for-profit organisation, and are comprised of a group of academics, policy ‘experts’, 
and research affiliates of other think-tanks, the most prominent being the Institute for Public 
Policy Research (IPPR). Much of their public facing discourse centres around proposals for 
Universal Basic Income (UBI), links between automation and unemployment, the gendered 
dynamics of waged and non-waged work, and ideas for a ‘post-work’ society. They have had press 
coverage in a range of left-wing and right-wing publications, including The Guardian, The 
Economist, The Daily Mail, The Sun and Novara Media, with pieces going by titles such as ‘Post-
work: the radical idea of a world without jobs’ (Beckett, 2018, in The Guardian) and ‘Britain should 
switch to a NINE-HOUR working week to cut emissions and save the planet, think tank claims’ 
(Nikolic, 2019, on the MailOnline). 
 
The data for this chapter is comprised of eight research interviews that I conducted with eight 
members of Autonomy, and some of the public facing discourse that featured on Autonomy’s 
website during the time of writing (February 2019). Using a CDA approach, I thematically explore 
the prevailing discourses within both sets of data, and consider the pertinence of some of the 
differences that emerged within each. I argue that the discourses offered in the research interviews 
express more radical positions than much of Autonomy’s public facing content, which often 
invokes neoliberal rhetoric, and situates businesses, rather than workers, as the addressees of issues 
surrounding waged work. I consider the pertinence of this discord, and how it speaks to a broader 
cultural context of capitalist realism and iterations of ‘radical’ politics within it (Autonomy, 2018). 
I argue that while Autonomy are informed by radical left-leaning positions, their convergence with 
neoliberal narratives offers a ‘compromise’ that will ultimately sustain capital (Boltanski & 
Chiapello, 2005, p. 22).  
 
The structure of this chapter will proceed as follows. In the first section, I outline some of the 
rationale behind exploring Autonomy as the final case study of this thesis, and how their work 
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relates to other ideas surrounding notions of ‘postcapitalist’ futures and utopian ideals in relation 
to technology. This chiefly draws upon the work of Srnicek and Williams, who form part of 
Autonomy’s ‘Advisory Board’ and have previously outlined ideas about how digital technologies 
can be mobilised to disrupt the prevailing ‘work ethic’ (2016). In the second section, I draw out 
prevailing themes from Autonomy’s public facing discourse, focusing chiefly on how they 
articulate notions of productivity and freedom, and how these relationships relate to their 
connotations within neoliberal discourses. In the third section, I explore some of the prevailing 
themes that emerged within my research interviews, focusing specifically on how ‘post-work’ 
imaginaries are articulated, and how automation and technology feature within these.  
 
6.1 Rationale and Context 
 
I became aware of Autonomy via an acquaintance who is involved with its running, and as a result 
of my curiosity around the ideas for a ‘postcapitalist’ future put forward by Nick Srnicek – who, 
as briefly aforementioned, is one member of Autonomy’s ‘Advisory Board’ – and Alex Williams 
in Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work (2016). In this book, Srnicek and 
Williams outline a series of ‘demands’ that they believe will bring about a ‘post-work’ society, which 
are heavily tied with notions of appropriating digital technologies for the political project of the 
‘left’ (2016, p. 107). ‘The utopian potentials inherent in twenty-first-century technology’, they write, 
‘cannot remain bound to a parochial capitalist imagination; they must be liberated by an ambitious 
left alternative’ (ibid, p. 3). As I hope has become clear throughout the course of this thesis, my 
feelings around the ‘utopian potentials inherent in twenty-first-century technology’ (ibid, my 
emphasis) were sceptical - at best - and I was interested into how much of the technologically 
deterministic rhetoric within technolibertarian discourse had become similarly invoked within 
contemporary leftist accounts such as these. On ‘postwork’ imaginaries, Kathi Weeks also uses the 
term ‘demand’, noting that it ‘encourages critical reflection on the order of things: what are the 
problems the demand seeks to address, and what is the rationale for the solution it puts forward?’ 
(Weeks, 2011, p. 145). The ‘demand’ then, in this way, speaks decisively to both the present and 
the future, where its crux lies in lacks, failings, and hopes. 
 
Some of the ‘demands’ put forward by Srnicek and Williams include ‘full automation’, a reduction 
in the length of the working week without a reduction in one’s wage (‘it’s not Mondays you hate, 
it’s your job’), a universal basic income (UBI), and an overcoming of the ‘pervasive pressure to 
submit to the work ethic’ (ibid, pp. 107 - 126). The combination of these factors, they argue, will 
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contribute toward a new ‘realm of freedom’: a post-capitalist future without work, where ‘we’ have 
greater personal autonomy over how time is spent outside of the capitalist wage relation (ibid, p. 
126). They extensively outline conceptions of how digital technologies could alleviate ‘humanity’ 
from the toils of waged labour, where, ‘without full automation […] postcapitalist futures must 
necessarily choose between abundance at the expense of freedom (echoing the work-centricity of 
Soviet Russia) or freedom at the expense of abundance, represented by primitivist dystopias’ (ibid, 
p. 109). Putting aside for a moment the reductivism in this dichotomy, I was intrigued as to how 
‘technology’ again functions here as its own ontological force, and how this is entwined with their 
own notions of ‘freedom’. Universalistic notions of appropriating automation for the objectives 
of the ‘left’ do not adequately engage with whose and what politics are privileged within a wealth 
of digital systems, and risk reinforcing pre-existing discriminatory dynamics that digital systems 
are often – either explicitly or implicitly – designed to uphold.  
 
In discussions about the length of the working week, Srnicek and Williams further discuss how 
the presence of networked digital technologies in day-to-day life has helped further dissolve the 
‘work-life’ distinction, flagging how ‘many of us are now tied to work all the time, with emails, 
phone calls, texts and job anxieties impending on us constantly’ (2016, p. 115). Similarly to the 
narratives offered by the ‘digital detox’ campers, for Srnicek and Williams there is a close 
association between the presence of certain digital technologies within day-to-day life and waged 
work. They then go on to posit that a shorter working week could help alleviate the ‘mental health 
problems fostered by neoliberalism’ (ibid, p. 116). In a similar vein to Fisher (2009) and Frayne 
(2015) - who both write about interrelations between work, neoliberalism, and mental health - this 
argument posits that mental health conditions such as depression and anxiety must be understood 
within a wider political context, where the ‘work-centred society’ is intimately tied with feelings of 
insecurity and alienation (Frayne, 2015, p. 230). Following this logic, these writers argue that a 
reduction in the hours of the working week would help mitigate these dynamics, and pave the way 
for populations to have greater autonomy over how their time is spent.  
 
The goal for Srnicek and Williams is increasing ‘worker power’, where less time spent at work 
would mean workers have more scope for collectivising and demanding better working conditions. 
This, for them, would be potentiated by less working hours, which would then pave the way for 
more time to engage in non-work pursuits, as well as potential heightened mental well-being that 
might be bought about by less engagement in waged labour (2016, p. 116). This, it is pertinent to 
note, is not dissimilar to pushes for shorter working weeks within spheres such as Google and 
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Microsoft. As several have highlighted, such pushes from these corporations stem from the 
recognition that overwork may have negative impacts upon the mental health of its employees and 
curtail productivity (Pearl, 2014; Cederström & Spicer, 2015; Davies, 2011; Davies, 2015; Beckett, 
2018). In a project titled ‘Work-Life Choice Challenge Summer 2019’ at Microsoft Japan, all 
workers were given five Friday’s off work without a reduction in pay. Reports from this experiment 
claimed that the shortened working weeks led to ‘more efficient meetings, happier workers and 
boosted productivity by a staggering 40%’ (Paul, 2019). This is also a logic that underscores some 
of the public facing discourse put forward by Autonomy: that in shortening the working week, a 
‘Happy Productive workforce with a healthy work-life balance’ can be achieved (Autonomy, 
2019a).  
 
Universal Basic Income (UBI) is also a frequent topic of discussion within a series of ‘post-work’ 
imaginaries, and features within the work of Weeks (2011), Srnicek and Williams (2016) and 
Autonomy. UBI is a model where all citizens unconditionally receive the same amount of money, 
regardless of employment or salary (Dent, 2019). Advocates from the left have argued that a UBI 
could help mitigate benefit stigma, as well as some of the paternalistic disciplinary mechanisms 
encompassed with the contemporary welfare system within the UK (ibid). Pivotally, Weeks also 
posits that UBI could allow for a departure away ‘from those strictly productivist values that link 
the worth of individuals to their commitment to work and that tether access to income to its 
performance’ (2011, p. 146). She highlights how UBI could mitigate some of the inequalities that 
are interlinked with which forms of labour are waged and which are not. Exploring the example 
of housework, she notes that UBI could untether some of the ideological weight that devalues 
such forms of labour, challenging ‘productivist ethics and family values’ and the forms of social 
reproduction that these encompass (ibid, p. 147). This, for Weeks, does not come without caveats: 
while a UBI would mean women could receive a wage for household labour or childcare, for 
instance, this would not automatically untether the patriarchal structures that pressure into women 
undertaking such forms of domestic labour. However, she posits that a UBI could nonetheless 
function as a pivotal starting point for challenging the inequalities that exist within waged labour 
and domestic labour, as well as sever some of the ties between waged labour and identity.  
 
UBI has however also been enthusiastically advocated by high-tech big names such as Mark 
Zuckerberg, and right-wing think tanks such as the Adam Smith Institute. Right-leaning spheres 
such as these often note that UBIs advantages lie in the prospect that it could help mitigate some 
of the issues around unemployment following the automation of certain job roles (Adam Smith 
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Institute, 2019). That a UBI could be a tool for right-wing political agendas stems from the idea 
that a UBI would replace all other forms of welfare. Pivotally, right-wing variants of UBI would 
not provide a living wage: libertarian writer Charles Murray’s In Our Hands: A Plan to Replace the 
Welfare State, for instance, has made proposals for a $10,000 UBI, while scrapping all other welfare 
systems within the US (Ikebe, 2016; Murray, 2016). Since welfare systems depend upon a 
significant amount of state bureaucracy, a one-size-fits-all system would provide leverage to 
significantly reduce the scope of government, giving instead ‘the money to the people’ (Murray, 
2016; Zwolinski, 2013). A $10,000 a year wage falls far below a living wage, and would reinforce 
neoliberal agendas where citizens choose between services, allowing for the widespread expanse of 
the market and privatisation. A UBI thus does not entail a ‘universal’ solution to those living in 
impoverished conditions, and in certain formulations could exacerbate economic precarity and 
propagate neoliberal capital.  
 
I take forward these considerations in the following sections and consider how claims to 
universalism and overarching ‘solutions’ occur throughout Autonomy’s discourse. I consider how 
the agendas put forward by Autonomy may be subject to - and beneficial to - forms of 
capitalisation, and where similarities occur between the proposals put forward by Autonomy and 
more explicitly neoliberalised instantiations of similar agendas, as outlined above. I consider how 
these discourses are legitimated by textual and visual discourses surrounding expertise, and how 
these are bound with paternalistic notions of what is good for us. This contributes to the ongoing 
thread that runs throughout the thesis pertaining to how discourses and cultural assumptions 
surrounding universalistic notions of technology and ‘social good’ are epistemically reductive, and 
can produce further scope for capitalisation within neoliberal frameworks. 
 
6.2 Analysis of Research Data  
 
I will now turn to an analysis of the research data. As highlighted in chapter two, the data from 
this chapter is comprised from eight interviews I undertook with eight members of Autonomy, as 
well as public facing discourse that featured on Autonomy’s official website at the time of writing 
(February 2019). I explore the pertinence of the discords between the two sets of data, and how 
these discords allude to a broader imaginary of capitalist realism. Capitalist realism, as I’ve explored 
throughout this thesis, refers to the imaginative constraints that Fisher understood to be imposed 
by capital; to the overarching sense that alternatives to capitalism lie outside of contemporary 
imaginaries (2009, p. 2). 
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6.3 Public Facing Discourse 
 
In this section of the chapter I will outline the discourse that features on Autonomy’s website, and 
how these discourses are presented. This will allow me to introduce some of the key themes within 
their public facing discourse for analysis later in the chapter. The information provided on 
Autonomy’s homepage is fairly concise, and is presented on one scrolling page, featuring 
professional-style photography and fairly minimalistic page design. Short snippets of information 
above sliding photographs include phrases such as ‘what kind of automation?’, ‘ideas for the post-
work century’, ‘rethinking work’, ‘healthier working cultures’ and ‘the new economy’. These quotes 
fall on top of photographs depicting various scenarios, including people of various nationalities 
doing chef work, a logistics port, and a block of high-rise buildings. The format for this webpage 
is very similar to other think-tanks, such as the Adam Smith Institute, who likewise feature sliding 
professional-style photography with short snippets of information and similar options on the 
navigation menu. Photographs on the website of the Adam Smith Institute include high-rise 
buildings, a logistic train network depot, and cityscapes, with snippets of information including 
‘making long distance work’, ‘a defence of intellectual property: patently good’, and ‘the neoliberal 
manifesto’.  
 
Underneath this segment at the top of Autonomy’s homepage, there are two brief paragraphs 
about the main aims and focuses of the think-tank:  
 
We provide necessary analyses, proposals and solutions with which to confront the 
changing reality of work in society today. Our aim is to promote real freedom, 
equality and human flourishing above all. 
 
It is time to question how waged work is organised, question our fundamental 
beliefs about work and determine rational and enabling solutions to the problems 
we face.  
 
The navigation menu in the top right corner includes options of ‘research’, ‘latest’, ‘consultancy’, 
‘projects’, ‘about’ and ‘support us’. The ‘research’ and ‘latest’ pages feature a series of articles and 
reports written by members and affiliates of Autonomy, as well as other material from leftist 
writers surrounding the politics of waged work. At this time of writing24, some of the reports and 
pieces of research go by titles such as ‘Employability in the New Economy: Financialisation and 
the Promise of Self-Branding’, ‘The Shorter Working Week: A Report from Autonomy’, ‘No 
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Autonomy without Equality! An Interview with Denise Calenano’, and ‘Stop repeating the mantra 
that “work is good for you”’ (Autonomy, 2018).  
 
The homepage also provides a bullet point list of some of the main focus points of the think-tank. 
These focus points include: a shorter working week (‘how can we move to an economy of shorter 
working hours, healthier workforces and more free time for all?’); technological employment 
(‘what is the reality of the widespread automation of tasks across employment sectors?’); gender 
inequality (‘how is work gendered and how can we reduce the fundamental inequalities that deny 
freedom to many?’); place and work (‘how can the designed spaces of work, and the coordinates 
of the city be transformed in order to facilitate a stronger, more egalitarian economy?’); and 
proposals for UBI (‘what qualifications are needed to make this idea pragmatic and enabling?).  
 
Under ‘Projects’, brief information about some of the research projects being undertaken by 
members and affiliates of Autonomy is featured. One of these projects involves ‘designing 
strategies’ to shift employment policies, and addressing ‘challenges’ around contemporary issues 
around automation, climate change, aging populations and wealth inequality in Valencia. Another 
investigates the role of ‘employability’ within the ‘new economy’, which reviews forms of self-help 
and management literature to consider how it encourages readers to utilise leisure time to boost 
their employability. The final piece of research detailed is a collaborative graphic design project, 
which invites students to explore ‘utopian scenario-modelling’ in response to contemporary issues 
surrounding political economy and the ‘crisis of work’.  Under the ‘About Us’ section, there is a 
menu showing options of ‘Directors Introduction’, ‘Our Team’ and ‘Press’. The ‘Directors 
Introduction’ is written by the co-founder of Autonomy (white, male), Will Stronge, which shows 
a professional head shot and further details about the ‘crisis’ of work within the UK and 
worldwide. Some themes here pertain to job precarity, the impact of automation upon working 
conditions, and the prospect that it is working families within the UK who are often the most 
impoverished. He also draws attention to the punitive sanctions that have increased over the 
recent decade which stigmatise and disempower those without employment. Stronge then goes on 
to note that Autonomy believe that ‘we cannot draw on traditional responses from Right or Left: 
the state of work today requires new thinking that seeks progressive, pragmatic and desirable 
solutions’, and lists similar organisations who explore ‘virtues’ surrounding waged work, including 
the Basic Income Network, Plan C, Disabled People Against Cuts, Boycott Workfare, and NEF 
and IPPR. Autonomy, he notes, ‘settles into this ecology of institutions’, and invites people to 
support the work of the non-for-profit think-tank. The ‘Our Team’ page then provides more detail 
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on the research backgrounds and institutional affiliations of the members and affiliates of 
Autonomy. 
 
From this initial set of verbal and visual discourses, there are a few elements that I will bring 
forward in the analyses later in the chapter. Firstly, language of ‘determin[ing] rational and enabling 
solutions’ is iterative of technocratic and neoliberal discourse, where the ‘crisis of work’ is situated 
as solvable according to rational logics. This is further iterated in notions of ‘progressive, pragmatic and 
desirable solutions’ (Autonomy, 2018). While the term ‘progressive’ is oriented toward leftist 
political positionalities, the language of pragmatism indicates that the tactics of Autonomy are 
situated as an extension of what is already real; that is, what already exists within the parameters of 
capital. The ‘directors’ introduction is further embedded in the rhetoric of neoliberalism, within 
which the portrait shot of the male director entrenches pre-existing relationships between 
hegemonic notions of expertise and white-manhood. Terms such as ‘director’ are further 
embedded in these broader sets of discourses, and is indicative of a top-down approach to politics 
within the think-tank. The invocation of these verbal and visual discourses, I will argue, paves the 
way for notions of what is good for us to be articulated and validated in accordance with hegemonic 




Narratives of ‘productivity’ were often iterated in one Autonomy and IPPR (Institute for Public 
Policy Research) report entitled ‘Exploring our Latent Potential: Moving Towards an Economy 
of Freedom’, throughout which the writers discuss ideas for a move towards a more ‘progressive’ 
working culture (Stronge and Archela, 2018). This report draws upon contemporary issues 
surrounding waged work within the UK, and makes suggestions for where changes might be made 
to establish a ‘healthier’ working culture (ibid). The arguments put forward in this piece are 
immediately situated within discourses of productivity: a term which is framed by the writers as 
the ‘share of national income that goes to labour (in the form of wages, salaries etc)’ (ibid, p. 222). 
Productivity is thus articulated here in its economic sense, referring explicitly to relationships 
between labour and capital. The rationale behind why shifts in working conditions are needed is 
also justified by discourse of productivity, and the posited financial costs of ‘burn out’ and ‘stress’ 
to the wider economy:  
 
Acknowledging these realities of the employment-centred society, we might say that 
real freedom might mean better work (and we should always seek to improve our 
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practices), but it should also mean less of it. […] Reducing burn out and stress in this 
way could increase productivity (by decreasing absenteeism) and benefit the NHS and 
the public purse 
 
This acknowledging of the ‘realities of the employment-centred society’ is gesturing to arguments 
made earlier in the report, pertaining to income inequality, job polarisation (here meaning an 
increase in very highly paid jobs and very poorly paid jobs, and a decrease in the availability of jobs 
with salaries that fall between the two), the gendered division of labour, and inadequacies of 
welfare policies within the UK; it is not stating that the ‘employment-centred society’ is the only 
feasible reality. This said, the phrase of the ‘realities of the employment-centred society’ 
nonetheless positions the ‘employment-centred society’ as the main focus. ‘Real freedom’ is not 
positioned outside the framework of the ‘employment-centred society’, and pertains here either to 
an improvement in working conditions, or a reduction in the time that one spends working. The 
benefits of less work are again framed in terms of productivity and a decrease in ‘absenteeism’, 
where ‘less work’ is correlated with a more committed engagement to ones labour during working 
hours. It should also be noted that notions of ‘always improving our practices’ are iterative of 
neoliberal discourses of self-optimisation. Each of these arguments are substantiated primarily in 
terms of their potential benefits to overall public spending, as opposed to, for instance, alleviating 
mental health issues or reducing poverty. This is again intimately tied with capitalist realist politics, 
where issues surrounding mental welfare and equality are articulated chiefly in relation to how they 
can be mitigated or improved in order to propagate to capital (Fisher, 2009; Davies, 2011).  
 
Later in this report, the writers also discuss ideas pertaining to ‘democratic automation’. Here, they 
note that a ‘concerted effort’ is needed to ensure that the ‘time-benefits’ produced by automated 
technologies are distributed to workers. In this regard, they suggest that IPPR’s proposal for a 
body entitled ‘Productivity UK’ would help set this in motion, as a project intended to help educate 
small and medium-sized firms about how automation might benefit their businesses. Economic 
incentives around automation come first in this discussion, followed by suggestions that these 
business consultations should involve unionised and non-unionised workers, and ‘could - and 
should - also involve the possibility of working time reductions’ (2018, p. 228). The language 
surrounding ‘working time reductions’ is less assertive than the language used in the rest of this 
section, where terms such as ‘could’ and ‘possibility’ frame suggestions for working time 




The introduction of automation technologies could in this way address both issues of 
worker wellbeing and enterprise productivity – thereby enhancing the conditions for 
a happier, healthier workforce and a more productive, successful enterprise (2018, p. 
228) 
 
Businesses are hereby the primary addressees of this report, and the rationales underlying the 
majority of the suggestions made are framed in economic terms. While this can be seen in the 
discourse thus far highlighted - in terms of understandings of ‘productivity’, and the addressing of 
business motives in discussions around automation - notions of ‘wellbeing’ might also be 
understood here in economic terms. In this regard, as discussed previously in this thesis, there 
have been a host of writers that have problematized the politics encompassed in rhetoric of 
‘wellness’, and how they function within neoliberal cultural contexts (see Davies, 2015; Cederström 
and Spicer, 2015). Cederström and Spicer explicitly gesture toward a ‘wellness syndrome’, referring 
to the ideologies that are encompassed with such rhetoric and their relatedness to neoliberal 
governmentality. This can be seen in the section highlighted above, wherein a ‘happier, healthier 
workforce’ is co-aligned with a ‘more productive, successful enterprise’ (Stronge and Archella, 
2018). A ‘healthier workforce’ is thus oriented here towards establishing subjects that are more 
proficient at fulfilling the motives of neoliberal capital.   
 
The ‘Consulting’ page on Autonomy’s website invokes similar language, and outlines the 
consultation ‘services’ that Autonomy offer to help ‘forward-thinking firms’ understand how a 
four-day working week could be useful for them. Here, a brief bullet point list is shown, depicting 
why a four-day working week could benefit ‘your organisation’, which includes, in the following 
order: ‘improv[ing] employees’ health and wellbeing; bolster[ing] a friendly office environment’; 
‘rais[ing] productivity’; and ‘attract[ing] and retain[ing] staff’ (ibid). It then outlines brief details of 
what Autonomy ‘offer’, which includes working with organisations to design a four-day working 
week trial, and working alongside staff to ‘best fit with your working practices’. Following this, it 
notes that Autonomy have ‘extensive research in this area’ which ‘equips us with the knowledge 
to help you’. These discourses again directly address businesses, and echo management strategies 
used within workplace environments (Flemming and Sturdy, 2010). ‘Extensive research’ invokes 
notions of expertise, which in this instance reinforces paternalistic notions of what is good for us, and 
further, what is good for business. The overriding discourse in this section is not one of improving the 
‘wellbeing’ of workers to alleviate experiences of mental turmoil, but rather to encourage workers 
to affiliate and become more committed to the motives of their workplace environment. In this 
report, then, economic productivity and worker wellbeing are articulated as co-constitutive, and 
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the imperative towards greater mental health of workers is validated according to narratives of 




In the introduction to this thesis, I discussed notions of ‘freedom’ and how it has been variously 
articulated across the political spectrum in relation to developments in digital technology. Here, I 
highlighted that many have drawn attention to how notions of ‘freedom’ have been endorsed from 
an array of political standpoints, and assume vastly different meanings in different contexts 
(Winner, 1997; Borsook, 2000; 2001; Mirowski, 2013; Golumbia, 2013; 2016). David Golumbia 
has recently pointed toward the view that ‘widespread computerisation naturally produces 
democracy and freedom’ has emerged from technolibertarian politics, and could be used to 
partially explain ‘such a stark decline in the Left’s political fortunes’ alongside the rise of digital 
communication technologies (Winner, 1997; Golumbia, 2013). Meanwhile, ‘freedom’, within anti-
work literature by writers such as Gorz (1999) and Frayne (2015), as well as in Italian Workerist 
and autonomist-Marxist positions, pertains to labour as fundamentally distinct from the wage 
relation (see Beradi, 2009; Dyer-Witheford, 2012). For David Frayne in The Refusal of Work, 
vocabularies of ‘freedom’ are intertwined with the resources one has available to pursue ‘their own 
autonomous self-development’, which here pertains to the ‘capacity to represent and create oneself 
and one’s relationships, the freedom to design, within obvious bounds, our own lives’ (Weeks, 
2011, p. 168; cited in Frayne, 2015, p. 230).  
 
‘Freedom’, within the context of some of Autonomy’s public facing discourse, was articulated in 
terms of ‘better work […] but it should also mean less of it’ (Stronge and Archela, 2018, p. 226). 
This form of ‘freedom’ then might be understood as freedoms around control, rather than freedoms 
from control (Berlin, 1958; Flemming and Sturdy, 2010). This again speaks to the politics of 
capitalist realism, where the imaginary here does not potentiate a future outside of the wage 
relation. Similar understandings of ‘freedom’ are articulated throughout the same report, which 
concludes with the following:  
 
By updating our social security net, and directing automation technologies 
according to the values of freedom and democracy, we can ensure a productive 




While the report in question does not explicitly assume the view that computerisation is inherently 
geared towards ‘freedom and democracy’ - indeed, the writers note that drive is needed to ensure 
that the ‘time-benefits that accrue from automation technologies are distributed to the workforce’, 
and would require governmental and organisational input for this to be realised - the notion of 
‘directing automation technologies according to the values of freedom and democracy’ are 
ambiguous and contingent upon specific political readings of the terms. Indeed, as Winner argued 
in 1997 in relation to discourses surrounding the Web, ‘rather than proclaim community, 
democracy, and citizenship, it would be better to study these boundaries, to think about how 
communities are likely to be affected by the arrival of networked computing and what a reasonable 
response would be’. In a similar vein, notions of harnessing computation for the purposes of 
‘freedom and democracy’ was a discourse that occurred throughout the ‘blockchain for good’ 
initiatives explored in the previous chapter, in which I argued that these terms often ambiguated 
neoliberal and neo-colonialist agendas through invoking hegemonic notions of ‘social good’. It is 
therefore important that the specificities of how precisely computation will be harnessed; whose and 
what freedoms are ‘automation technologies’ designed to propagate; and within what broader 
frameworks are such ‘automation technologies’ functioning within. This report continues: 
 
An expansion of free time outside of employment will allow us relative freedom from 
disciplinary management and from repetitive toil, the freedom to equally share 
necessary, unpaid work, the freedom from an invasive state, and – most importantly 
– will allow us the space and cognitive bandwidth to pursue our own interests 
(emphasis added) 
 
The term ‘relative’ here is significant, indicating that complete ‘freedom from disciplinary 
management’ is not part of this imaginary. It is also pivotal to note that while ‘freedom from an 
invasive state’ is often a current within anti-work literature, notions of ‘freedom from the state’ 
within such contexts are constitutive of broader socio-anarchist imaginaries. Within the context of 
this report, which frequently invokes language that occurs within neoliberal discourse, more critical 
and nuanced language is needed to prevent the convergence of these proposals with neoliberal 
and libertarian agendas. Similar language of relativism is iterated within another Autonomy report 
entitled ‘A Shorter Working Week: A Radical and Pragmatic Proposal’ (Autonomy, 2019b, emphasis 
added). The term ‘pragmatic’ here again gestures toward a capitalist realist imaginary, where 
Autonomy’s propositions are situated within the parameters of what is already real. A complete 
overhaul of the dynamics of neoliberal capital are not potentiated here; what is suggested instead 
are ways of mitigating some of the ‘stultifying’ effects of capital while still operating within its 
parameters (Flemming and Sturdy, 2010).  
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It is also worth drawing attention to the term ‘cognitive bandwidth’ here, and how this is iterative 
of rationalistic understandings of the mind that are prevalent within neoliberal and libertarian 
paternalist rhetoric. Jones specifically notes how the term ‘cognitive bandwidth’ occurs within the 
discourse of behavioural economics, and propagates neoliberal political agendas in which poverty 
is framed in terms of the ‘decision-making’ capacities of individuals (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013). 
Within such spheres, she notes, it is assumed that ‘those with power and wealth have cognitive 
competence and know which specific behaviours and decisions are “best” for poor citizens, who 
are assumed to lack cognitive skills or “bandwidth”’ (2017). This reasoning can be seen in 
statements such as ‘money worries can absorb cognitive bandwidth, leaving less cognitive 
resources to make optimal decisions’, which features in a ‘behavioural science’ report by 
Mullainathan and Shafir (2013; cited in Jones, 2017). I would further suggest that Autonomy’s 
proposition of providing ‘rational and enabling solutions’, highlighted earlier in the chapter, is also 
encapsulated in the political discourses of behavioural economics and libertarian paternalism. 
Here, the convergence of these discourses with that of Autonomy is indicative of two potential 
factors: firstly, that this language has been adopted by Autonomy to speak to imaginaries in which 
such discourse has become hegemonic, thus broadening their potential audience base; and 
secondly, that there are elements of paternalism here, in that Autonomy are speaking as a group 
of ‘experts’ or ‘directors’ about what is good for us.  
 
Having now analysed some of the prevalent themes within Autonomy’s public facing discourse, I 
will turn to an analysis of some of the discourses that were used in the research interviews that I 
conducted with eight members of Autonomy, and consider the pertinence of some of the 
similarities and differences between these discourses and Autonomy’s public facing discourse. I 
decided to compare these two sets of research data as, upon conducting my study, I noticed there 
were significant differences between them. These differences are pertinent as they show a contrast 
between the discourses mobilised to encourage a wide-spread audience to identify with 
Autonomy’s political agendas, and the political beliefs of those who are affiliated with the think-
tank. This, I argue, reveals pertinent insights as to how the public imaginary was understood by 
members of Autonomy. These interviews, as highlighted in chapter two, were conducted via 
Skype, and enquired into what interested the participants about the prospect of anti-work, what 
they saw to be the core issues, how the issues were being addressed by Autonomy, and where it 
was that they envisaged Autonomy having an impact. I further enquired about what they 
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understood a ‘post-work’ society to be, whether they saw a ‘post-work’ society to be a feasible 
prospect, and the role they envisaged technology playing within prospective ‘post-work’ futures. 
 
6.3.3 Post-Work Imaginaries 
 
The prospect of a ‘post-work’ society features in much of Autonomy’s public facing discourse as 
one of the main focus points of the think-tank, and is a topic that features frequently within ‘anti-
work’ literature (Srnicek and Williams, 2016; Weeks, 2011). Further to this, one of the chapters in 
Srnicek and Williams’s ‘Inventing the Future’ book falls under the title of ‘Post-Work Imaginaries’, 
while Weeks also explicitly discusses post-work imaginaries within ‘The Problem with Work: 
Feminism, Marxism, Anti-Work Politics and Post-Work Imaginaries’ (2011). Srnicek and Williams 
do not provide a distinct definition for ‘post-work’, however their chapter on ‘post-work 
imaginaries’ is subtitled with a quote form Arthur Clarke, which states that ‘the goal for the future 
is full unemployment’ (2016, p. 7). This chapter then goes on to list their ‘demands’ for prospective 
post-work futures, which, as previously noted, include universal basic income, full automation, 
and a reduction in the working week. In this chapter, a future without work is articulated as an 
aspirational long term goal, while these ‘demands’ are positioned as stepping stones toward this 
imagined future. For others, such as Aranowitz et al., a ‘post-work’ political project would entail 
‘shorter working hours, higher wages, and best of all, our ability to control most of our own time’ 
(1998, p. 33). ‘At a fundamental level’, they note, ‘the first thing required is a change in ideas’, 
thinking ‘differently about work itself’ (1998, p. 38). Post-work for these writers thus encompasses 
a critique of a widespread ‘common sense’, with the goal of having greater autonomy over how 
one’s time is spent, outside the parameters of capital. 
 
As aforementioned, my interview question pertaining to ‘post-work’ enquired as to what my 
participants understood a ‘post-work’ society to be, and whether they saw the prospect of a ‘post-
work’ society to be feasible. This question prompted a lot of interesting discussion, and varied 
fairly substantially from interviewee to interviewee. One topic that occurred fairly frequently 
however was around the prospect of a four-day working week. Many anticipated that a four-day 
working week could play a pivotal role in de-prioritising work within everyday life, which could 
subsequently shift how work is engaged with and understood. This was referred to by some as a 
disruption of the ‘work ethic’, and was often seen as a necessary component in a shift towards 
prospective ‘post-work’ futures. This was articulated in the following interviews:  
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I1: And then shifting things like… shifting to a four-day working week under certain 
circumstances could really shift normative values around work and they could 
hugely transform the way in which we relate to work, in which case it would make 
room potentially for broader and more deep changes afterwards  
 
I3: I think given time of a three-day weekend, people can discover different ways 
of being, thinking and living 
 
The stance that a four-day week would be necessary for shifting relationships between waged 
labour and capital was widely held by the interviewees, however views on how a four-day week 
might become instantiated, and the effects it was anticipated to have, were varied. While it was 
broadly hoped that a four-day working week would help de-prioritise waged labour within daily 
life and pave the way for alternative ways of living, many also highlighted that this might not 
automatically de-couple relationships between life and capital.  
 
From some leftist perspectives, as several interviewees highlighted, a four-day week could lessen 
the amount of time one spends engaged with the pursuits of waged work, and could thus help 
mitigate some of the forms of governmentality that are encompassed with waged labour (such as, 
for instance, attempts to optimise ones capacity for economic productivity). However, one 
participant noted that their hopes for a ‘broad sway left’ were not optimistic, and that shifts toward 
a four-day working week were more likely to be instantiated within spheres such as Google. They 
noted that there’s recognition at Google that intensive working hours have a negative impact upon 
the mental health of workers, which forms part of the drive towards a four-day working week 
within these workplace environments. In a similar vein, many have flagged how Google’s aims to 
‘create the happiest, most productive workplace in the world’ are intended to encourage workers 
to identify with the company’s values and increase profits (Stewart, 2013; Flemming and Sturdy, 
2010). A four-day week within such contexts is thus oriented towards optimising the company’s 
overall productivity and profit. This is not to state that the potentiality or benefits of better mental 
health stemming from reduced working hours are automatically negated or rendered futile by these 
neoliberal contexts, but rather to flag that the motivations underlying the drives for four-day 
working weeks within such spheres are definitively bound with neoliberal rationalities. I would 
thus posit that less time spent engaging in waged labour would not automatically equate to the 
negation of ill mental health; indeed, if the parameters within which these shifts operate are 
nonetheless geared towards the maintenance of neoliberal capital, imperatives toward self-
improvement, competition, and economic precarity - that many have strenuously linked with ill 
mental health - would not be offset (Fisher, 2009; Davies, 2011; Cederström and Spicer, 2015).  
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I probed the interviewee further on this topic, and enquired about what they thought about links 
between mental health and notions of productivity, and how this was being addressed within 
corporate spheres such as Google. Here, the participant went on to discuss relationships between 
leisure time and work, and how they understood leisure time to also be constituted by work and 
capital:   
 
I1: … part of this that I guess we don’t foreground as much is that leisure is almost 
entirely capitalised on. Capitalised by work or captured by work, or produced by 
work. Desires… the way in which we engage with leisure, the way in which we 
engage with our kind of ‘freedom’… kind of thing… This is all constitutively 
produced through work. The Google play-work combo is potentially like not the 
answer but the apotheosis of neoliberalism  
 
This is a stance that I empathised with. I argued in chapter four that the discourses of ‘play’ 
articulated by the ‘digital detox’ campers were bound with similar rationalities; as both constituted 
by neoliberalism, and invoked as a way of adjusting ones relationship to work and enhancing 
productivity. The interviewee then went on to note that they disputed that a shift forwards a four-
day week within Google would achieve ‘anything useful’, but that shifts in ‘entrenched structures’ 
such as the five-day working week might shift other structures in ways that ‘you just can’t foresee’, 
but that could be potentially ‘capitalised upon’. This position contrasted quite starkly with some 
of Autonomy’s public facing discourse, where ‘introducing shorter working hours in your 
organisation’ was, in a similar vein to Google, proclaimed to ‘improve employees’ health and 
wellbeing’, ‘bolster a friendly office environment’, ‘raise productivity’, and ‘attract and retain staff’ 
(Autonomy, 2019a).  
 
In another interview, one participant extensively queried what should constitute ‘post-work’, and 
whether it would entail ‘replac[ing] it with leisure time or […] a recognition of other types of work’, 
or simply ‘reducing the focus on paid work employment [and] recognising the work involved in 
every other sphere of life’. This participant worked within public policy and wasn’t directly 
associated with an academic institution. They noted that they found it hard to comprehend how 
society could shift towards something ‘radically different’, and noted that instead of ‘post-work’ 
entailing no paid labour whatsoever, a more ‘realistic’ understanding of ‘post-work’ might simply 
involve the recognition that forms of labour that aren’t typically waged (for example childcare, or 
domestic labour) should also be constituted as ‘work’: 
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I4: well I think it’s like I was saying earlier that right now, the leap from where we 
are now to something radically different, is just very hard to comprehend how you 
would go from where we are to something which you know, does post-work involve 
no paid work at all, or does it involve a more kind of humane balance between a bit 
of paid work and other things, and you know, as we were discussing, what are those 
other things? I think… I guess the question about what is post-work is such a big 
question, because, what do you want to replace it with? Do you want to replace it 




People won’t stop wanting to volunteer or to do the gardening, or to grow 
vegetables. Those things are hopefully not going to disappear; they’re all forms of 
work that are unpaid. So I guess that would be a more positive place to end up, that 
we value all forms of work more highly  
 
Here, ‘post-work’ was understood in terms of a reduction of work ‘in the economic sense’, and a 
heightened recognition of forms of labour that aren’t monetised (Gorz, 1989). This participant 
also noted that ‘post-work’ might then simply be the understanding that ‘work is not the answer 
to all of our problems’. ‘Post-work’ was thus not understood here as a distinct break with capitalism 
as it currently stands, but rather as a framework in which shifts occur in terms of what activities 
are assigned economic value.  
 
The topic of a four-day working week was also a topic of discussion with this participant, and how 
they saw this to relate to a decoupling of life and capital. They questioned the notion that a four-
day week would automatically create the space for different ways of living, which was iterated in 
the following sections: 
 
I4: I don’t think that we can assume that just by the very fact of having more time 





Anyone that’s been unemployed even for a few months knows it’s incredibly 
depressing to be sat around twiddling your thumbs, and you know, if you weren’t 
depressed to start with, you’re probably depressed at the end 
 
 
They went on discuss how their female friends who had taken time out of their professions to 
care for children had often felt that ‘they’d lost something of themselves’ when they’d stopped 
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going to work. They attributed this to the ties between waged labour and identity, noting that ‘who 
we are is what we do for work’. This felt significant as it gestured towards a broader dogma around 
work which is entwined with feeling good ‘about our lives’, and again towards an understanding 
that less time spent undertaking waged labour would not necessarily negate neoliberalised 
imperatives toward economic productivity, and the rationalities and psychic landscapes that are 
tied with such imperatives.  
 
For other interviewees, UBI was a ‘key’ part of their ‘anti/post-work future’ imaginary. This, for 
I2, was seen as a step towards a radically different future: a ‘world where we don’t even have 
money anymore, or sort of alternative forms of exchange’. This participant noted that UBI was a 
‘feasible’ stepping stone towards this future, adding that ‘we have the trial in Finland’, and that 
‘the EU is talking about how we probably need to implement this across the EU’. It is pressing to 
note here that these trials for UBI in Finland were part of a centre-right political agenda, which 
occurred simultaneously with funding cuts in education, health and welfare (Laterza, 2015; 
Zamora, 2017). This was discussed by another interviewee following a question about how they 
could foresee ‘anti-work’ or ‘post-work’ politics being instantiated: 
 
I7: the universal basic income argument, is like… in of itself it’s not a good thing, 
it’s how its implemented that means it can be progressive or regressive. Either it 
could help break the connection between income and working, or it could be 
used to destroy public services, and just transfer a small amount of money to 
people and they can choose which marketised healthcare they buy. So you know, 
on the other end these kind of things in practice can mean very different things    
 
The specificities of how precisely a UBI would function are therefore crucial; it would not 
automatically benefit those in precarious positions, nor is it possible to benefit all political agendas. 
While, as noted earlier in this chapter, and in this section of I7’s discourse, there are drives from 
a wealth of neoliberal and technolibertarian initiatives for UBI, it is again imperative that the 
structures within which a UBI exists are first of all subverted. 
 
6.3.4 Understandings of ‘Human’ 
 
The term ‘human’ also occurred frequently within research interviews. While these understandings 
again varied from interviewee to interviewee, there were several prominent themes. The term 
‘human’ frequently occurred alongside ‘flourishing’ and ‘labour’ (i.e. ‘human flourishing’ and 
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‘human labour’). ‘Human flourishing’ was often understood as distinct from waged work, or as 
something that occurred outside the sphere of waged work:  
 
I3: …we can talk about big business, those things - big businesses and large capital, 
i.e. platforms, have no interest in basically reducing everyone's working week, 
allowing for human flourishing 
 
This distinction - between ‘human flourishing’ and the objectives of capital - echoes some of the 
discourse previously explored around ‘blockchain for good’, where the so-called ‘human aspect’ 
of blockchains was positioned as distinct from blockchain uses within financial contexts 
(Blockchain for Good, 2018). Similar understandings of ‘human activity’ and ‘capital production’ 
were articulated by other participants:  
 
I6: Changing the conversation groundwork means, in part, changing our 
understanding of human activity in relation to capital production, in relation to the 
social reproduction of our general lives, and how that’s mediated through institutions  
 
Distinctions were also made between notions of the ‘human’ and digital technology, which usually 
occurred during conversations surrounding automation. During a discussion about automation 
with one participant, they discussed the absence of the ‘human’ in the motives underlying big tech 
companies:  
 
I7: You then get an incredible tendency for technocratic solutionism in Silicon 
Valley, and I think Uber is a fantastic example of this. Like, oh don’t worry we’ll 
solve transportation problems by making people self-employed and organise them 
through an algorithm, and we have this imaginary future where everything will be 
automated and we’ll make super profits. The human in all of that becomes 
completely missing 
 
‘Human’ was thus used here in contrast to ‘automation’ and ‘profits’; as something that was missing 
within high-tech imaginaries. In a similar vein to the discourses I explored within the case studies 
of the ‘digital detox’ and ‘blockchain for good’ (for example, ‘humanising the blockchain’ was used 
in contrast to explicitly ‘financial’ uses for blockchains) the implication here is that to be ‘human’ 
is distinct from the motivations of capital and the functionalities of digital technologies. 
 
6.3.5 Automation and Technology 
 
Automation and digital technologies were frequent topics of discussion throughout the research 
interviews. One aspect surrounding the role of ‘technology’ in relation to work pertained to the 
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unpaid labour that occurred during time spent commuting, which was attached to answering 
phone calls and emails. This however was only remarked upon by one participant; for the most 
part discussions around ‘technology’ or ‘automation’ revolved around certain digital technologies 
performing job roles that would have previously been undertaken chiefly by human actors. 
Understandings of how automation might intersect with issues around work and labour varied 
from interviewee to interviewee - while most interviewees noted that digital technology embodies 
bias, there was quite a lot of variation in terms of how interviewees envisaged the role of 
technology in prospective ‘post-work’ futures. Despite the bias that many interviewees pointed 
toward, some remained hopeful that it could play a role in reducing working hours, and in replacing 
job roles that they considered to be particularly toilsome:   
 
I5: I think overall, we can use technology as a good thing to help implement a post-
work society, to help achieve that goal of working less. But having said that, at the 
same time we need to understand that technology and work, they are not competing 
for the same thing. I think that most technologies are created with the purpose of 
efficiency, or replacing manual labour 
 
On the whole, while ‘automation’ is foregrounded as one of the main focus points of Autonomy 
within their public facing discourse, the conversations held around technology were on the whole 
vague25. ‘Automation’ was often flagged as something that could potentiate a post-work future, as 
having ‘positive potential of freeing up people from the most laborious, unfulfilling manual or 
repetitive kind of tasks’ (I4). Most held the position that technology could be a ‘good thing’, or 
that ‘technology is the kind of thing that might make [post-work futures] happen’ (I5). These 
arguments were usually based upon the idea that technologies could undertake the labour of the 
‘really crappy jobs’. One participant questioned whether people would work in spaces such as ‘car-
washes’ or the ‘tills at Asda’ if such jobs were able to be automated: 
 
I5: I think the problem is that, why do we still have low-paid, low-skilled workers 
doing that. So... again, are people just working because we have the moral 
imperative of work? Some people that advocate UBI would go - well, would they 
still be working if they got six-hundred pounds a month? Would they still be doing 
this kind of low-skill, doesn't add much to society, work, if they had other sources 
of income? So I think technology can be beneficial if it helps us to rethink those 
other things that still exist, cause it seems to me that in the current system 
technology and low-skill, low-paid work are competing for the same thing and it's 
creating a tension 
                                                 
25 It should be noted here that interviewees had different forms of ‘expertise’, some of which didn’t 
directly involve relationships between technology and work 
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It is worth flagging here the value assumptions associated with such low-paid forms of labour, and 
how these are tied with imaginaries surrounding automation. While I do not - in any way - dispute 
that there are some jobs that are particularly toilsome and detrimental to the mental and physical 
wellbeing of workers, constituting some forms of work as ‘low-skill, doesn’t add much to society’ 
(alongside using ‘Asda’, a supermarket targeted at lower-income customers, as a prototypical 
example) encompasses value assumptions that require closer inspection and critique: what 
constitutes ‘skill’ and what does not? Which jobs are constituted as valuable to society and which 
are not? Who decides which jobs are worthwhile and ‘skilled’? According to what is the value of 
certain professions evaluated? How does ‘technology’ play a part in replacing the professions that 
are considered to be invaluable? And how, then, does this affect those working in such professions, 
in terms of perhaps involvements in communities, routines, or other forms of satisfaction that 
may be derived from participation in a given workplace environment? ‘Technology’ in this passage 
is juxtaposed with ‘low-skill, low-paid’ work, which the interviewee claims produces a ‘tension’; 
this tension was again not articulated in terms of the capitalistic frameworks producing 




In this chapter I have explored some of the discourses invoked by left-leaning think-tank 
Autonomy. I have analysed some of the prevalent themes within Autonomy’s public-facing 
discourse, and those which occurred within interviews that I conducted with eight of Autonomy’s 
affiliates. In the first section of the analysis, I chiefly argued that Autonomy’s public facing 
discourse invokes neoliberal rhetoric to substantiate their proposed political agendas. While 
explicitly constituting themselves as ‘radical’ and ‘progressive’, terms such as ‘director’, ‘cognitive 
bandwidth’, ‘raising productivity’ and ‘solutions’ situate Autonomy’s rhetoric within broader 
constellation of neoliberal and technolibertarian discourses. I have argued that phrases such as 
‘relative freedom from disciplinary management’ and a ‘radical and pragmatic proposal’ are iterative 
of capitalist realist politics, where the proposed imaginaries and political agendas do not extend 
beyond contemporary capitalist frameworks. Language of ‘pragmatism’ suggests that Autonomy’s 
proposals are located in what is deemed to be realistic; that is, what already exists within a capitalist 
order, or as Fisher’s ‘capitalist realism’ points toward, the only possible order (2009). 
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The language of neoliberalism is part of the common sense of contemporary capital; it is, to draw 
upon Boltanski and Chiapello, encompassed with a series of ‘shared representations’, a dominant 
ideology that is invoked within Autonomy’s public facing discourse to appeal to a majority (2005). 
In this way, Autonomy ‘forge[s] compromise’ with the dominant discourses of contemporary 
capital, and regularly makes appeals to the motives of business. The ‘directors introduction’ on 
Autonomy’s homepage notes that ‘we cannot draw on traditional responses from Right or Left’. 
They make appeals to the motives of business (‘organisations around the globe are adopting 
shorter working weeks in order to create healthier, happier workplace environments’; ‘reducing 
hours at work can […] attract and retain staff’), and what might be typified as typically leftist 
political agendas (‘our aim is to promote real freedom, equality and human flourishing’; ‘how is 
work gendered and how can we reduce the fundamental inequalities that deny freedom to many?’). 
This echoes appeals to increases in the ‘scales’ in the political project of the ‘left’ put forward by 
Srnicek and Williams, who argue that forms of resistance situated in the ‘local’ are insufficient for 
tackling the scope of neoliberal capital (2015). 
 
I have argued that the conflation of these discourses within Autonomy’s public facing discourse is 
strategic, and aimed at appealing to a broad range of political positionalities; it was not 
representative of the positions held by the majority of my interview participants. On the whole, 
my interview participants expressed far-left views about relationships between work and identity, 
and were largely critical of how pushes for a four-day working week or a UBI could function within 
neoliberal frameworks. One participant argued that shifts toward a four-day working week were 
more likely to gain momentum in spheres such as Google, and that pushes within such spheres 
were ‘not the answer but the apotheosis of neoliberalism’. Several also highlighted that leisure time 
is also constituted by work, and that a four-day working week would not necessarily untether ties 
between identity and capital. I concur with these positions and would further extend that, 
following arguments made throughout this thesis, ‘solutions’ such as a four-day working week 
within a broader cultural framework of neoliberal capital would not untether these relationships, 
and could generate new scope for capitalisation. Work is an ideology that is not solely perpetuated 
via engagements with the five-day working week, nor is it an ideology that is solely perpetuated via 
engagements with digital devices that bind ‘free’ time to professions via emails and social media: 
it is an ideology that is perpetuated via the epistemological frameworks that perpetuate ‘digitally 
ubiquitous’ environments, in its propensities toward efficiency, self-improvement and economic 
and scientific progress.  
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With these ideas in mind, following Gorz, I would suggest that the ‘question we must ask […] is 
what meaning we wish to give this new-found free time and what content we wish to give it. 
Economic reason is fundamentally incapable of providing an answer to this question’ (1989, p. 4). 
Without a deeper critique of the neoliberalised frameworks within which these working structures 
exist, and indeed in invoking the language of neoliberal capital, I would conclude that Autonomy’s 
project offers a comprise that will ultimately sustain capital. It offers, as Boltanski and Chiapello put 
it, ‘hesitant populations the opportunity to participate in [capitalism] more enthusiastically’ (2005, 
p. 22). Universalising ‘solutions’ that invoke neoliberal and technocratic language are limited in 


































This thesis, Activism, Refusal, Expertise: Responses to Digital Ubiquity, has been concerned with the 
everyday practices; the instances of refusal and compromise; the discourses that have theorised, 
narrativised, advocated and opposed digitality in its many facets. It has been guided by the question 
of whether digital technologies capture human potential in terms of economic value, and how this 
is entwined with neoliberal governmentality. It has examined how the forms of power exhibited 
by the state, corporate and bureaucratic institutions that govern and influence living-being within 
contemporary spheres are bolstered with and via digital technologies, allowing such powers to be 
outsourced, re-established, materialised, de-materialised and, most principally to this work, 
embodied. It has explored embodiment via theories of sociomateriality, where I have argued that the 
politics and architectures of non-human entities are pivotal to understanding the intricacies of the 
relationships between digital technologies and power. 
 
Throughout the thesis I have returned to Mark Fisher’s notion of capitalist realism, which I also 
argue to be critical to understanding the contemporary moment in the West (2009). To briefly 
reiterate, capitalist realism refers to the prevailing sentiment that not only is capitalism the ‘only 
viable political and economic system’, but also, that alternatives to capitalism lay beyond 
contemporary imaginaries altogether (2009, p. 2). This has formed the theoretical terrain from 
which I have interrogated how and where digital technologies – as extensions of capital – 
materialise capitalist realism as a ubiquitous force in everyday life. I have explored how this 
‘psychic landscape’ (Noys, 2019) influences imaginaries for the future, and whose politics and 
futures are privileged via the boundaries and chasms produced within contemporary digital 
environments.  
 
This work was prompted by an interest in culturally specific theories of the mind that situate it in 
terms of a series of partite attributes: attributes that can be categorised, bureaucratised, exploited, 
and managed. Following Fisher, I noted that framing the mind in this way paves the way for 
experiences of mental turmoil to be detached from the political and social contexts that often play 
a critical role in engendering it (2009; 2011). Poverty and social stigma attached to notions of race, 
disability, nationality, gender and sexuality are abstracted from such mental health frameworks: in 
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this way, mental illness is something that can be alleviated via purchases, pharmaceuticals26, and 
personal willpower; it is not our pasts – both personal and cultural – or the subsumption of time and 
rationality by capital.  
 
In the introduction to this thesis, I noted that the term ‘digital ubiquity’ - used most prominently 
within high-tech spheres - often refers to environments that are saturated by a prevalence of 
networked information technologies. I reflected on some of ‘ubiquity’s’ earlier theological 
meanings to understand its power in understanding contemporary digital environments. ‘Ubiquity’ 
in its theological sense, I noted, has a hierarchical relationships to humans; it knows humans in a 
way that humans cannot know it; it is both material and immaterial; and it is totalising. It has been 
my contention in this thesis that this ‘ubiquity’ of digital technologies is crucially entwined with 
Fisher’s articulation of capitalist realism, an argument that is realised via a critical scrutiny of the 
logics and politics that are materialised in digital objects. In an article entitled The Privatisation of 
Stress, Fisher wrote,  
 
since 1989, capitalism’s success in routing its opponents has led to it coming close 
to achieving the ultimate goal of ideology: invisibility. […] In the global North at 
least, capitalism proposes itself as the only possible reality, and therefore it seldom 
‘appears’ as such at all (2011, p. 124 - 125).  
 
I have argued that capitalist realism is reinforced via the material and epistemological frameworks 
that compose contemporary digital environments. Digital ubiquity is both ideology, in that it is 
‘inscribed in institutions, [and] bound up with actions’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, p. 3), and 
sensibility, in that it ‘educates desires, and configure[es] habits, aspirations and beliefs’ (Murray Li, 
2007, p. 275), forms of relationality, perceptions, and emotional states of being. It arranges ‘things 
so that people, following their own self-interest, will do as they ought’, where all aspects of life and 
matter are configured and evaluated in terms of market value (Scott, 1995, p. 202, my emphasis). 
It is not intrinsically coercive - as libertarian paternalist discourses may suggest - but, via an epistemic 
order that helps frame digitality as neutral and anchored in what is real, thought and movement 
are guided towards ways-of-being in which capitalism is understood as natural, abstractly beneficial, 
and, as Fisher argues, the only possible reality. 
                                                 
26 I am not disregarding the many instances in which medication has had positive and life changing 
impacts on mental illness sufferers; I am rather gesturing toward pharmaceuticals as constitutive of a 
broader framework of corporatisation, where such mental health treatments are privileged above the 
mitigation and overcoming of austerity, or therapeutic mental health treatments that have become 
increasingly inaccessible under austerity. This is also a tension that Fisher points toward. See also Fisher, 
2009; Noys, 2019 
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In the third chapter, I explored a series of theories surrounding sociomateriality, which here 
referred to the social norms and processes that are entangled with matter, and how these 
entanglements recursively shape and influence the conditions and practices of everyday life. This 
recursivity – between the digital and the non-digital, the political and the psychological, the 
governing and the governed – is constitutive of Stiegler’s understanding of ‘individuation’, where 
identity is situated not as fixed or stable, but rather as always transforming within a wider network 
of people and things. This, I have argued, has pivotal implications when interrogating the politics 
and forms of control manifest in digital objects and the relationship of these dynamics to 
embodiment. I further explored how technological determinism – predicated upon a discursive 
binary between human and technology – features in contemporary discourse, and how it can be 
seen to propagate and obscure corporate agendas. I argued that discourses that abstract the politics 
underlying digital objects maintain a specific function under neoliberalism; they pave the way for 
hegemonic understandings of technology as politically neutral, and serve to reinforce ideologies of 
contemporary capital as common-sense through the invisibilisation of these ideologies within digital objects 
and their surrounding discourses. I further explored the notions of ‘translation’ and ‘erasure’, 
where I foregrounded that digital technologies both translate according to the logics that they have 
been designed to operationalise, and erase all that is not encompassed within these parameters.  
 
The ‘digital detox’ retreat that I explored in chapter four invited its participants to attend the 
retreat and ‘remember what being human really feels like’ (my emphasis) through relinquishing use 
of their digital devices, discussion of their professions, and use of their ‘real names’ for a four day 
period. The participants of the ‘digital detox’ often attributed the presence of the ‘digital’ within 
their day-to-day lives to senses of isolation, anxiety, and self-consciousness. In a vein that echoed 
the discourses utilised by the retreat, many of my interviewees often remarked upon the 
interconnectedness of their professions, or ‘work’, with their digital devices. Discourses of 
‘origins’, ‘childhood’ and returning to ‘nature’ were also prevalent throughout the interview data 
for this case study. Within this sphere, the ‘digital’ and ‘work’ were rarely associated with politics 
or understood as political forces, and were rather understood as necessary and core tenets of 
everyday life, from which the space of the ‘digital detox’ allowed participants to only temporarily 
withdraw. This, I argued, alluded to a broader framework of capitalist realism, where life beyond 
the remits of ‘work’ and the ‘digital’ was so unthinkable that notions of eschewing these dynamics 
were bound with drastic returns to primitivism. 
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My case study of ‘blockchain for good’, undertaken in chapter five, explored how notions of 
‘social good’ were mobilised for philanthro-capitalist and libertarian paternalist political agendas. 
I explored how the ‘blockchains for good’ in question materialised incentivisation mechanisms, 
and were predicated upon what constitutes ‘rewardable’ or ‘good’ behaviour. Living-beings within 
the ‘blockchain for good’ discourses I explored were often framed as fraudulent and self-serving, 
which, as myself and Scott argue, is an understanding that often underscores the functionalities of 
blockchains (2014). Users of blockchains are encouraged to partake in consensus mechanisms not 
for the collective benefit those involved, but rather through a process that individually rewards for 
collective participation. A theme of ‘trust’ recurred throughout this research data, where statistical 
recording on blockchains was often framed as speaking the ‘truth’ for potentially unreliable 
subjects. I explored how universalising notions of ‘social good’ within ‘blockchain for good’ 
contexts often ambiguated market-based principles, where decisions are made ‘not in a context of 
certainty, nor even of available knowledge, but of doubt, premonition, foreboding, challenge, 
mistrust, fear, and anxiety’ (Ewald, 2002, p. 294, my emphasis). The forms of ‘social good’ thus put 
forward within these discourses were ones in which the future is framed as secure; ‘risky’ subjects 
are monitored and policed; and the motives of banks and businesses are preserved. ‘Risk’ here 
meant those persons that posed threat to the maintenance of capitalist powers; and anxiety about 
those risks were then managed through narrativising unknowable futures as predictable, legible, and 
economically rational. 
 
In chapter six, I explored some of the discourses offered by left-leaning think-tank Autonomy. 
Here, I examined the pertinence of the disjunctures that occurred between the narratives offered 
in some of Autonomy’s public-facing discourse and those in my research interviews. I argued that 
Autonomy’s public facing discourse often invoked neoliberal rhetoric to substantiate their 
proposed political agendas. This contrasted quite heavily to the perspectives offered in my research 
interviews, which in most cases offered far-left ideas about relationships between waged work and 
identity. I argued that while proposing ‘radically’ leftist agendas, the invoking of neoliberal and 
technocratic language within Autonomy’s public facing discourse would ultimately sustain a 
cultural framework of capitalist realism. I further contended that Autonomy’s notions of 
harnessing ‘automation’ for leftist political agendas within their public facing discourse did not 
adequately engage with the motives of computational capital. Indeed, while I am careful not to 
disregard digital technologies as inherently capitalist, if the capitalist frameworks within which they exist 
are not first subverted, digital technologies will continue to propagate the motives of capitalist power. 
As Frayne similarly suggests, ‘so long as economic rationality continues to dictate the goals and 
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methods of production, existing attempts to humanise working conditions are highly limited in 
what they can hope to achieve’ (2015, p. 46). I thus contended that Autonomy ‘forges compromise’ 
with the dominant discourses of neoliberalism, and offers the opportunity for ‘hesitant 
populations’ to participate in capital more enthusiastically (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). 
 
This body of work began, then, as an exploration into the psychic structures of capitalist realism 
as they are manifest through ‘digital ubiquity’, and culminated in the study of a series of initiatives 
and political agendas for whom the psychic wasn’t necessarily the point. I have argued that capitalist 
realism pervaded the objectives, strategies and imaginaries offered in each of these ‘responses’ to 
digital ubiquity. Anxiety, as a sentiment that is intimately entwined with how we imagine, has been 
a core part of each of these stories, and was made manifest in the discourses and agendas that 
attempted to make presents and futures more legible, more manageable; less abstract, and less 
chaotic. On this tack, Noys argues that the ‘psychic experience of high capitalism is chaotic’ (2019). 
This, I would argue, gestures toward the prominence of anxiety within contemporary 
environments, as well as the chasms that neoliberal capital produces. While neoliberalism constructs an 
anthropocentric vision of the world in which the future is narrativised as knowable and 
fundamentally within our control, the question of what falls between these gaps has recurred 
throughout each of my case studies. This gap, I would contend, has often been articulated in 
notions of what it means to be ‘human’. In each case study, being ‘human’ was articulated as 
distinct from the workings of capital and the world of high-tech. While this is bound with a 
broader epistemic structure that shapes how we understand the world in the West, I would posit 
that the prominence of this recurring discourse points toward something deeper; that in spite of 
its propensities towards establishing itself as ubiquitous, a pervasive underlying sense that capital, 
and the ways in which it is manifest through high-tech, has existential limits.  
 
What I have not had the scope to do in this thesis is explore the implications of these chasms 
upon those that are marginalised by these structures; those that are implicated or erased from 
‘ubiquities’ parameters. What I have offered has been an uncovering of some of the various spaces 
in which capitalist realism operates, and how even discourses that attempt to reduce the scope of 
capital are nonetheless entangled with its logics. My contention has been that capitalist realism is 
sustained, in large part, by the digital apparatuses and epistemic structures that are oriented 
towards the invisibilisation of these ideologies. While it may present itself as such, capitalism can 
never be totalising. Opportunities for future research, then, might examine the spaces and 
collectivities that offer different ways-of-seeing to those offered by capitalist realism; those that 
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critically engage with the limitations and potentialities of the digital; and those that strive to 
amplify, rather than supress, the voices of those marginalised and erased under Westernised 
systems of governance. From here, we might start to explore the ‘elsewheres’ - of which, I believe, 
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Profession: High School Teacher  
 
E: So I just need to record your age, nationality, and profession, if that's okay 
 
I: Sure. So I'm thirty-three, Canadian, and I'm a high school teacher 
 
E: Okay. So I was going to begin by asking, what were your motivations for doing a digital detox 
at Camp Wild*? And do you think you were a heavy user of digital technology before attending? 
 
I: I found this really interesting, this idea of not having devices, not having Google to turn to. 
Not having your phone to take photos of every single little thing - food, experiences, funny 
moments, whatever. Because I feel like we rely on our phones - I'm using phones but of course 
it means 'technology' - we rely on our phones so easily. And if we don't know the answer to the 
question, if we don't know what an actors name was right away, we jump to our phones. And I 
thought it would be really interesting if we just had to talk, and we just had to be, and wonder, 
frankly. And keep wondering, unless we answer it through different means. I think in my job I 
don't use my phone for work, so I don't have my school emails going to my phone. Once the 
day is done my phone use is personal, it's nothing to do with school or my job I guess. So for 
me, as someone who can't have her phone really, through the eight to five, it wasn't as difficult 
for me to detox, because I don't normally have it on my hip every day. But personally, I feel like 
I use social media a lot. I'm often sharing photos, or looking up YouTube tutorials on the most 
random things, and I'm definitely someone who can fall down a rabbit hole and start wondering 
the most random thoughts, and going to Wikipedia and that sort of thing. So I think personally 
I'm a user often of digital - you know, on my phone, or on Google, or I use Netflix - but in my 
job I don't have to use it, and I rarely can use it. So it was a bit of a [inaudible]. 
 
E: Okay, awesome. If and where was the pressure to come from to a digital detox? 
 
I: Definitely no pressure. I think it seemed more fun than anything, interesting, very unique, 
because so often you can't even go to dinner with people without someone having their phone. 
So definitely pressure, even while we were there, as someone who was on the organising 
committee, I was busy the entire time I felt, or like there was always something going on, there 
was always someone to talk to, there was something to do. I didn't even think about my phone, 
to be honest. The first day was different for me, cause right away you wanna use your phone for 
the time, you wanna use your phone to check the weather. But after that I kind of honestly didn't 
even think about it 
 
E: Okay, fair enough. Me too actually, I think after the first day it wasn't really a thing anymore. 
So how would you describe your experience of the digital detox? What specifically did you stop, 
how did you feel, or maybe, what technologies in particular did you feel had an effect? 
 
I: So I think it was nice... there were definitely a few moments where I thought... 'I wish I could 
take a photo of that', just for the memory purpose. But it became more important to experience 
versus thinking about taking a photo of the experience, if that makes sense? So there was 
definitely a few moments where I would have loved to have captured what was happened, but I 
think it was good that it wasn't an option. It wasn't just - 'I'm making a personal choice to not 
have my phone' - we couldn't have our phones, and we didn't have our phones. So [inaudible] - 
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and something that's changed since camp, I stayed logged out of a couple of my social medias, 
and log in, you know, when I have a moment to check it. Or, you know, an evening, maybe 
before bed or something. It's also helped that I've been in New Brunswick for a couple of weeks, 
and will be here for another week. And there's no wifi at my mum's house, so that's why I 
wanted to do this at my sisters as she has wifi, because that causes me to check it less as well. 
Frankly, also, from an economic standpoint, from not wanting to use or pay for so much. So it's 
kind of helped me in that way. But I've actually stayed logged out, which I didn't think I would 
keep doing. Like, I didn't think it would continue, and it has, so that's been a bit of a change. 
 
E: Do you think... how do you feel differently with regards to having not logged in all the time, 
do you notice a different feeling in yourself?  
 
I: I think it’s helped me to sort like I said, stay more present, and just be in the moment without 
needing my phone next to me all the time. And it's not even that camp helped me not wanna do 
that, it just made me more aware. And I've wanted to stop doing that, and it just sort of helped 
me see, like it’s a funny thing to say, it sounds like a Hallmark card, that it's okay to not have a 
picture of every little moment, and it’s okay to not share that picture even if you took it, and that 
sort of thing. So I'm just more in tune with what's going on, I guess. 
 
E: Okay. So how do you think others at Camp Wild* responded to the environment? And would 
you say their experiences were similar or different to yours?  
 
I: I definitely didn't hear too much about people missing their phones or wishing they had their 
phones or anything like that - in the conversations I had anyway. I thought before camp, I 
thought this is going to be really interesting, because sometimes you might meet someone who 
constantly you might meet someone who constantly has their image at the forefront of what they 
do. And needing to have the perfect instagram post, or have the perfect experience, or look how 
much fun I'm having, or look how cool my life is. And I thought it was going to be really 
interesting and it was. There were no ulterior motives, if there would have been normally. You 
knew there weren't, as there was no option to take a photo of your food, or of you sitting on the 
dock, or whatever the case. So at camp it would be very authentic to have conversations with 
people without the worry of someone recording them, frankly, or without the worry of a photo 
being taken, being in a swimsuit that they might not wear somewhere else, or things like that. 
And personally as a teacher my public image matters. And you know, there could be things I'm 
very conscious of, photos being able to be taken of me in public and things like that, cause that 
can affect my profession. And that's the reality and I knew that going in, but it was a bit freeing 
to know that I could have conversations that I knew - I mean not that I think I'm being recorded 
in regular life, or anything - but just to know you have that freedom. And I think that effected 
everyone the same way. It was a sense of, [sighs], I can be me, in the truest form, because I don't 
have to worry about clients being at the next table, I don't have to worry about potential 
employers being, you know, in the vicinity, or anything along the lines. So it was very freeing, 
you knew that the conversations were very authentic, because there could be no ulterior 
reasoning. And not being able to talk about our jobs was very cool, it was very interesting. 
 
E: Yeah, I found that too. I noticed that with myself, as well - it is just a kind of engrained 
thought pattern I think to just be like 'hey, who are you, what do you do?' - I never really had 
that level of reflexivity about that until the camp, and then I realised 'oh yeah, that is the first 
question I ask people' 
 
I: And it's such a part of our life, too. As a teacher, it is my life and it has always been, so it's 
natural that you would wanna talk about something that plays such a big role in your life. You 
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know? Or if you built a company from the ground up, that is your baby, that's your life, so it 
totally makes sense that that would be a common ground for you to find things to talk about and 
discuss. If you're both in the tech industry, if you're both you know, whatever, it's just nice to 
find other things to talk about. Yeah, it was kinda cool. 
 
E: Yeah, I liked it too. Cool, so my next question is how did you interact with others at camp, 
and did this differ to interactions you have outside of camp, and why? 
 
I: So I think, again, being part of the organising committee before having attended camp - so this 
year was my first Camp Wild - I was on the organising committee so I get to see it through a 
different lens. I got a taste for what camp people were like through the organising committee - 
very open, very affectionate, very real, you know? When they asked you how you are, they meant 
it. You know? And that's what I felt with all my interactions with different types of people at 
camp. When they said 'thank you', they like grabbed you by the shoulders and really said 'thank 
you'. Or when they asked you how you were in the morning, it wasn't just a passing comment, or 
a nicety, they really meant it - like 'how are you doing, emotionally, spiritually, energy wise?' you 
know, whatever the case. So I just felt like they were so meaningful. And not that I don't have 
meaningful interactions in my daily life, in the default world, but in the camp world, when 
someone sought you out for a conversation, or stopped you when you were getting your coffee 
in the morning to have a chat, it was so purposeful, it was really touching to know just how 
caring and very mindful of everyone around them that everyone seemed to be. Everyone that I 
interacted with. And hugs were real hugs, and you know, that kind of thing. I'm a hugger anyway, 
I love to hug anyway, that's something that I'm a big fan of anyway, and just having so many 
people around that everything they were being, you knew they were being 100% real. And I felt 
it in my interactions. And it was just really nice to know, that if someone stopped to talk to you it 
was cause they really wanted to stop and talk to you. If someone asked you how they were, its 
cause they really wanted to know. It wasn't just a passing comment that you say because you 
meet up at the water cooler, kind of thing. 
 
E: Okay, great. So what were your expectations of digital detoxing prior to the experience? And 
where did these expectations come from? 
 
I: Hmm. I think, I thought it would be a lot harder, not only for me but for other people. I 
thought... I think I expected a lot of complaining or there to be a lot of people asking to see their 
phones, or just to check their phones quickly, and mind you I wasn't part of where they were 
being kept with the directors, I wouldn't have been someone they would have come too had they 
needed. It would have been Boo* or Green* or one of the head honchos. I just expected to hear 
more about it, or for people to say 'oh I wish I had my phone', and I really didn't. And maybe 
that's because I wasn't around the people who were saying it, I thought I'd find myself to be a bit 
more like 'maybe I'll just check it quickly!', you know? Or something like that. So my 
expectations were that it would be much harder, and it wasn't. Again, cause we were doing stuff 
all the time, and then I also thought when I got back to my phone, that there would be a million 
messages floating in, and there weren't, which was funny. So there were definitely a few, but also 
when I got my phone back it was dead, so I couldn't even use my phone for another five hours 
or something. So it was quite interesting that my phone was dead when I got it back, so I was 
like 'oh, I can't check it anyway'. It's sort of like - it was an interesting thing to see that the world 
didn't fall apart, everyone's still fine, like nobody needed to get in touch with me. I mean again, 
by that time I was finished, I was pretty much finished with school as well, like our school year. 
So, even if there were communications, it's nothing that couldn't have waited another couple of 
days, so I'm not someone who might have some very serious emails waiting with regards to my 
job. But yeah, everyone was fine, everyone moved on with what they were doing at the weekend 
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so, I don't know why I expected there to be so many - like everyone knew I was at camp, they 
knew I didn't have my phone, so they wouldn't have messaged me anyway. I think I thought - I 
wasn't as important as I think I thought I was. 
 
E: Yeah, I had exactly the same. I was expecting a stream, and then it was like 'ah! nope!'.  
 
I: Two messages, great! [Laughing] 
 
E: [Laughing] Yep, I had the same thing. So, this is my last question actually, and it is, did your 
experience at Camp Wild* change things for you subsequent to your experience? And do you 
think the effects of your experience will be sustained? I guess you've already answered this 
slightly 
 
I: So I think, again I tried not to be the person that had their phone on 24/7, especially when - 
like I mentioned this before, but like going to dinner with friends, I'd really try to not take my 
phone out, unless there were good reason to sort of, you know, we need to find the next 
restaurant cause we don't know where it is. Or something that was actually necessary. And I 
think Camp will just help me be more like that. Definitely guilty of it, definitely guilty of having 
my phone out, but I just have a few very close friends who have their own on all the time, like 
turned up on the table, all the time. And I see that and I don't wanna do that myself. So I think 
camp has taught me to be a little more like that, and plus any time I've met with camp people in 
the last - well, I was only in Toronto for a week after camp, but no one had their phones. And it 
was just so nice that we were hanging out and not doing much of anything but we just didn't 
have our phones with us for a while, so it was really. And I think it will just help me be more and 
more aware of how disconnected you are when you are connected. And I think it’s something 
that I'll sort of lead by example, given the friends that didn't come to camp with me. There's 
even been instances and something has come up and I've been like 'oh I'll show you later', and 
they're like 'no you can show me now' and I'm like 'no, we're eating, like I'll show you later. We'll 
have time', you know? So, sort of influencing them, maybe, to be a little less plugged in. Which 
might not influence them at all, and not that I wanna take the moral high ground, I just don't 
wanna be the person that has my phone all the time. So I think it'll just help me be even more 
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Appendix 6.2: Sample Interview 
 
E: My first question is - what is it that interests you about anti-work and what are the core issues, 
for you?  
 
I: So... I guess... I guess it's in a kind of a broad context of... I suppose it would be more useful to 
look at where I sit within the work and probability kind of sphere, which is... that I've worked 
for ten or fifteen years or so in different organizations and different roles, around employment 
and skills policy and strategy. So, some more policy based work and some more managing 
services, and setting up projects and things. And so, I guess... none of that has been sort of JCP, 




I: So... I guess one of my... of the sort of interests that I've had particularly over the past few 
years has been around low pay, and in-work poverty, and how the idea that getting a job solves 
all of your financial issues, brings us all out of poverty, is obviously... maybe never was the case 
but certainly not now the case. And I set up a project in 2014, which was... there was very little 
else at that point which was looking at how to support people in low paid work, to press, to 
improve their skills, to get out of really badly paid and very often bad terms and conditions as 
well. And I guess just seeing and understanding the impact on people's lives and trying to 
manage that, being in those circumstances, and trying to manage the rest of their lives, around 
having poorly paid work, shift work, zero hours contracts, all those kinds of things, I guess that's 
sort of one of the main kind of angles that I would come from, the kind of failure of work to 
address poverty really. And so, I wouldn't say that then I directly make the leap to say, we should 
be... you know, no one should work, or... should immediately move into some kind of post-work 
utopia. So I think it's the understanding that work is not the answer to all of our problems I 
guess. And... is there another way. Or there's got to be a better way for paid employment to 
function for people, which isn't just, work your guts out and still not manage to scrape by. Um... 
yeah. So I think that's kind of, the place I would say my interests comes from, I guess. And then 
also... kind of, in parallel to that, an interest in universal basic income, you know, which may or 
may not be something that’s in combination with working less, or not working. And I think one 
of my main interests in basic income is... is whether it could offer us a better way for social 
security and welfare to work. But I think... I wouldn't count myself as a kind of 100% passionate 
advocate of it, but I think it's opened up some really useful conversations around conditionality, 
around what we value as work, what we financially reimburse people for, paid work versus 
unpaid work, care, etcetera... should we be punishing people for being unemployed? I think the 
conversations that are opened up by talking about basic income or really important or relevant to 
that, you know that bigger picture, of what work is or could be. Or what we should or could get 
paid for. So, if that's makes sense? 
 
E: Yeah, yeah - that makes total sense. I think that's a really interesting way of... or just a helpful 
way of looking at UBI. Because there are... I dunno there has been lots of stuff around how it 
could be used by right-wing interests, but then it's also got lots of potential for yeah, leftish uses, 
but yeah, I think what you said about opening up conversations is important. So my next 
question was going to be - if and how are you responding to these issues? But you have already 
touched upon that with regards to your work and what you do. But if there was anything else 
you wanted to add... 
 
I:  Yeah, I think that's one thing, definitely, is that issue of low pay. Although I think it's 
important to recognize that most of the... most of the practical work, of implementing projects, 
 187 
at the moment, addressing low pay is very much focused on the individuals who are in low paid 
work, rather than trying to address the bigger late market issues. You know, obviously there's 
lots of commentary and lots of kind of policy proposals but from what I can see this work on 
the ground is very much based on trying to support individuals to move out of low pay. Which is 
important, but it's only one side to the issue. You know, how... what are we doing, or could we 
do, to address the growth in low paid work, feels like it's more of a theoretical conversation than 




I: I was thinking about this yesterday actually, and about my own sort of personal experience of 
not post-work, because I'm still working, but with working... I don't do a 9 - 5, I don't have an 
employer, I structure my time by building days when I don't do work that I get paid for. And I 
was just kind of reflecting on that as, you know, not... not in any way to be radical choice, but it's 
done in a way because it suits me, and that made me reflect I think on how I feel that I'm in a 
very lucky position to be able to do that, to be able to manage that financially. And I think the 
conversation about, should we be working a four day week, a three day week, should we all work 
less? Is very... very contingent on how much you earn.  
 
E: Yeah, absolutely 
 
I: You know, the idea that we could all work three days a week and take up painting and look 
after our kids more - whatever it is - is very contingent on what we can afford, so I think... it was 
just a reflection to myself that the way that, the way that I balance paid and unpaid work and 




I: And so, I guess the debate about post-work or anti-work, I guess there's a danger that it 
becomes quite a middle class... you know, wouldn't it be lovely if we could have lots of days off 
to do nice things [laughs], which then I guess brings you back around to the basic income 
debate, about, okay, how would we be able to afford that, how would everyone be able to afford 
to do that, so it's not just another thing that the middle classes have access to and others don't. 




I: What would it really look like, you know, if we all worked less?  
 
E: I think that's thing, isn't it, there's definitely a tension there between time and privilege, and 
we can paint this ideal world in which it is... like you were saying, post-work where everyone's 
got free time, but actually, in actuality, what is that going to mean for different groups, and is it 
possible to sort of undo that tension or not  
 
I: Yeah. Yeah. The other thing I was thinking about yesterday was the idea that is having loads of 
free time necessarily a good thing? 
 
E: Mmm. Mmm 
 
I: I think generally, we, as human beings, want to be doing something productive, whether it's 
paid or not, but you know, you only have to look at people who have been unemployed for 
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decades without being enabled or without finding something productive to do to know that it's 
incredibly depressing. So I don't think there's an autonomatic, I don't think that we can assume 
that just by the very fact of having more time to ourselves, we'll all be happier and healthier and 
feel better about our lives, you know? And there's a link to privilege there, isn't there, to have the 
means to do something nice with your time 
 
E: Yeah, cause that's costly as well 
 
I: Yeah, yeah. Anyone that's been unemployed even for a few months knows it’s incredibly 
depressing to be sat around twiddling your thumbs, and, you know, if you weren't depressed to 
start with, you're probably depressed at the end, after a few months of it. So yeah, its... I'm sure 
you know far better than me, it's like all of these things, it's very easy for it to be an incredibly 
simplistic debate, which actually misses a lot of the broader context and you know, well... how 
do you make something like that work for everyone, rather than just be a nice-to-have for a small 
chunk of society 
 
E: Yeah. Yeah. I don't know [laughs]. But these are questions that I'm circling around as well. 
With regards to how you were responding to these issues, in terms of what you were saying 
around low pay, and addressing that in terms of individuals, I was just wondering if you had any 
thoughts on how it might be addressed on a wider scale? 
 
I: I think there's all sorts of options and as I say, most of them are just things that we sort of talk 
about, theoretically really, at the moment. So the project that I set up was focused on skills 
development, which seems to be affective to some people, to gain new skills, or improve specific 
work-based skills. So I think there's a whole other debate around adult skills policy and funding 
and does that work, and how that should be tailored. I think, I think on the supply side, it's very 
focused on the supply side of you know, what are individuals doing, what have individuals got to 
offer, but in terms of what does the market want, and what are the jobs out there, I think there's 
positive potential in autonomation for example, for autonomation to take over some of the really 
really crappy jobs, but then you're still in the position of how do you support those people on 
something else, but I think there is the positive potential in harnessing automation/AI etcetera 
rather than it being a big scary thing that takes away all of our jobs. It could be a way of freeing 
some people up from the worst end of things. And I think there's some... I think there's some 
potential in... well there's a need for greater sort of parity of esteem and pay in things that can't 
really be autonomated. So things like social care work, for example. The terms and conditions 
and the pay are so bad, you know. Where that comes from, you know, whether those employers 
of that industry itself is in a position to do much about that, you know, their budgets are so 
squeezed, it very quickly turns into this massive insoluble... how do you change an entire 
industry? Until, unless you can make some, some kind of bigger shifts in things like paid 
conditions in that kind of sector, you're always going to get the bottom end of those types of 
jobs being really hard work, really badly paid, and without a lot of investment in people's 
progression. So, I think there's lots of things you could do, there are some things that are more 
straight forward than others, and I think a lot of the reasons a lot of attention is focused on 
individuals is cause it's kind of easier, it's less complex than trying to tackle a whole sector or a 
whole system, to try and support individuals but then you're not doing anything about the fact 
that those jobs exist, and for a lot of people the only for them to progress and earn more money 
and to get a better job is to leave that employer and leave that job. And that job will still exist 
and still be crap. But that's much harder to address. Yeah that's much harder to address. So, yeah 
I think it's a really big and complicated sequence of... [laughs] 
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E: Yeah. Absolutely. Okay, that's great. So I was wondering if you could say a little bit maybe 
about how anti-work or post-work issues are being addressed by Autonomy. Don't worry if 
you've not had that involvement.  
 




I: Ask Rob*! 
 
E: Ask Rob*, alright yeah, I will ask Rob* actually! I've had a bit of an interview with him but 
I've got questions [laughs]. Um okay, so what would you... what do you understand a post-work 
society to be, and do you see this prospect to be feasible?  
 
I: Oh my gosh, that's a big... good question. Mmm... well I think it's like I was saying earlier that 
right now, the leap from where we are now to something radically different, is just very hard to 
comprehend how you would go from where we are to something which you know, does post-
work involve no paid work at all, or does it involve a more kind of humane balance between a 
bit of paid work and other things, and you know, as we were discussing, what are those other 
things? I think... I guess the question about what is post-work is such a big question, because, 
what do you want to replace it with? Do you want to replace it with leisure time or do you want 
it to be a recognition of other types of work. So, post-work as reducing the focus on paid 
employment, but recognising the work involved in every other sphere of life. Which feels more 
realistic, I suppose, to me. Because people are never going to stop having to look after their 
children or parents. Or, people won't stop wanting to volunteer or to do the gardening, or to 
grow vegetables. Those things are hopefully not going to disappear, they're all forms of work 
that are unpaid. So I guess that would be for me a more positive place to end up, that we value 
all forms of work more highly. And we're not obsessed with paid employment as much as we 
currently are. But I think we were discussing that the what-else do we will our days with is... it's 
not just going to happen by magic that we're all suddenly active, happy and vibrant citizens 
overnight, just because we have a day off. So it feels like there would be quite a process, or quite 
a kind of evolution to happen, to get to somewhere really significantly different. And I think, 
that - the somewhere different, is so hard to kind of get your head around now, because it's so 
many steps away. Things like... just, more people being able to work flexibly, more people being 
able to work from home, you know. Working in the way I do, as I generally work from home, I 
set my own schedule, if I want a day off, I can have a day off. I guess these are all small steps 
toward something different, but there is... there... our attachment to paid work as status and 
identity is so huge that that's... I have plenty of female friends who you know, have had kids, and 
taken a couple of years off paid work, and really felt that they'd lost something of themselves, in 
not going into work, and who kind of struggling with their own status and identity from not 
going to work. And that's... and it's not like they weren’t busy and doing something important, 
but I think that is so ingrained in us, that who we are is what we do for work, and how you kind 
of unpick that, and how we find... how we develop our identities as something bigger than that I 
think is really challenging. And something I've personally find difficult as well, sometimes like - 
cause I don't work for an organisation, you know, I'm just me. So even within a work identity, 
like not having an attachment to a place or a kind of entity bigger than yourself gives you 
something to identify with. I think these are really challenging issues but really interesting issues, 
that kind of, on an individual level are quite challenging, with regards to how we define ourselves 
outside of work. So I don't think I've answered your question at all! 
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E: No that was a really interesting answer, and has got me thinking a lot. That's something that I 
think about - that is one of my main research questions actually, around the centrality of work 
within identity formation, and you're right, what would we do if we had that three day weekend, 
it's not like we can automatically undo years of socialisation under a system, you know, from 
when we're four years old, has us developing towards 'what we do'... it's as fundamental as the 
verb 'to do'... 
 
I: I think there's huge potential in that, it's something that we as individuals would have to really 
get our heads around, but culturally, you know, culturally and economically would be such a 
huge shift as a, yeah... it's a kind of decades long process it feels like, to be able to make a shift, 
to weening ourselves off this obsession with - that paid work is the big-all-end-all. A lot of my 
work has been around how do you support people into work and to staying in work, and to get a 
decent job. I guess I'm not coming from the perspective of you know, no one should have a job, 
because I do still think most of the time it is a good use of our time. And there are lots of things 
that we gain from paid employment which are valuable. But it's... But I think it is an obsession 
that means that it tips over into unhealthy, you know, an unhealthy focus and any job is better 
than no job, which is obviously not the case. So I guess there's an argument for just rebalancing 
our idea of what is good work, as well. Cause you still, you know you still get DWP saying work 
is the best route of poverty, still, now. When it so clearly isn't for a lot of people. So, yeah - how 
you manage to unpick that narrative at that level is... that feels like a long a way in the future 
 
E: Yeah. For sure. Okay, I've done most of my questions, but I just wanted to ask if you had any 
thoughts about where you would see or envisage technology playing a role within anti-work or 
post-work?  
 
I: Um, so I guess, the positive potential of freeing up people from the most laborious, 
unfulfilling manual or repetitive kind of tasks - you know, that's where technology could play a 
positive role. I guess also, it could - you know, I'm not an expert in any of this at all any of this 
technological side of stuff, but it could be, the question of what you do with your time in this 
utopian future, I'm 99% sure the technology would play a big part in that. I don't know what it 
would be... but in terms of, I guess, enabling us to connect and to find things, you know, to find 
engaging things to do with our time, I'm sure technology would play a part in that. And I guess 
even in potentially, in enabling everyone to benefit from that time. I dunno, thinking very very 
broadly, very vaguely, people with disabilities for example, or people who are socially or 
geographically isolated, that... how... technology I guess could play a part in enabling everyone to 
be able to participate in things... [laughs] I don't know. Yeah, I guess, all we hear so much about 
the doom and gloom of technology, robbing us of a future, but I think there is a lot of potential 
for it to be... for it to be a positive tool, although obviously not a tool that has yet enabled us to 
work a fifteen hour week, as has been promised. But that's about what you do with it isn't, that's 
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